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Throughout the nineteenth century, no other rebellion received the same level of 
attention in Britain as the 1857 Indian Rebellion. This was one of the most written 
about events in the nineteenth century. The foremost writer on the rebellion is Sir 
John William Kaye. This thesis examines John Kaye’s writings on India before and 
after the rebellion. Kaye viewed the British-Indian relationship through a paternalistic 
lens. Kaye viewed the role of the British to uplift the condition of Indians through 
personal examples. He was therefore critical of the East India Company’s policies 
and actions which were detrimental to this agenda, while he still defended it as an 
institution of progress. After the 1857 Mutiny, Kaye re-examined his standpoint on 
British interference in India. He did not forsake his paternalistic viewpoint, which 
allowed Kaye to examine how British actions had caused a divide between the British 
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2 Portrait of John Kaye in The Calcutta Monthly Journal and General Registrar of 
Occurrences Throughout the British Dominions in the East from an Epitome of the Indian Press For 





Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Writings                                          
on the 1857 Indian Rebellion 
 
The British had traded with India since the early seventeenth-century and 
Parliament gave the East India Company a monopoly on this trade. During the late 
eighteenth century, the East India Company (EIC) began to adopt governing powers 
in India while also extending their territorial control. Although many wars and 
numerous mutinies occurred in India during British rule, none received as much 
attention as the 1857 Indian Mutiny. In 1857, a great mutiny began when the sepoys, 
Northern Indian soldiers serving in the British Indian Army, rebelled against their 
British officers. This event was instigated by the introduction of Enfield rifles into the 
Indian army, which required the use of greased cartridges for firing. Sepoys had 
religious objections to using the cartridges due to rumors of unclean animal fat used 
for the grease. In many cantonments, British soldiers and residents were murdered by 
Hindu and Muslim troops. Due to the low ratio of the British to Indian troops within 
India, the British home government had to send extra troops to assist Lord Canning in 
regaining control of India. By 1858, the British had retaken Northern India. This 
event changed how the British governed India and had a great impact on Victorian 
society. Parliament removed the East India Company from power and instead made 
India a Crown colony. In addition to this change in government, the mutiny upset 
British society and contributed to shifts in nineteenth-century racial ideology. 
 Most Victorians responded with shock and horror at the boldness of Indians 
to revolt against the British. The fact that a less developed race rebelled against the 





of rape and murder perpetrated by Indians against British women. The time it took for 
Victorians to receive news from the colony exasperated the unease because they had 
to wait to learn if loved ones had survived the violence in India. Domestic British 
news sources did not have informants in India and therefore had to wait for 
individuals living in the sub-continent to send information to Britain.3 The revolt 
shook the Victorian belief that non-British subjects of the empire were content under 
British rule. The supposed Indian savagery which accompanied the uprising made the 
British doubt the possibility of future self-rule for India. In the nineteenth-century 
post-Mutiny writings, sepoys were vilified while British cruelties were praised as 
justified actions.4 In interpreting this event and searching for the origins of the revolt, 
blame came to settle primarily on the East India Company for failing to predict the 
rebellion and to maintain control of their army.  
Not all Victorians agreed with this narrative of Indian savagery and placed 
blame on the EIC for the revolt. The writings of Sir John William Kaye are one 
counter-narrative to the general Victorian reaction. Prior to the rebellion, he was 
considered a subject expert on India and an established historian. Writing was Kaye’s 
primary source of income during large periods of his life. He believed that the British 
Empire should play a cautious, paternal role in assisting the subjects of the empire 
towards progress. After the Mutiny, Kaye was one of the few Victorians who 
                                                 
3 Shiv Gajrani, “Writings on 1857 and the Punjab: Official Perceptions,” in Rethinking 1857 
and the Punjab edited by Navtej Singh (Patiala, India: Punjabi University, 2008), 180.  
4 The conflict of 1857 has been remembered as a Mutiny. However, how the conflagration 
should be termed has been an issue of debate. Even though it began as an army mutiny, most of the 
Northern population in India assisted in the rebellion. Various historians have referred to the events of 
1857-1858 as a mutiny, a rebellion and a war. Kaye referred to the event in some of his writings as a 
mutiny. However, his history of the event referred to it as a war. In this thesis, all of these terms will be 
used. Since the event has been predominately referred to as the Mutiny, this term will be used in 





investigated the causes of the revolt. Through his writings, Kaye acknowledged 
British failures in India and adopted a more nuanced view of the Mutiny and of India. 
His worldview of India did not dramatically shift after the Mutiny, but he became 
more reflective on empire and how British actions might have created greater 
discontent within India. His framework for interpreting India was based on a 
paternalistic view on the British-Indian relationship which colored all of his writings. 
After the rebellion, Kaye continued to defend the East India Company, British 
individuals, and most of the Indian people. Kaye is significant therefore as one of the 
foremost authorities on India, who did not share the general negative Victorian 
reaction and stands as an example of a more complex response to the Mutiny.  
This thesis will examine John Kaye’s writings on India and explore his 
reaction to the Mutiny. The introduction will briefly review the writings on the 
Mutiny, both nineteenth-century sources and modern historiography. The second 
chapter will cover the life of Sir John William Kaye and his career as a significant 
Anglo-Indian, the British community who lived in India for a long time. This chapter 
will consider Kaye’s life experience in the Indian Army, the EIC Administration, his 
writings in India, and his continued writings and positions held while living in 
England. The third chapter will examine Kaye's view of the British Empire in India 
before the 1857 Mutiny. Chapter three will breakdown Kaye's idea of the empire into 
three concepts: race, the British debates on “reforms” in India, and territorial 
expansion. This chapter demonstrates that Kaye’s views of the events in India were 
highly affected by his view of the close relationship between the British and Indians. 





the condition of Indians, he was critical of the EIC’s policies and actions which were 
detrimental to this agenda. Even though Kaye was critical of specific polices of the 
EIC, he argued that it was a vehicle for progress. The fourth chapter will address 
Kaye's opinions on India after the 1857 Mutiny. Kaye re-examined his standpoint on 
British interference in India. He had not forsaken his paternalistic viewpoint, which 
allowed Kaye to examine how British actions had caused a divide between the British 
officers and the sepoys. Kaye continued to defend the EIC and argued that 
reconciliation between India and Britain was still possible. Unlike most of his 
counterparts, he believed that the people of India could still be loyal to the Empire. 
Nineteenth-Century Writings about the Mutiny 
The vast number of works, both historical and fictional, about the Mutiny 
indicate the variety of reactions within Great Britain to this rebellion. This was not a 
short-term fascination with the Mutiny, but one which continued into the twentieth 
century. The fervor for these materials continued and increased. During the 1890s, 
more books were published on the rebellion than in the previous three decades. 
Overall, more than 700 books have been written about the 1857 Mutiny. The number 
of cultural productions about this rebellion demonstrates how important this event 
was to the British psyche. How the British and the rebellion were written about in the 
nineteenth century was foundational to how the British imagined themselves and 
related to their surrounding world. The novels and histories reflected the changing 
British priorities and viewpoints.  As Gautam Chakravarty wrote, the Mutiny was 
important because "rebellion turns upon congeries of political, ideological, literary, 





which the British had construed their presence in the Indian subcontinent since at 
least 1765."5 Victorian writings generally pointed to the dangers in colonial 
possessions, which needed identification in order to maintain the Empire.6 Post-
Mutiny Victorian writings displayed a British desire for violent revenge and reprisals 
in India. Even though the British response was similar in other colonial conflicts, the 
cruelty expressed in the Victorian publications made Benjamin Disraeli, the British 
Prime Minister, question if British religion had been changed by the rebellion since it 
evoked such unchristian sentiments.7 However, immediately after the Mutiny the EIC 
became the scapegoat for the rebellion, which left other reasons for the rebellion to 
remain unexamined. The novels and histories had many common themes, but varied 
in their arguments and presentation. These similarities and differences demonstrated 
the public reaction to the rebellion and how different genres addressed varied aspects 
of the revolt. 
Nineteenth-Century Novels about the 1857 Indian Mutiny 
British readers could not consume enough works on the 1857 rebellion. 
Before 1857, India did not feature prominently in British literature. The events of 
1857 ushered in a new age of novels which used the dramatic circumstances in India 
as a backdrop for their stories of heroes, conquests, and romance. Immediately after 
the rebellion, the majority of writings were of a more historical nature. In the late 
nineteenth century, the new imperial age encouraged the production of fictional 
stories featuring the rebellion. This new age of expansion is one reason why there 
                                                 
5 Gautam Chakravarty, The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13. 
6 Ibid., 23. 





were more writings in the 1890s about the Mutiny than previously. This trend 
included important writers such as Charles Dickens, G.A. Henty, Rudyard Kipling, 
and others. Victorian novels included three common themes across the genre: the 
atrocities committed by sepoys against British women, the violence and betrayal of 
Indians towards the British, and the desire for British retaliation against those who 
had murdered so many perceived innocents. These novels did not consider the Indian 
viewpoint or show sympathy for the deaths of Indians in the British reprisals.  
Victorian novels exploited the position of women in India during the 
rebellion, focusing on the ravages of women at the hand of Indians. When reports 
arrived in Britain about the Mutiny, the violent actions of sepoys were exaggerated, 
such as claims of sexual assault on British women. The rumored treatment of British 
women by sepoys during the Mutiny called for vengeance and no clemency towards 
Indians. Authors such as R.E. Forest praised heroines for their boldness in the 
conflict. Forrest’s Eight Days (1891) specifically praised British women for their 
“mild, gentle,” and "saint-like” behavior.8 Charles Dickens also used the trope of the 
ravaged women as a compelling justification for violence against Indians. His annual 
Christmas story in 1857, “The Perils of Certain English Prisoners,” was situated in a 
South American colony but allegorically represented the circumstances of the British 
in India.9 Dickens praised the bravery of British women and the pluck of a few British 
officers who had been captured by pirates and held in the jungle. In this work, 
Dickens called for the extermination of the pirates, representative of the rebellious 
                                                 
8 Christopher Herbert, War of No Pity: The Indian Mutiny and Victorian Trauma (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 264-265. 






Indians, who had perpetrated these atrocities against the British.10 Another example 
was Edward Money’s The Wife and the War; or, a Life’s Error (1859). This novel, 
about the siege and massacre of Kanpur, followed the fictional Captain Edington. 
This novel showed pre-1857 Anglo-Indian society and how it struggled to survive 
during the siege. Edington was married to Marion, who demanded that Edington kill 
her instead of allowing her to be ravaged by Indians.11 In alignment with British 
belief about pure womanhood, it would have been better to die than to be sexually 
assaulted by an Indian. This work used the roles of British women in India during the 
Mutiny to exaggerate Indian savagery. These works relied on the trope of the 
endangered British woman, for whom the British officers would do anything to 
protect. The killing and defilement of British women was used as a justification for 
violence towards Indians.  
The second major theme in these novels was Indian violence towards 
Europeans, and particularly the unprovoked, savage nature of that violence. Post-
Mutiny novels focused on this Indian violence, which was once again used to justify 
harsh British reprisals. One event which appeared in many novels was the Cawnpore 
Massacre. The rebellion reached Cawnpore in June of 1857. The sepoys in the 
cantonments revolted, released the prisoners, and killed their British officers. Some 
British officers and their families took shelter within the cantonment and defended it 
for nearly a month. At the end of June, the British surrendered to Nana Sahib under 
the terms of safe travel away from Cawnpore. However, once the British were on 
                                                 
10 Herbert, 212. 





boats leaving, the rebel forces ambushed the British boats on the river and committed 
betrayal and murder, including women and children. This massacre took a primary 
role in many of the novels, including G.A Henty's Rujub, The Juggler (1893), 
Maxwell Grey’s In the Heart of the Storm (1891), and Hume Nisbet’s The Queen’s 
Desire (1893).12 Once again, the focus on Indian violence and betrayal created a 
dramatic story which argued for legitimate British reprisals. 
Because of the violence of the sepoys against British women and officers, 
Victorian novels demanded retribution, criticized Indian sympathizers, and asserted 
that the people of India could not be trusted in the future. These writings include 
works such as L. E. Ruutz Ree’s Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow (1858). 
Ree’s work focused on Lucknow and how moral law had disappeared. The ability to 
trust the word of Indians and to rely on a moral code became impossible during the 
rebellion.13 The Greatest Game (1930) by C. Lestock Reid criticized those who 
sympathized with Indians.14 This book was published seventy-three years after the 
Mutiny and yet continued to play on the theme of anti-reconciliation feelings. Other 
works suggested that future violence was probable in India such as Jules Verne’s The 
End of the Sahib (1880). In this novel, Nana Sahib returned from hiding and fomented 
another rebellion, once again threatening British lives.15 These works demonstrated 
the anger and fear which the rebellion sparked in the British people. 
Victorian literature in response to the 1857 Indian rebellion is significant 
because these works illustrated how the British viewed their place in the world. The 
                                                 
12 Herbert, 276. 
13 Chakravarty, 217.   
14 Ibid., 116.  





novels displayed fear and outrage at the treatment of women, children, and British 
soldiers. This theme of focusing on the cruelties against women and children 
showcased Indian barbarity. How Indians treated women was important because of 
the outrage it sparked and because Victorians believed that gentle treatment of 
women was considered a mark of a highly civilized society. These novels also pitted 
British bravery against Indian betrayal and savagery. The Mutiny remained a popular 
theme in British novels and continued into the twentieth century.  
Nineteenth-Century Histories about the Mutiny 
Novels were not the only cultural productions about the Indian rebellion. 
Many personal accounts and histories were published detailing the events of 1857-
1858. Most histories were limited in scope and portrayed the Mutiny as a military 
event, while ignoring other factors which might have contributed, such as 
economics.16 Like the novels, these histories also focused on the outrageous actions 
of the sepoys and their atrocities against British women. British historians were 
extremely biased and did not consider the Indian viewpoint. Most historians blamed 
the greased cartridges episode as the sole reason for why the Mutiny occurred. Even 
though there was a variety of viewpoints as to the origins of the rebellion and the 
responsibility of the British, these histories tended to share similar ideas on race and 
Indian religion. The number of historians who examined the rebellion and the role the 
British played critically were few. There are several important themes which 
influence how Mutiny histories were written: the dividing factions within India, the 
                                                 
16 Sashi Bhusan Chaudhuri, English Historical Writings on The Indian Mutiny, 1857-1859 






contribution of religious belief to the outbreak of the rebellion, the manipulation of 
the British by the sepoys, and the racial inferiority of Indians.17 
Within Anglo-Indian society, the three major interest groups were 
missionaries, the EIC, and the Indian military. The historian Chaudhuri found these 
three different interests in India as more polarizing than traditional political parties. 
The EIC had discouraged missionary activity in India since the 1806 Vellore Mutiny, 
blaming missionaries for stirring up discontent amongst the natives. Most 
administrators identified the need to cautiously allow missionaries to convert natives, 
without it seeming as a threat to the general religions of India. The EIC did not 
officially support the missionary effort in India because they feared causing too much 
disaffection. Some writers, like Reverend Duff, interpreted the rebellion as a 
punishment from God. Duff believed that the British had not been proactive enough 
in converting Indians and therefore allowed them to remain in their sinful practices 
and traditions.18 The EIC blamed the British government for ill-advised foreign policy 
                                                 
17 Some of the other works, both personal accounts and historical works include: General J. 
Adye, The Defiance of Cawnpore by the Troops under the Orders of Maj-Gen. (London: C.A. 
Windham, 1858), G. Anderson, A Personal Account of the Siege of Lucknow (London: 1858),  Major 
Brevet Anson, With the H.M 9th Lancers During the Indian Mutiny (London, 1896), Charles Ball, The 
History of the Indian Mutiny (London: London Printing and Publishing Co., N.D.), Mrs. K.M. 
Bartrum, A Widow’s Reminiscences of the Siege of Lucknow (London, 1858), Colonel J. Bonham, 
Oude in 1857 (London, 1928), Sir Colin Campbell, A Narrative of the Indian Revolt from its outbreak 
to the capture of Lucknow (London, 1858), Reverend John Cave-Brown, The Punjab and Delhi in 
1857 (Edinburgh, 1861), F. Cooper, The Crisis in the Punjab from the 10th of May until the fall of 
Delhi (London, 1858), Dr. Alexander Duff, The Indian Rebellion, its causes and results, in a series of 
letters (London, 1858), Mrs. Hamilton Forbes, Some Recollections of the Siege of Lucknow (1905), Sir 
George William Forrest, Life of Field Marshal Sir Neville Chamberlain (Edinburgh, 1908), Sire 
George William Forest, History of the Indian Mutiny, three volumes (Edinburgh and London, 1904-
1912), J. Holloway, Essays on the Indian Mutiny (London, 1864), Lady Macgregor, Life and Opinions 
of Major-General Sir Charles Macgregor (Edinburgh, 1888), G. B. Malleson, The Mutiny of the 
Bengal Army, a historical narrative by one who served under Sir Charles Napier (Red Pamphlet) 
(London, 1872), Sir George O Trevelyan, Cawnpore (London, 1865). 






and the military society in India for causing the unrest. Since Kaye was a strong 
supporter of the East India Company, this viewpoint will be examined more 
thoroughly later. The military viewpoint claimed the EIC was at fault because of its 
mismanagement of Indian affairs.  Many officers who served in India during the 
rebellion published personal accounts and histories describing this conflict from a 
military perspective. Colonel Malleson was one of the most published historians from 
this category. The Mutiny was a personal event for Malleson who fought and who 
also lost his brother-in-law during the rebellion.19 He first wrote the “Red Pamphlet” 
about the Mutiny and later finished Kaye’s volumes on the Sepoy War. Malleson 
concentrated his writings on the military events from his battlefield perspective.  
Most Victorian historians recognized a religious component as a reason for 
the revolt. Many historians thought that the missionary efforts to convert Indians to 
Christianity had caused increasing pressures which instilled fear about possible forced 
conversion. Mutiny historians distinguished between Hindus and Muslim in this 
conflict by placing more blame on Muslims. Cooper wrote that a Shah had called 
faithful Muslims in India to “oust the treacherous tribe of the British.”20 Since both 
Hindus and Muslims revolted, this theory seems unlikely. Cooper might have 
constructed this theory on the embarrassment of the British from their failed war in 
Afghanistan at the hands of Muslims. Others more broadly considered religion as a 
significant reason for the Mutiny. Charles Ball wrote that “it is more than possible 
that the alleged insult offered by the greased cartridges, and the dread of conversion 
                                                 
19 Colonel Malleson, Kaye and Malleson’s History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8 (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co, 1897) V. 
20 Frederic Cooper, The Crisis in the Punjab, From the 10th of May Until the Fall of Delhi, 





to Christianity, gave the main impulse that roused the discontented spirit of the troops 
into mischievous activity.”21 Utilizing his knowledge of Indian society, Ball admitted 
that the cartridge questions could have been the actual start of the revolt. 
Yet, many considered that even though religion was important, sepoys 
exaggerated their beliefs to manipulate the British. Being an Asiatic race was 
significant in how the British viewed and treated Indians. For example, Charles Ball 
wrote that the Sepoy "knows well that government never intended any insult to his 
creed, however absurd it may be; but he knows that, by crying out about his caste, he 
keeps the power in his hand, saves himself from many of the hardships of service, and 
makes his officers afraid of him."22 Reverend Alexander Duff, a missionary in India, 
also viewed the motives of sepoys to be dubious. In his letter, Duff wrote that 
“throughout all ages the Asiatic has been noted for his duplicity, cunning, hypocrisy, 
treachery.”23 Duff later wrote that; “kindness, conciliation, benefits conferred, all 
have gone for nothing. The moment the external restraint has been removed, the old 
spirit, which exalted in the merit of sending the souls of infidels to the abyss of hell, 
has burst forth with uncontrollable fury.”24 Many Victorians believed that Indians 
purposely manipulated the British through their religious beliefs.  
Another major theme Victorian historians revealed in their studies was how 
the rebellion reflected the racial character of Indians. As racial theories shifted in the 
                                                 
21 Charles Ball, The history of the Indian mutiny: giving a detailed account of the Sepoy 
insurrection in India; and a concise history of the great military events which have tended to 
consolidate British Empire in Hindostan (London: London Print and Pub. Co.,1858), 40. Emphasis 
Mine. 
22 Cooper, 36. 
23 Alexander Duff, The Indian rebellion; its causes and results (New York: Carter, 1858), 58, 
letter 6, Calcutta, July 7th. 





mid-nineteenth century, environmental difference became a more common view of 
the subjects of the empire. Ball approached race by looking at how the environment 
affected the nature and development of human beings. The English believed that 
weather and climate affected an individual’s mental capabilities. Charles Ball wrote 
that “the direct rays of a nearly vertical sun, and even those of the moon cause 
affections of the brain, that are frequently productive of fatal results; and when not so, 
require removal to the temperate zone for their relief.”25 Ball believed that the climate 
had made Indians inferior due to mental degradation caused by the sun. Frederick 
Cooper followed a different type of racial bias. In his 1858 work, he attributed the 
Mutiny to the inferiority of Indians. His writings documented Englishmen who called 
the 16th sepoys ‘niggers,’ and that the “Asiatic mind, ‘unstable as water,’ ha[s] been 
dealt with in the mode that has ever insured success.”26  Cooper claimed Indians had a 
different mental state which conditioned their behavior. He asserted that when a 
Goorkha was angry he acted as “a savage demon.”27 Even though Ball and Cooper 
approached race from two different perspectives, both of their writings demonstrated 
that the British perceived that Indians rebelled because of their mental inferiority and 
inability to control their passions. This Indian weakness meant that sepoys could 
quickly turn to their savage ways when situations became complex and they could not 
logically understand that the British were there for India’s benefit. 
Few historians approached the Mutiny by looking at a longer period of British 
Empire in India. George Dodd’s history of the Indian Revolt examined many of the 
                                                 
25 Ball, 3. 
26 Cooper, 6.  





causes of the revolt and contextualized India within the empire. His book, The 
History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expeditions to Persia, China, and Japan, was 
published in 1859. His history began with the 1806 Vellore Mutiny, which indicates 
that in his view the rebellion had more causes than just the greased cartridges. Dodd 
viewed the people of India as childlike rather than simply barbaric.  He viewed 
Indians like children who looked to the EIC as their mother.28 In this viewpoint, 
Indians needed the British and it was beneficial for them to be controlled by this 
empire. He did not go into detail about who instigated the Mutiny, except for “evil 
people” spreading rumors about greased cartridges. This was one way in which he 
could remove blame from the Sepoy and envision future reconciliation. Dodd 
recorded that "some [English officers] believed that the native soldier was docile, 
obedient, and loyal as long as his religious prejudices were respected,” but he would 
go mad and rebel if his religious belief was violated.29 Dodd did not view the people 
of India as manipulative. Rather, he argued that they were not intelligent enough and 
were therefore fooled into rebellion by enemies of the empire.  
Nineteenth-century historical writings demonstrate a wide variety of responses 
to the Mutiny. The majority showcased the inferiority of Indians through their 
treatment of women, their untrustworthy character, their lower status as a race, and 
their child-like mentality. In contrast, the British men and women were depicted as 
strong and brave individuals who could overcome the savagery of the Indians. The 
majority of Victorian writings was reactionary and did not question whether or not 
                                                 
28 George Dodd, The History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expeditions to Persia, China, and 
Japan, 1856-79 (London: Edinburgh, W. and R. Chambers, 1859), 17. 





the rebellion occurred because of any other reasons besides the greased cartridges. 
Instead, the writings focused on the inferiority of Indians. Those who considered 
other reasons for the revolt, such as Dodd and Kaye, were few and far between.  
Twentieth-Century Historiography on the Mutiny 
The historiography of the Mutiny shifted significantly in the twentieth century 
due to the decline of empire and the Indian fight for independence. This shift 
reflected the changing nature of India's relationship to the British Empire, and 
particularly Indian Independence in 1947. During the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth century the British controlled publications in relation to India and shaped 
what could be written about the Mutiny. Because Indian nationalism opposed British 
interests in India, the government banned nationalist publications from printing in the 
United Kingdom. Even with these publication restrictions, there were some early 
examples of a nationalistic interpretation of the rebellion. In 1907, V.D. Savarkar 
wrote a history in which he argued that the Mutiny was the first Indian War of 
Independence of 1857.30  Savarkar interpreted the uprising of 1857 as the first 
national movement. With Indian independence in 1947, the British ceased to control 
the discourse about the Indian rebellion. Around this period, Indian writings on the 
Sepoy War began to depict it as the first patriotic movement for Indian liberation. For 
British scholars, the Indian Mutiny became an awkward topic of research because of 
the shift away from imperialism in the mid-twentieth century and Indian 
                                                 
30 Kim Wagner, The Great Fear of 1857: Rumours, Conspiracies and the Making of the 





independence.  It was not until the end of the twentieth century that there was 
renewed scholarship from both British and Indian historians.   
Since the 1940s, Indian historians have claimed that the Mutiny was the first 
nationalistic movement which led to Indian independence in 1947. There were many 
problems with research because of the lack of Indian sources and the overtly biased 
surviving British materials. In these studies, a major focus was to determine if the 
outbreak of 1857 was a mutiny, rebellion, or the first war of Indian independence. 
This clarification was critical because each of these interpretations had a different 
implication for how the uprising could fit into their national narrative. For the 
nationalist argument, it was hard to justify how such a diverse people had formed 
together without common interests, a shared past, ethnicity, religion, and language to 
form a movement. Historians who argued for the rebellion as a nationalist movement 
pointed to the general dislike of the British which was a unifying cause even if the 
basic elements of nationalism did not yet exist in India.31 However, most twentieth-
century historians agreed that it was unlikely that nationalism in India was a driving 
force behind the rebellion. Most British historians insisted that claims of nationalism 
in 1857 were premature and merely reflected the claims of modern Indian 
nationalism. For example, Cave Brown pointed to the unity of the Punjab troops who 
fought with the British against the sepoys as an argument against nationalism.32 The 
fact that Indians helped to suppress the rebellion and were integral to British 
operations was a strong argument against nationalism. Kim Wagner evaluated 
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nationalistic claims as responding to British colonial historical bias. In their response 
to nineteenth-century prejudice, Indian historians encountered the same pitfalls of 
nineteenth-century historians because both groups failed to question their own bias.33 
Historians began to question if the discussion should move beyond nationalism. 
With this divergence of research into the rebellion, historians began to move 
beyond questions of nationalism and the factual causes of the uprising to examine 
how this event affected the British. Navteg Sing suggested historians should examine 
the consequences of political violence and recover local histories.34 Historian Kim 
Wagner examined the fear which pervaded both the British and Indian societies by 
presenting a microhistory which studied India leading up to the rebellion.35  Wagner’s 
overarching theory was that the small problems in India, which might have been 
discounted by previous historians, were actually important because they became 
amplified when combined with other issues.36 His work is important because it 
diverged from the dichotomy of a planned nationalistic revolt versus a spontaneous 
uprising. He, therefore, focused not on determining the facts, but about emotional 
reactions of both the Indians and the British. Wagner found that there were rampant 
fears and distrust between the Indians and British. Wagner argued that the perceptions 
of the British and Indians were far more important than the actual events of 1857. 
Wagner maintained that what happened in 1857 does not matter as much as how each 
side perceived the other. The pervasive fear on both sides was more important in 
                                                 
33 Wagner, XXVI. 
34 Navteg Singh, “Commencement,” in Rethinking 1857 and the Punjab, xvii. 
35 Wagner, The Great Fear of 1857. 






explaining how the events progressed instead of trying to determine if events like the 
passing of chupatties occurred.37 The fear of sepoys and of the British officers was 
what compelled each side to take their specific actions. Once this fear is understood, 
the violence committed on both sides is more readily understood.  
The historian Christopher Herbert’s writings addressed the interpretations of 
the rebellion. His writings examined the Mutiny as a literary event, many times 
retold, and analyzed the stylistic format many of these accounts used. Herbert 
identified in early British writings the tendency to minimize British violence towards 
Indians and instead focus on the British shock over the rebellion.38 The theme of 
affection that military officers felt towards their sepoys and their sense of betrayal 
dominated many histories of the rebellion. Most of these accounts showed how the 
British felt the sepoys had betrayed them. Herbert identified paternalism as an 
important concept in nineteenth-century writings. Paternalism marked British officers 
as father figures for their sepoy troops, who were relegated to the child's position in 
this relationship. British officers were needed to guide their troops and assist them in 
understanding orders as a father would to his child.  As Herbert pointed out, however, 
even though it is easy to read these pieces as blaming the sepoys for their betrayal, 
these histories also show the culpability of the British officers for allowing this bond 
to be broken.39 Herbert also insisted that using this trope of a father-son relationship 
offset the rampant racism in Victorian society during the rebellion.40 Herbert asserted 
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that the father-son motif used in describing the betrayal of the sepoys deepened the 
impact of the rebellion on the public mind because it made the treachery feel more 
personal. It was not random soldiers who rebelled, but sepoys who were viewed as 
sons. The deaths caused by the sepoys led the British to commit equally, if not more, 
horrible acts against the sepoys. Victorians feared that violence in others could evoke 
the less civilized nature of the British. They were a society who believed in continual 
progress and cruel behavior required justification or it could be termed as regressive 
behavior. Victorians justified this British violence by depicting the Mutiny as a battle 
between light and darkness, defending patriotic values, and in many circumstances 
dehumanizing Indians. 
Herbert argued the uprising had such an impact because it created questions 
about British Empire in India, even if most writings attempted to avoid these topics. 
He pointed out how the rhetoric of empire worked to reinforce the idea that empire 
was beneficial for all. The Indian rebellion challenged this ideal. Herbert wrote that:  
all mechanisms of imperialist society, political, cultural, 
psychological, work in concert to reinforce and to rationalize 
domination: such is the assumption guiding this scholarly field. To 
inhabit imperialist society is virtually by definition to be blind to the 
cruel reality of imperial domination. That an imperialistic society 
could experience serious ideological instability- that its inner 
contradictions could be visible to itself and interfere for that reason 
with its flow of business; that public media could be channels of 
resistance to the imperial enterprise- is not a possibility that 
postcolonial analysis in its usual forms is equipped to entertain.41  
 
The rebellion challenged the imperialist assumption that the empire was beneficial to 
its subjects and was desired by the other societies under British control. The rhetoric 
                                                 





of this period primarily dehumanized the rebels as a way of creating a narrative in 
which the British were the victims. However, as Herbert pointed out, this was a 
unique event which starkly contrasted empirical dogma to the effects of British rule 
on the native people. 
 There have been many writings about the rebellion since 1857. These writings 
are important in understanding Victorian reactions to the uprising. The novels and 
histories demonstrate a society which was traumatized by this conflict. This created a 
large number of materials about the rebellion which continued into the twentieth 
century. The rebellion challenged British preconceptions of India. Most Victorians 
responded in anger, fear, and a desire for retribution. However, not all Victorians 
responded in this manner. John William Kaye offers a different discourse about the 
Sepoy War. Unlike other contemporary writers, he examined the reasons for the 
rebellion and argued for future reconciliation.  
 Modern historiography on the rebellion has examined nationalistic claims and 
has worked to recover lost facts about 1857-1858. Many historians are still trying to 
determine what happened to specific Indian units during the conflict. Some historians, 
such as Chaudhuri, have examined the bulk of nineteenth-century histories on the 
rebellion to identify common themes. Others have considered how the rebellion 
impacted British culture. A few historians, like Wagner, have examined the 
perceptions of participants in the uprising. Kaye’s volumes on the Sepoy War have 
been widely used by scholars of the Mutiny. Few historians have specifically studied 
the arguments in John Kaye’s writings. Kaye’s works have primarily been used for 





writings, both before and after 1857, were critical of the British empire and 
encouraged the British to change India through paternalistic relationships. Most other 
Victorian historians described the outbreak of the rebellion and how the British re-
took control of India, but they failed to address the long history of Indian complaint 
which culminated in the Mutiny. Unlike his peers, Kaye’s history of the rebellion was 
more compassionate towards Indians who rebelled and praised Govenor-General 
Canning’s call for clemency towards mutineers. Few historians have carefully studied 
why Kaye attributed the rebellion of 1857 to British actions, desired reconciliation 
with the people of India and defended the EIC for being the best vehicle for Indian 
progress. Considering that his three volumes on the Sepoy War have remained the 
basic texts for research on the rebellion, analyzing Kaye’s core arguments is essential 
to understand the volume which have impacted historiography on the Mutiny up to 
the present.  
In addition, Kaye’s writings are important to study because of his experience 
and his unique viewpoint. His post-rebellion writings did not align within the general 
Victorian reaction to the Mutiny. Unlike the majority of Victorian historians, Kaye’s 
writings did not demonstrate a racial shift after the rebellion. Kaye’s long intellectual 
engagement with India before and after the rebellion renders him an exceptional 
example to interpret British policies in India and the events of 1857. By living in 
India before the Sepoy War he acquired a paternalistic view of India and took a 
cautious stance between Anglicization and orientalism.  This fully developed 
viewpoint remained with him throughout 1857-1858 and accounts for his more 





EIC was beneficial for ruling India. It is because of Kaye’s life experience and 
because his writings do not fit in the normal British response that his writings are 
valuable for research. Kaye’s texts have been reprinted many times. By 1880, his 
histories of the Sepoy war were in their ninth reprinting. His works have continued to 
be reprinted based off these nineteenth-century publications.  Even though his 
volumes on the Sepoy War have been well studied and remain a basic text for 










Chapter 2: The Life and Experience of Sir John William Kaye 
 
John William Kaye was one of the most prolific writers about India during the 
nineteenth century. Unlike previous writers, like James Mill who focused on the 
whole history of India, Kaye primarily concerned himself with British India. Kaye 
was particularly interested in the policies of the EIC and how they affected the 
inhabitants of India. Kaye had a unique view of India because of his experience living 
there and his scholarship in this field, which included reviewing articles and books 
about India in addition to his own writings. One of the primary reasons Kaye 
frequently wrote about India was to inform individuals in India and Britain about 
important debates and events relating to India. Kaye continued to write about Indian 
affairs and correspond with prominent Anglo-Indians after his return to Britain in 
1845. His writings are distinctive because Kaye extensively researched original 
sources and personal papers in addition to his own experience. Other contemporary 
writers relied solely on personal experience when writing about India. This chapter 
will examine Kaye's life, writings, and his experience. It will demonstrate how Kaye 
contributed to Indian scholarship and display how Kaye's life in India shaped his 
viewpoint, and gave him greater writing authority.  
The Life of Sir John William Kaye 
John William Kaye was born on June 3, 1814, into the middle-class family of 
Charles and Eliza Kaye of Acton.42 His grandfather, Joseph Kaye, and father were in 
the legal profession. His grandfather and father both became solicitors for the Bank of 
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England.43  Kaye was a bright student and his family intended him for a political 
career. Kaye attended the schools of Rugby and Repton as a boy. In 1823, he began to 
attend Eton College. However, due to his father’s financial problems, Kaye left Eton 
in 1826 to attend Salisbury under the tutelage of Dr. George Radcliffe.44 His 
grandfather was able to obtain a cadetship in the Indian military service for Kaye 
from William Astell, a director of the EIC.45 From 1831-1832, Kaye attended 
Addiscombe College, which was the training school for Indian officers.46 In 1832, at 
the age of eighteen, Kaye departed to India, commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in 
the Indian Army.47 In 1837, he moved to Calcutta to command an artillery 
attachment. During this time in India, he married Mary Catherine Puckle of Surrey in 
1839.48 In 1841, Kaye resigned from the military due to ill health and committed 
himself to writing.49 During this time he wrote for the Bengal Harkaru and 
established the Calcutta Review.  
When Kaye return to England in 1845, he supported his family by writing for 
various journals and publishing his books. Indeed, the primary source of his income 
was from his writings. His family had grown during Kaye's time in India and he had 
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six children to support.50 In 1856, he began to work at the home service of the East 
India Company. Even though his work and interest kept him apprised of the situation 
in India, he never returned to the colony. When John Stuart Mill stepped down as the 
secretary of foreign affairs for India in 1858, Kaye succeeded him as Chief of the 
Political Department.51 Kaye described himself as having “served the honest 
merchant in his great house in Leadenhall,” which demonstrated not only his working 
history, but also his commitment and respect for the Company.52 For his service to the 
British in India, Kaye was made a Knight Commander of the order of the Star of 
India on May 20, 1871.53 Once again, failing health forced a change in his career path 
and Kaye retired from public service. According to the Pall Mall Gazzette, "owing to 
failing health" Kaye retired from "the post of secretary in the Political and Secret 
Department of the Indian Office" after nineteen years of service.54  In 1874, the India 
Office and the Marquis of Salisbury awarded Kaye a generous pension for both his 
official service and literary contributions on India.55 Sir John William Kaye passed 
away at the age of sixty-three in 1876 with less than 1,500 pounds to his name.56 
Kaye’s World: Empire and Movements in the Nineteenth Century 
The nineteenth century was marked by many changes, considered by 
Victorians to be positive reforms, both within Britain and the Empire. These changes 
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included the rise of evangelicalism, the growth of the middle class, the industrial 
revolution, parliamentary reform, and the abolition of slavery. Kaye grew up in a 
society that was greatly influenced by this spirit of reform. The early nineteenth 
century was optimistic about progress, both within Britain and for the people in the 
empire. The abolition of slavery, won in 1833, fundamentally shifted labor practices, 
especially in the Caribbean. The 1832 Reform Act widened the voting base and more 
equally distributed parliamentary seats. The middle class, due to the industrial 
revolution, greatly expanded and became a driving force in politics and morality. The 
British believed that they were the representatives of the progress spirit which they 
needed to bring to the subjects of their empire. The desire for progressive reforms and 
the expansion of empire were not always well aligned. Both movements were 
dependent upon racial theories and justifications for empire. 
The British Empire had grown significantly by the time Kaye was born in 
1814 and it continued to expand. After the British lost the American colonies, they 
turned to their second empire, which was centered on India and the East. The British 
had a strong belief that their rule brought justice and freedom to its peoples. However, 
for foreign subjects of the empire, liberty was limited. Indians were constricted by 
British notions of civilization and denied the very freedoms which the British 
admired. For example, the British valued representative government and freedom. 
However, Indians were denied self-government and any input into how their regions 
were controlled by the British. They had limited freedoms that fit within the 





justifications for empire. Within these arguments, there were debates about the level 
of British interference in Indian traditions.   
British policy towards India vacillated between trying to quickly improve 
Indian society through Anglicization versus slow developmental changes. One group 
adopted Indian customs and culture and had no desire to change India. They were 
usually referred to as orientalists, but by the time Kaye was writing, this group was 
becoming less popular and prevalent. Utilitarians believed that too much change to 
India’s customs would unravel Indian society that was entrenched in the caste system, 
and that, Indian customs should be respected.57 These views were particularly 
appealing to Anglo-Indians who thought that implementing changes too quickly 
would cause great discontent in India and threaten the ability of the British to 
preserve control of their territories. This group was more pragmatically concerned 
with maintaining power in India than in progressive reforms. Utilitarians were more 
prone to adopt Indian ways and did not champion quick change. Even though the 
trend of British men going native and adopting oriental customs was fading out of 
style, many still championed slow Anglicization with the adoption of some Indian 
practices. Anglicists, on the other hand, were in support of expanding British territory 
and control and more in favor of forcing British culture on Indians.58 These two 
viewpoints were in tension over how aggressive the EIC should be towards 
progressive reforms. As governor-generals changed, the policy of the EIC vacillated 
between Anglicist and Utilitarian strategies.  
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Liberalism was the primary theory of empire used during the nineteenth 
century to justify expansion. Historians had treated empire and liberalism as two 
separate topics until Theodore Koditschek placed these theories in dialogue with each 
other. He defined nineteenth-century liberalism as "a loose constellation, 
encompassing free trade, free labor, free association, free press, and formal equality” 
and that “by the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain had gone quite far toward 
becoming a liberal society," even if this meant freedom to starve.59  This racial aspect 
of Liberalism rested on the idea of mono-genesis, which was the belief that all people 
shared common ancestors and were part of one human race. This theory followed the 
biblical account of the creation of one race which all human beings are descended. 
Over time, some groups advanced further than others and developed faster. The 
differences between races were cultural. Because all races had potential to better their 
civilization, improvements and progress was beneficial to all. In India, British respect 
for its ancient past declined and instead, there was a renewed interest in finding the 
inadequacies of Indians.60 Certain interest groups who desired to witness greater 
progress, such as missionaries, viewed the continued backwardness of India to be the 
fault of the EIC for not using enough resources to promote progressive reforms. 
British rule was justified by arguments that they brought improvements to India and 
was demonstrated by the renewed efforts to educate Indians; through Anglicization 
Indians could rule their own country in the distant future. Yet others, like James Mill, 
believed that British cultural superiority trumped Indian culture and gave the British 
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free rein in ruling India.61 Instead of having the responsibility of ruling India and 
bringing civilization, the superiority of the British gave them free rein in making 
changes without regard for Indian practices. This viewpoint also argued that Indians 
would never be capable of self-rule.   
Liberalism and ideas on race worked together to define and justify imperial 
policies. Racial ideology infiltrated and influenced every aspect of Victorian society. 
Racial thought was integral to discussions of progress, the structure of society, and of 
empire.  As Robert Knox wrote, "race is everything:  literature, science . . . 
civilization depends on it."62 All parts of Victorian society were touched by images of 
race, which in turn helped to cement racial ideology.  Race in the nineteenth century 
was an evolving topic driven by historical context, representations, and 
subjectivism.63 Douglass Lorimer asserted that during the second half of the 
nineteenth-century racial ideology changed. This shift occurred partially because of 
advances in science, but also due to the changing political realities resulting from the 
abolition of slavery, the mutinies, and the expansion of empire.64 The theory of racial 
difference shifted from cultural difference to biological difference. Cultural racial 
difference postulated that each civilization was in a different stage of advancement in 
comparison to each other, but that each society was part of the human race. Cultural 
racial difference was based on the idea of monogenesis, which argued that all humans 
were descended from the same race but through the process of time had culturally 
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diverged, which left certain civilizations less developed. This variation in civilization 
allowed the British to judge other societies as inferior and gave them the 
responsibility to interfere to help lead others to a more civilized society, akin to the 
British. How other nations ranked could also change over time. John Stuart Mill, as 
an example, believed India was only "half-civilized," a decrease of status from 
previous evaluations.65 For the British, this analysis legitimized benevolent despotism 
and limited the right of representative governments to Europe and Britain.  
Victorians used the theory of cultural racial difference to elevate themselves 
above other societies by using a shared common past to trace the development of 
different civilizations and how they had deviated over time. George Stocking used the 
Great Exhibition of 1851 as an example of how exhibits representative of nations 
were arranged to show this progression in development. The exhibition showcased 
the various stages of civilizations other countries were ranked in comparison to the 
British.66 Victorian anthropologists studied indigenous people to learn more about the 
past of the British people.67 The Great Exhibition displayed how far the British had 
come by displaying tribes against the backdrop of British society. The Great 
Exhibition displayed the intelligence and industry of the British as the epoch of 
civilization against the tribal practices of other ethnicities.  
In the second half of the nineteenth century colonial rebellions, such as the 
Morant Bay Rebellion and the Indian Mutiny, shifted racial thought. Race continued 
to be an overarching viewpoint that affected every aspect of Victorian society, but the 
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way racial difference was interpreted changed. The predominant theory of racial 
difference became biological difference, which argued that humans were comprised 
of multiple races arranged hierarchically. Most Victorians did not experience racial 
"others," but instead relied on personal and official accounts from the empire on 
which to base their opinions about other ethnicities. Mutinies were one of the forces 
that changed racial thinking in the nineteenth century. This was due to the accounts 
which flooded Britain and the perceived rejection of British customs by the natives of 
the Empire. This was particularly true of the Indian rebellion. Many post-1857 
writings, which idealized the British and degraded Indians, inundated the market and 
contributed to Victorian opinions on race. The British interpreted the mutinies and 
rebellions throughout the empire as a rejection of their civilization. This supported the 
idea that racial difference was not just cultural because the empire had failed to 
fundamentally improve other cultures and that their subjects were ungrateful for 
British assistance. The rebellions were used as evidence to undermine the idea of 
monogenesis and encouraged the development of the polygenesis theory. This 
concept delineated three different races: Aryan (northern India shared in this 
ancestry), Mongolian (Asiatic), and Ethiopian (African).68 The rejection of British 
culture and morality by subjects of the empire, which was demonstrated by mutinies 
throughout the empire, ended Victorian optimism about the potential of other races to 
elevate themselves and instead supported the belief in biological difference. The 
British had believed that Anglicization could be an equalizer in the British Empire. 
                                                 






The Indian Mutiny ended this romantic view of empire and replaced it with realism 
and caution.69  
Even though Victorians had these general ideas on race, some non-white races 
were viewed as more civilized than others. Victorians viewed Indians as racially 
superior to Africans. Bolt demonstrated this concept through comparing missionary 
strategies of Africa with those of India. Even though they had similar approaches, the 
average Victorian had a greater belief in Indian than African potential, which led to 
the better treatment of Indians in comparison. This was partially due to British respect 
for the old glory of Indian civilization, and also due to Northern India’s purported 
shared Aryan descent. After the rebellion, the rise of biological racism amalgamated 
colored peoples as inferior.  By 1869, there were cases of Indians being referred to as 
“niggers” by the British press.70 Even so, India was still treated better than other 
regions of the empire. 
Kaye’s Publications About India  
Kaye wrote for a variety of audiences and genres. Kaye's first published works 
were written during his time in the Indian Artillery. Kaye began by writing fictional 
stories, two of which were set in India and a third in Afghanistan. His published 
novels included: Jerningham: or, The Inconsistent Man: a Novel (1836), Doveton: or, 
The Man of Many Impulses (1837), The Story of Basil Bouverie (1842), Peregrine 
Pulteney: or, Life in India (1844, three volumes), Long Engagements: a Tale of the 
Afghan Rebellion (1846). Kaye published his first novel at his own risk after being 
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rejected by a publisher. He later recounted how he was proud of his work, but 
realized how Jerningham was deficient.71 His novels portrayed a theme of “virtuous 
men marry rich women.”72 Even a man who was not born rich could still achieve 
good standing in society. These novels held to the Victorian ideal that virtue would 
triumph and lead to success. Kaye's novels were partially self-reflective of his own 
life. They mirrored his own financial situation in which he had to embark on a career 
without much, if any, assistance from his parents. According to Singh, Kaye’s works 
highlighted both political and social aspects of life in India.73 Once he started 
seriously writing for periodicals, he no longer published novels. 
For the most part, his writings consisted of serious articles and historical 
books in which he critically portrayed events in Britain and the Empire. During his 
lifetime, Kaye wrote over one hundred and thirty-nine articles, four histories (most 
were multi-volume), and five biographies. Kaye did not sign his name to many of his 
articles, which gave him greater critical freedom to express his opinions. Due to the 
variety of papers he wrote for, his topics were wide ranging and included gardening, 
touring Bath, women’s suffrage, progress within India, and government changes in 
India. Kaye worked for the Bengal Harkaru during the Afghanistan War, which took 
a more critical approach to Anglo-Indian affairs than official sources. This ability to 
censure the British Empire continued in Kaye’s writing in which he questioned the 
actions of the British government. The most significant journal that Kaye worked for 
was the Calcutta Review, which he established in 1844 and wrote for from 1844-
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1855. Kaye acted as editor until his return to England, at which point he passed his 
role to Reverend Duff, a prominent missionary and friend who remained in India.  
Over his lifetime, Kaye wrote almost fifty articles for the Calcutta Review. Kaye also 
wrote for the North British Review, Bentley’s Miscellany, the Edinburgh Review, 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, and Cornhill Magazine. By writing anonymously 
in the majority of his writings and the variety of platforms, he had great freedom to 
explore his arguments without retribution.  
Kaye had lived in India for twelve years by the time he established the 
Calcutta Review, which he dedicated as his “vigorous offspring.”74 Kaye wanted to 
ensure the survival of this journal by receiving the blessing from the Governor- 
General. Lord Ellenborough granted this permission and Kaye also garnered support 
from the missionary Alexander Duff, J.C. Marshman, and Henry Lawrence.75  Kaye 
wanted the Calcutta Review to stimulate interest in the events and culture in India and 
publicize this knowledge in both Britain and India. Kaye had noticed a disconnect 
between the metropole (the British at home) and the colony because of inaccurate 
information infiltrating Britain. Citizens in Britain were not aware of what took place 
in India. Some of this was due to lack of interest. However, many of the opinions 
Britons held of India were dated. Kaye wrote that “it is our duty to notice such books 
[on India], whether published in India or in England, as relate to Indian Affairs, and 
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we seldom pass over any that yield materials, either singly or conjointly with others, 
for a readable article . . . we do our best with what is set before us, and are thankful 
for what we can get.”76 Kaye not only wanted a venue for discussing Indian Affairs, 
but saw the need for a publication for lengthier pieces. Kaye wrote in the first issue 
that: 
The object of this work is simply to bring together such useful 
information, and propagate such sound opinions, relating to Indian 
affairs, as will, it is hoped, conduce, in some small measure, directly or 
indirectly, to the amelioration of the condition of the people. Our first 
desire is, to awaken interest; to induce a thirst after information; then 
to supply that information; and finally to teach the application of it to 
its most beneficial users. The bane of this country is ignorance; 
Ignorance not in the dark recesses of native life- there it is 
comparatively harmless; but in the high places,- among the ruling 
body.77 
 
Kaye’s writing was meant to encourage knowledge among Anglo-Indians and the 
British at home about the conditions in India. Kaye did not intend this publication to 
educate Indians about his concerns. Rather, he thought that for the British to 
“ameliorate” the Indian condition they had to first learn more about the people of 
India. The purpose of spreading Indian knowledge was to educate the British on how 
to engage with and help the people of India. Kaye here revealed himself to be a 
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standard Victorian believer in the duty of empire to bring “progress” and 
enlightenment. Kaye saw success in his endeavor. By 1847, he noted in reviewing 
recent writings on Anglo-Indian Society that “we may congratulate ourselves on a 
growing desire among our brethren at home for information regarding the affairs of 
the Eastern World.”78 Kaye cared about how India was discussed and that both the 
British and Anglo-Indians were well apprised on Indian topics. He wrote about the 
people and events in India because he viewed these as important as a focus of his 
work. The Calcutta Review was just one example of his many writings to educate the 
public both before and after the rebellion. 
In addition to writing articles and his editorial duties, Kaye also wrote four 
historical narratives which totaled eight volumes. Each of these were supportive of 
the EIC. He wrote History of the War in Afghanistan (1851), which he later expanded 
to three volumes. In this work he discussed the events leading up to the first 
Afghanistan war and concluded by listing the mistakes the British made which led to 
their own embarrassment.  Even though he was already well known in India before 
writing this history, it was this work that made Kaye famous in Britain as well as 
India. This book went through many reprints and was later expanded by Kaye. This 
conflict was not popular to the British public because of the British failure in placing 
their own ruler in Afghanistan. The Administration of the East India Company (1853), 
which was subtitled “a history of Indian progress,” was a narrative of the Company’s 
role in India. In this work, he discussed many of the governors-generals of India and 
other Anglo-Indians who he viewed as heroes. Kaye chose heroes who had respect for 
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the people of India, maintained close relationships with Indians, and who 
demonstrated British loyalty and bravery. Kaye had the satisfaction of seeing his 
work quoted in the 1853 debate in Parliament over whether to renew the EIC's 
charter.79 In this history, he viewed the EIC as a successful vehicle of bringing 
progress to the people. Kaye demonstrated this viewpoint through tracing the moral 
and physical improvements that had taken place in India since the late eighteenth 
century. The increased focus on morality in Britain mirrored the same trend in India. 
In addition, the establishment of Addiscombe and Haileybury created an orthodox 
training which helped to prevent British officers and administrators from adopting 
oriental manners while in India. Christianity in India (1859) was another opportunity 
for Kaye to demonstrate the progress which the EIC had brought to India. In this 
book, he argued that India was ripe for Indians to convert to Christianity. However, 
Kaye also argued that the British needed to proceed with caution and temper their 
zeal in order to avoid frightening Indians that the British would force conversion. The 
Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe (1854), The Life and 
Correspondence of Henry St. George Tucker (1854), Selections from the Papers of 
Baron Metcalfe (1855), and the Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm (1856) 
addressed how these men contributed to India and gave Kaye an opportunity to praise 
his heroes. The History of the Sepoy War (1864-1876) was his most famous work and 
became a basic textbook for studying the Mutiny.  
                                                 





One important aspect of Kaye’s writings was his view that history was the 
product of the work of great men, which was in alignment with the writings of 
Thomas Carlyle. Carlyle wrote that the  
Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this 
world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men . . . they were the 
leaders of men, these great ones; the, patterns, and in a wide sense 
creators of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to 
attain; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are 
properly the outer material result, the practical realization and 
embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the 
world.80  
 
This theory depicted history as driven and created by individual men who made 
impactful decisions. In each of his histories, Kaye focused on the individual men who 
were integral in the story. In Kaye’s history of the East India Company, he 
concentrated on the governor-generals Hastings, Clive and Cornwallis because of 
how each had an impact on the morality and his idea of progress in India. Kaye 
viewed the rebellion as a testament to the British character because of the bravery of 
the British officers and used it as a way to highlight the biographies of certain men.81  
Kaye wrote that “the best history is that which most nearly resembles a bundle of 
biographies, it is especially true when said with reference to Indian history; for 
nowhere do the characters of individual Englishmen impress themselves with a more 
vital reality upon the annals of the country in which they live; nowhere are there such 
great opportunities of independent action.”82 Kaye’s histories demonstrated Carlyle’s 
great men theory by emphasizing the actions of his heroes and downplaying their 
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faults. This belief that great men made history was also influential in his views 
against centralization and other actions of the EIC which reduced the decision making 
power of British officers.  
Kaye’s historical methods distinguished him from his contemporaries because 
his writings were research based whereas many contemporary histories were more 
akin to published personal journals. There were two typical types of writings 
Victorians used to learn about the empire: travel journals and histories. The 
nineteenth century abounded with travelers who published their travel journals. These 
accounts showed individual experiences without extensive research to substantiate 
their travels as authoritative. Sometimes, these travel journals were treated as 
histories. Many historians wrote synthesized histories without performing any 
original research. Kaye, however, combined personal experience with research. Kaye 
remained apprised of the debates regarding India by reviewing many articles and 
books about the colony, published in both India and in Britain. Not only was Kaye 
involved in the scholarship on India, but he also performed original research using 
private papers. Because of his connections, he was able to request to see personal 
papers. Kaye had special permission to access a number of his sources, many of 
which have not survived.83 In doing research for his histories, Kaye also used 
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government papers. These additional sources allowed Kaye to more critically and 
accurately relate information. Kaye's writings were comprehensive and detailed, with 
many quotations from original sources. Additionally, Kaye recognized that there was 
British bias in most of the published writings. In 1849, Kaye wrote, “there is a great 
deal too much one-sidedness in the generality of our war-narratives.84  He viewed 
historians as “rarely disposed to be prejudiced against his own countrymen; and we 
conceive that such prejudices, when they do exist, are less injurious than those which 
set in the opposite direction.”85 This acknowledgment about British bias was clear in 
his writings in which he attempted to be fair towards other political powers. As a 
result of living in India for a long period of time and being a part of the Indian army, 
Kaye was critical of British Imperial policies regarding India. In Kaye's critiques, he 
was aware of personal and national bias.  
The Reception and Historiography on Kaye’s Writings 
Kaye’s writings were well received in his lifetime and continue to be used and 
debated amongst historians. Most attention has been towards his three volumes on the 
Sepoy War. However, all of his published books went through several editions. By 
1880, the Sepoy War volumes had been reprinted nine times. Kaye’s work has been 
heavily used by historians as a reference for the events which occurred during the 
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mutiny. In describing Kaye’s historical writings, N.N. Singh wrote that, “Kaye’s 
writing reflected a keen individual mind with a sensitive awareness of the major 
issues of his day.”86 Singh wrote the first and largest monograph on Kaye. In this 
work, Singh viewed Kaye as a pragmatist who was influenced heavily by theories of 
liberalism while also promoting the slow spread of Anglicization.87 Singh approached 
Kaye by evaluating his various types of writing. Singh broke Kaye’s writing into the 
intellectual distinctions of military historian, defender of the Company, biographer, 
and his volumes on the Sepoy War. He evaluated Kaye’s writings by these types, but 
did not compare Kaye’s writings before and after the rebellion. One of the major 
shortcomings of Singh’s work is that he did not incorporate all of Kaye’s writings 
into his analysis because many of Kaye’s articles were not signed in the journals. 
When Singh wrote his history, many of these works had not yet been identified as 
Kaye’s writings.  
Douglas Peers examined how imperial ideology was reflected in Kaye’s 
writings. Peers wrote that the “writings of J.W. Kaye provide unique opportunities to 
test the ideological and material processes at work in the production of colonial 
discourse, for his writings not only straddle a range of genres, but Kaye himself was 
variously located in a number of different communities.”88 Because of the transitional 
period Kaye lived in and conflicting ideas about empire, Kaye’s work allows 
historians to examine how this discourse was produced. Peers found that Kaye 
                                                 
86 N.N. Singh, 6. 
87 Singh, 7. 
88 Douglas Peers, “There is Nothing More Poetical than War”: Romanticism, Orientalism, and 
Militarism in J.W. Kaye’s Narratives of the Conquest of India in Imperial Co-Histories: National 






believed in the Victorian ideas of progress, but was also still part of the romantic age, 
believing that the British could bring advancements to Indian society and that loyalty 
and heroism would win. This explained how Kaye could exalt men without 
examining their faults and also be critical of the British Government and the EIC. 
As may be expected, Kaye’s writings have received criticism from both his 
contemporaries and modern historians. The two most consistent complaints about 
Kaye’s writings were his factual inaccuracies and his high praise of certain British 
individuals. Chaudhri acknowledged that Kaye’s mistaken facts are problematic in 
taking his account as valid. This is one critique of Kaye's writings that has been used 
in most reviews of Kaye. Some pointed to how Kaye mistook important historical 
characters. For example, Chaudhri wrote that “for a careful historian which he claims 
he is, it is surprising that he should mistake major-general Thomas Reed who 
succeeded Sir Henry Barnard.”89 This is a significant blunder considering that Reed 
was in India during the first Anglo-Sikh War and Barnard did not arrive in India until 
1857.90 However, even though Kaye included these inaccuracies, his writings 
demonstrate a critical view of the British Empire that has value on its own. One 
reason researchers have identified so many inaccuracies in Kaye’s writings is because 
of the prominence and widespread use of his writings. It is natural for a history that 
has been given that much attention to have many mistakes found. Many other 
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histories of the Sepoy War have not received the same degree of attention by 
historians and similar mistakes may not have been discovered. Because Kaye’s 
viewpoint and his interpretations of events in India are more valuable than the basic 
facts, these few inaccuracies do not negate the importance of Kaye’s writings. 
The other primary critique is that Kaye was too biased toward men he 
respected and gave too much praise to select men. As Kaye approached history 
through biography, certain men whom he admired were not highly criticized in his 
work. K.C. Yadav viewed Kaye as too highly praising certain English men and 
justifying their behavior in the Mutiny.91 Because of this, Yadav viewed Kaye’s work 
as too unreliable for accurate history. Peers also argued that in some sections of 
Kaye’s biographies he skipped over the ugly actions of men he respected. 92  For 
example, The Standard published a letter from Lord Colchester in regard to Kaye’s 
work, Lord Ellenborough and the Generals in Afghanistan, as not being factual. Lord 
Colchester wrote that “I have no wish to speak disrespectfully of Sir John Kaye, but 
any reader of his remarks on this topic should remember his close connection with the 
directors of the company, and Lord Ellenborough’s’ vehement disagreement with 
them . . . He [Kaye] must be heard as an advocate rather than a judge.”93 Kaye 
defended his impartiality by pointing to the fact that he wrote the article before he 
worked for the Company in England. Yet, this demonstrated that the perceived bias 
Kaye had in his writing towards certain individuals was viewed as problematic during 
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his career. Even though Kaye might not have accessed secret documents or written 
his histories on the behalf of Company, he did not easily criticize men he respected. 
As Colchester’s criticism demonstrated, not all of Kaye’s writings can be viewed as 
impartial. For example, Kaye was quick to criticize the failings of Hastings for 
sexually immoral behavior, but skipped over any corruption on the part of Cornwallis, 
whom he thought was a great man.94 Even with these failings, Kaye’s writings are 
still valuable for his perspective and critical view of British India. 
Kaye’s Foundational Life Experiences and Viewpoints 
 Kaye's life experience and knowledge made him a competent writer and 
expert on British affairs in India. His ability to identify with the Indian Army, 
missionary effort in India, and the EIC Administration made him capable of 
negotiating between the claims each group made within India and the faults each 
interest group claimed the others had made. This has made Kaye's writings very 
valuable for studying how the rebellion shifted an Indian expert’s standpoints on 
empire.  Before 1857, Kaye witnessed a changed Indian society through the 
abolishment of the sati-the burning of widows (suttee), female infanticide, thugee, 
and slavery.95 These changes helped to create the India that Kaye knew and wrote 
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about. It gave him a strong belief in Anglo-Indian society and that India was 
beneficial for British because it freed them from industrialization. Finally, Kaye’s 
involvement with the Indian Army allowed him to understand how it functioned. 
These different perspectives allowed Kaye to be critical of imperial policy. Kaye 
viewed himself as one of the most qualified writers on India because of his army and 
administrative experience in India. His experiences shaped a positive view of British 
work in India and the EIC and are essential in understanding Kaye’s arguments about 
India.  
As an Anglo-Indian, Kaye understood the unique British society in India. 
“Anglo-Indian” was the term used to identify Englishmen who lived in India for a 
long period. This term was used up to 1911 and described a unique and very specific 
community.96  This group was a distinct society that straddled the ideas of two 
different cultures. During the beginning of British India, it could take months to travel 
from India to Britain, which led many individuals to rarely, if ever, return home. By 
the 1850s, travel time between Bombay and London had been reduced to a month due 
to increasing ship speeds, new routes through the middle east, and the Suez Canal. 
This community was committed to India and led Anglo-Indians to be more concerned 
with the policies regarding the EIC than the domestic needs of Britain.  
Living in India and participating in the Anglo-Indian culture made Kaye value 
and defend this society in his writings. Kaye doubted that someone who was in India 
for a short time could be able to understand the people of India or Anglo-Indian 
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society. Kaye argued that Anglo-Indians were important because it took time to learn 
the colony and the people it governed. Many of the works Kaye read and reviewed 
were evaluated through this mindset. This was clear in his critiques of writings about 
India, which were mostly written by travelers who were only in India for a relatively 
short time. Kaye wrote that “all we can say is, that if people will write amusing books 
about India, we will undertake to review them.”97 His main criticism was that these 
writers used their brief time in India to support generalizations on the Indian Empire 
and Anglo-Indian society. Kaye did not doubt the authenticity of the described 
experiences, but whether these stories were representative of Indian norms. Kaye 
believed that an individual needed to be committed to India and to have lived in the 
colony for many years before being able to articulate Indian culture without using 
obscure circumstances to represent the whole of India. It was only because Kaye had 
insider knowledge of India through his long tenure in British India that he could write 
about India and understand the process by which an individual could learn about the 
people.  
Kaye also witnessed the enforced standards of behavior in Anglo-Indian 
society that gave him the ability to defend the modernity and morality of the British 
who lived in India. Kaye argued that nineteenth-century Anglo-Indians had the same 
behavioral codes as the British at home. Kaye recognized that the majority of British 
were ill-informed and were unaware of the moral improvements in India since the 
eighteenth century. India, like far East, was popularly conceived in Britain as an 
exotic land where Europeans went native and were corrupted by Indian culture. Kaye 
                                                 





recognized the misinformation that was spread abroad about British India. He wrote 
that “on the whole we are inclined to think, that the average social and official 
morality of Anglo-Indian residents in India, is not below the common standard of 
British morality in other parts of the world.”98 British men previously went to India 
and rarely, if ever returned home. These men formed relationships with Indian 
women instead of marrying a British woman and starting a legitimate family. 
However, these were no longer the circumstances. Kaye pointed to the evidence that 
it only took a month to travel from Bombay to London, which meant that the colony 
and the metropole were not as separated as they had once been. Also, British women 
began coming to India in the nineteenth century; this helped to keep British men out 
of the Zenana.99 This also meant that men could take furloughs back home to Britain 
and were not disconnected from British society. Kaye was committed to this society 
and recognized its equality to any other in the British Empire, including Britain itself. 
This theme appeared in many of Kaye's writings and, once again, was a lens through 
which he judged accounts of India and wrote about it himself. 
Another important aspect of Kaye's experience in India was his view of India 
as a liberating influence from the work atmosphere in Britain. Kaye romantically 
regarded India as freeing men from the trappings of modernity. During the nineteenth 
century, there was a movement within Britain for a return to nature and a rejection of 
industrialism. Even though Kaye viewed the climate of India as rough on the British 
constitution, he still found that India liberated men. Kaye found the lack of 
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industrialization, the abundance of nature, and the ability for men to act without 
approval from a bureaucracy as harkening back to a romantic ideal of a more pastoral 
England. Kaye wrote that: 
Indian official leads a much more active, stirring life than his brother, 
who is employed in the Public Service at home. There is in India much 
less of the go-cart of official routine- much less of that mechanical 
desk-work which belongs to our public offices. The duties of the 
Indian official bring him into communication with a larger number of 
men, and evolve more stirring incidents in a month than years in a 
department at home. He leads a busy and varied life. . . early in life he 
learns to rely on himself; there is no one to help, no one to support 
him; he is thrown into the water, and left to sink or swim; so he strikes 
out manfully, and in a little time rejoices in the very isolation, which at 
first alarmed his youth and startled his inexperience.100  
 
Kaye viewed India as forcing men to rely upon themselves because of the lack of 
family and other supports. This gave men the freedom to use their own intellect to 
solve problems. Kaye's reaction was probably in response to the Industrial 
Revolution, which shifted the workforce into new social categories and was 
demeaning to man and nature. Kaye wrote that “business in England clings to a man, 
like the poisoned shirt of the centaur. Here [in India] it sits lightly upon him, and 
flutters in the evening breeze. Its corroding anxieties do not eat into us, like venom at 
morning and evening prayer- do not make young men old, and turn the healthy into 
wretched hypochondriacs. . . men are not drones.”101  Kaye supported the idea that 
men could truly live in India, unlike in Britain where men worked only for survival 
and could not enjoy their lives. Kaye believed that this influence within Britain would 
affect everyone, even returning Anglo-Indians. He remarked that “there is something 
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in British air, which seems prematurely to rust the minds of returned Indians, who 
often from active energetic men, possessing first-rate abilities and eager to turn them 
to good account, sink suddenly into indolent listless drones, with scarcely a thought 
beyond their breakfasts and dinners, the play-houses, the opera, and the races.”102 
Perhaps Kaye romanticized India, yet, his comment displays a revulsion to the effects 
of the Industrial Revolution and a desire for space and freedom, which he found in 
India. This love of India- the community of Anglo-Indians, the advancement of his 
society, and the freedom found in India- were important components of how Kaye 
viewed India and were based on his life experience.  
Kaye’s military service was an important aspect of his life that he thought 
gave him authority on military matters. When Kaye graduated from Addiscombe, he 
was commissioned in 1832 as a second lieutenant in the Bengal Artillery. This was a 
sign of his intelligence and academic success because the artillery was reserved for 
higher achieving students.103  Kaye arrived in Calcutta on September 16, 1833, which 
marked the beginning of his long Indian career.  Kaye was only in India for 11 
months before he had to return to England due to illness. Kaye was on sick leave 
from August 15, 1834 to November 27, 1837, a little more than three years.104 By 
1838, Kaye was the commander of an artillery detachment at Kyaukpyu in Arkan. He 
once again fell ill and had to take a six-month sick leave. However, by August 1840, 
Kaye was promoted to a full lieutenant, but his ill health continued and Kaye resigned 
from the Indian military in April 1841.105 In total, Kaye was a commissioned officer 
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for over nine years and was active in his military career for approximately five years. 
Kaye believed his career gave him the ability to understand the military culture in 
India and authority to write about military affairs. In one of his articles, Kaye gave his 
credentials as “an ex-noncommissioned officer, holding an appointment in the civil 
service of the Crown; and, therefore, possessed of military experience, as well as of 
experience in civil life.”106 Because of Kaye's military and civil service experience, he 
viewed himself as an able judge of problems and debates in India. His military 
experience combined with his work for the EIC gave him the required knowledge to 
navigate these opposing factions. Kaye had taken part in both groups during his life 
and could therefore discuss both military and non-military life in India.  
Kaye’s military training was foundational in forming his view of the Indian 
Army. His experience of two years at Addiscombe became a focus of several of his 
writings and augmented his view of the military. Kaye’s article, "Rules and 
Regulations of the Honorable East India Company's Seminary at Addiscombe, 1834", 
seemed to rely heavily on his own personal experience and was only set two years 
after he was commissioned and left for India.107 In this article, he continually quoted 
his own novel titled Peregrine Pultuney; Or, Life in India, to reflect on his own 
experiences at Addiscombe. Kaye insisted that Addiscombe, one of the Company’s 
schools in Britain, was essential to the future of India because "the flower of our 
Indian Army" came from there and Haileybury.108  Kaye criticized the organizational 
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structure of the school, argued cadets did not have enough time outdoors, and thought 
the age disparity amongst cadets gave too much advantage to the elder students and 
led to bullying behaviors. This criticism seemed to be based on his own experience. 
However, Kaye later wrote positively of these colleges in 1852, noting that the cadets 
were “fine ingenious youths, full of hope and full of ardour, standing thus on the very 
margin of manhood, eager for the first plunge. . .  When we survey in imagination the 
immense continent of Hindostan, number the hundred millions of people who inhabit 
it, and remember that mainly by the alumni of Haileybury and Addiscombe the affairs 
of this mighty country are administered, there is wonderful suggestiveness in these 
half-yearly examinations.”109 Kaye claimed that the two years of preparation at these 
schools equipped men to quickly take their place in India. The cadets were trained in 
such a variety of materials that they could fulfill and shift between roles to support 
the Indian Civil Service. Kaye viewed these schools as essential to transforming India 
from a society where men adopted Indian ways to one which the British formed a 
morally upright community. Kaye argued in his works that after the establishment of 
these schools in the early eighteenth century, the numbers of higher caliber men 
coming from England increased. Because of his own experience, Kaye understood the 
training officers received before coming to India and how well prepared these men 
were to lead troops.  
Kaye was the most prominent writer during his lifetime on India. Out of the 
many historians who have written about the rebellion, his volumes on the Sepoy War 
have become the primary text. Kaye’s writings are respected not only because of the 
                                                 





number of pages he wrote about British India, but his unique viewpoint. He lived in 
India for a duration of thirteen years, with occasional trips back to Britain because of 
sickness. He was dedicated enough to India to remain in the subcontinent for an 
additional four years after his retirement from the Indian ar.my Kaye interacted with 
all aspect of British involvement in India and could articulate the varying British 
interests represented in India. Kaye’s critical view of Indian Empire is what makes his 
writings valuable. Even though historians have found factual errors in Kaye’s 
writings, these faults do not negate the worth of his writings. Kaye wrote prolifically 
before and after the uprising and the shift of his arguments will be the topic of the 





























Chapter 3: Kaye’s Interpretation of the British Empire in India 
Before the Sepoy War 
 
Kaye's writings covered a large array of topics and events, the majority of 
which discussed British Empire in India. His standpoints on the policies and 
relationships in India do not align with one traditional view of empire. Like 
traditional imperialists, he believed that British government, culture, morality, and 
Christianity were superior to Indian equivalents, and that under British care, India 
could enter a new period of economic and social progress that had already begun 
during the late eighteenth century.  However, he also found value in Indian culture, 
was not in favor of westernizing India too quickly, and was opposed to forceful 
religious conversions of Indians. Though Kaye believed that the British Empire 
benefited the people under its rule, he did not believe in rampant expansion. Rather, 
Kaye viewed annexation and expansion as events which should happen rarely and 
only under certain conditions. Kaye believed the British needed to have personal 
relationships with the people of India. The British needed to model the type of 
behavior that Indians should emulate. In the army, British officers were meant to play 
a paternalistic, or fatherly, role to the sepoys under them, whom they would guide not 
only in military matters but also in westernization. Kaye's proposed policies do not 
align with any one traditional view of empire and cannot be described as imperialist, 
purely progressive, or focused on missions. His view was more nuanced and 





This chapter will analyze Kaye’s views on both British and EIC policies 
towards India, including the discussion of paternalism, progress, Christianity, and 
expansion before 1857. Each of these topics was an essential part of the EIC in India.  
Paternalism, the subjection of Indians to a child-like role, determined Kaye's racial 
views of Indians. Race was integral in all discussions of empire because this ideology 
was used to justify imperial actions. But racial ideology varied, and Kaye's 
paternalistic view was not the predominant view during the mid-century. Kaye's 
paternalistic view of Indians demonstrated a belief that Indians could be advanced, 
but that this progressive process should be limited and gradual. Progress and 
paternalism were closely tied together in his mind with the British guiding Indians 
through these changes. Christianity was an integral part of British Empire that was 
used to justify interference in other cultures.  During the late eighteenth century and 
early nineteenth century the British continually expanded their territories in India. 
Kaye had a more nuanced view on British expansion in India than the traditional 
imperialist. He supported expansion when circumstances required it, but he did not 
think that rampant expansion was beneficial because of the negative impact on India 
and the delay of potential progress.  This chapter will demonstrate that Kaye’s 
paternalistic care of Indians was an overarching theme that demanded the people of 
India, Anglo-Indians and the natives, be considered in progressive policies and 
expansion. In both progress and expansion, Kaye was a cautious progressive who 
viewed slow and steady progress as a necessity with limited expansion to protect 
British interests, while also respecting native interests. In addition, Kaye expected 







Kaye’s Paternalistic View of Indians: The Cornerstone of His Ideology 
Kaye viewed Indians through a paternalistic lens. Paternalism was not a 
unique viewpoint to Kaye; it was generally how the Irish, women, and racial “others” 
were treated in nineteenth century Britain. By labelling women and other racial 
groups as infantile or effeminate, traditional English liberties could be denied because 
of their perceived inabilities.110 In India, the British role was to the guide Indians in 
education and progressive policies that were meant to create a more civilized India. 
This ideology helped to justify the need for withholding independence and self-
government from Indians while also promising them future freedom after becoming 
more advanced under British care. Kaye believed paternalism required close 
relationships, akin to a father-son relationship, between the British and Indians, not 
just official interactions that occurred through business. Kaye was obviously not the 
only individual to bring this viewpoint to India. Yet, Kaye's writings combined this 
perspective with a respect for Indians and a highly developed British responsibility 
for Indian actions. Many other writers did not view the British as responsible for 
Indian actions. Kaye's viewpoint was therefore not as dehumanizing as others and this 
racial view permeated all of his standpoints on the EIC’s policies. Kaye's paternalism 
also displayed an optimistic view of Indians, that with British guidance, they could 
become more like the British and their civilized society. His paternalistic view of 
                                                 





India was unusual because he placed responsibility for maintaining this kind of 
mentorship on the British and viewed British officers as partially responsible for the 
actions of their sepoys 
But, Kaye's paternalism also demonstrated a view of Indians as childlike. In 
1852, Kaye wrote that “Jack Sepoy is, in many respects, quite a child” and described 
his traits as “docile, but not without occasional fits of obstinacy; and he is easily to be 
won by kindness.”111 Just as a child could be coaxed by kindness, so too could a 
Sepoy. Kaye did not give any individual examples of this immature behavior by 
sepoys. Rather, he amalgamated Indians and used general examples, such as Indian 
obstinacy. Kaye believed that it was impossible to change an Indian’s mind once it 
had become determined on a path. Instead of blaming Indian mistakes on their 
inferior race, he noted that this was natural because “Jack Sepoy, like all other mortal 
beings, sometimes makes a mistake.”112 He believed that sepoys were truly childlike, 
capable of great mistakes, but also capable of great potential with the help of the 
British.  By placing sepoys in a childlike position, this removed partial responsibility 
for their actions. It placed this charge to develop the sepoys on the British, just as 
parents were accountable for the education and discipline of their children. However, 
this did not mean that Indians should not be punished for rebellious actions. But 
rather, they could not be held fully accountable for their behavior and the British had 
the obligation to train and develop India and its people.  
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Kaye believed that there were two necessary conditions for paternalism to 
succeed in the British-Indian relationship. First, sepoys had to trust their British 
officers. Second, British officers had to know and understand their Indian troops. This 
could only occur by personal interactions with each other.  Kaye described sepoys as 
desirous to please their officers, but that they did not have blind faith in their officers. 
Kaye believed sepoys were loyal because “it is his delight to prove himself worthy of 
the good opinion of his leader, and to do his best to support and assist him.”113  
Therefore, sepoys should be inspired by their officers to serve them with excellence. 
This was only possible if sepoys and officers interacted with each other in a setting in 
which they could learn more about each other. The trust of the sepoys could only be 
earned by officers who knew and understood their troops. This required 
understanding Indian culture which included religion, caste, and languages.   
Because Kaye recognized the need for the British to understand Indian 
culture, Kaye respected and praised men who encouraged this behavior. One reason 
why Kaye admired John Shore, an employee of the EIC who later became a 
Governor-General (Lord Teignmouth), was his desire to learn about the people, 
culture, and languages of India.114 In the 1770s, Shore's "local knowledge was far 
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greater than that possessed by the Governor-General . . . and there were few 
Europeans, at the time, with a deeper insight into the native character.”115  If an 
employee of the government did not understand the value of caste and the importance 
of religious practice, the officer could unwisely guide sepoys through changes. For 
example, the officer could issue insensitive orders or not understand why sepoys were 
reluctant to obey orders which interfered with caste and religious practices. Kaye 
believed that this was an important component of British rule in India. 
 Because of the paternalistic British-Indian relationship, Kaye thought that 
British officers were largely responsible for sepoy actions. Just as a father was 
responsible for the behavior of his children, officers were supposed to have this kind 
of relationship with the sepoys under their command.  Because British officer were 
supposed to have a close relationship with sepoys, the officers should have been able 
to guide their soldiers through difficult times and know when there was discontent 
amidst the ranks. Kaye clearly articulated this idea in his writings about the mutinies 
that predated 1857. The best example was the 1806 Vellore Mutiny. This mutiny took 
place in northern India after the British made changes in the Indian army to require 
uniformity in the ranks. Previously, many regiments allowed Indians to wear caste 
and religiously specific accessories, which allowed Sikhs to wear a dastar- a turban 
with religious significance. The military reforms enforced uniform western military 
headdress that would not allow the Sikhs to wear their dastars. Kaye argued that the 
reason for the Vellore Mutiny was the failure of paternalism because “whenever we 
hear that a Sepoy regiment has evinced a mutinous spirit we feel the strongest 
                                                 





possible conviction that the European officers of the regiment are not wholly 
blameless. If nothing else can be said against them, it may be generally assumed that 
they do not know their men.”116 The Vellore mutiny was an example of gross 
ignorance on the part of the British officers. The failure of these British officers to 
understand the Indians under their command was problematic because they did not 
appreciate the religious and social consequences of changing headdress requirements. 
Another problem at the same time was the close living quarters of Indians of different 
castes, who could not share the same food preparation, plates, and drinking vessels. In 
Indian society sharing the lotha (drinking vessel) with an individual from a lower 
caste meant being ostracized. This combination of the lotha and the additional fear 
caused by the headdress changes compounded worries of forced westernization and 
conversion to Christianity. Their British officers were unable to understand these 
concerns and explain the true British intent. Kaye placed partial blame for this mutiny 
on British officers not fully understanding the sepoys and therefore not being able to 
lead them well through the changes which occurred with pay and headdresses. By 
1806, westernization had weakened familiarity between the British and sepoys. The 
officers were also unable to report to higher officers the fear over losing their caste 
due to contamination from lower caste Indians.  
Kaye believed that the British-Indian paternalistic relationship had been 
declining since the late eighteenth century.  Initially, when the EIC began to trade in 
India during the 1600s, the British tended to become "Indianized." The men took on 
Indian customs and manners, even cohabitating with Indian women, which reduced 
                                                 





the culture clash between the British and Indians. The British were not interested in 
changing Indian culture, except where it could increase their own profits. Kaye 
recounted that the Anglo-Indians in the eighteenth century were men who “betook 
themselves to India with little expectation, perhaps with little desire, of ever returning 
to their native country. They very soon forgot their native land. They forgot all the old 
ties. They divorced themselves from the habits and the feelings which they had taken 
out with them.”117 The “evil” of the distance between the British and the sepoys was a 
more recent development because “there was formerly more sympathy between 
Europeans and natives than there is in these days. The former [British] were not only 
courteous in the demeanor to the latter, but took pleasure in conversing with them.”118 
Until regulations to limit British behavior began to take place in the mid to late 1700s, 
there was not a large divide between the Europeans and Indians. The British had 
adopted Indian customs and this created many similarities. Kaye viewed this intimacy 
between the two groups as significant in peacefully ruling India. It allowed the British 
to understand the people under them and through interacting with each other, to gain 
trust in the other. 
The understanding between the British and Indians significantly changed 
through the eighteenth to nineteenth-centuries because of the EIC strategies to stop 
the tide of British men “going native” and to improve the EIC administration.  The 
EIC began to be increasingly concerned about Anglo-Indian culture and the continued 
“Indianization” of their employees. This reflected a variety of influences. There was 
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growing pressure from humanitarians in Britain to criticize Indian society because of 
the progressive reforms in Britain. In addition, there was the growing 
professionalization of the EIC’s administration as illustrated by the establishment of 
the colleges Addiscombe and Haileybury to educate future British men to serve in 
India. These schools trained men in the appropriate languages and discouraged them 
from going “native:” they instilled “imperial responsibility and ingrained with a sense 
of Britain’s imperial greatness.”119 This education changed Anglo-Indian society by 
creating a growing cultural gap between the sepoys and the British. Kaye identified 
these schools as beneficial for the government of India by preparing trained men 
since he viewed Indianization as negative for the British and Indians. Kaye wrote that 
the reforms in India since the 1700s had been beneficial to the health, morality and 
comfort of British officers. But, he also viewed these schools as having a negative 
consequence because he directly linked them with creating a growing divide between 
the British and Indians. but by 1850 these reforms played a negative role in 
paternalism. Kaye wrote that: 
They have spoilt him for a Sepoy officer. There is hardly a genuine 
Sepoy officer now remaining with the army. Time was, when our 
officers, to a great extent, denationalized themselves; when their habits 
were rather of the Asiatic than the European type; when the language 
they spoke, the sympathies they encouraged, and the companions with 
whom they associated, were more frequently Hindustani than English: 
when, in a word, they lived more like natives than like Christians, and 
looked upon their Sepoys with kindness and affection as brethren and 
children. The supremacy of Englandism in India seems now to have 
made an impassible gulf between the English officer and the 
Hindustani soldier.120  
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The westernization of India, which Kaye often referred to as progress, negatively 
impacted the paternalistic relationship because it divided Indian and British societies. 
The British no longer respected Indian culture the same way, but viewed European 
ways as superior. This changed attitude on the part of the British was dangerous 
because it could lessen the respect Indians had for their officers. Kaye praised the 
moral benefits which came from this training as he did not view Indianization as 
beneficial for the British. Kaye did not envision an equal cultural exchange between 
the British and Indians in his writings.  Kaye viewed the growing distance of Anglo-
Indians from the people of India as problematic, not that he wanted the British to 
adopt Indian customs.  
Kaye’s Ideas on Indian Progress Before the 1857 Rebellion 
 Kaye was very optimistic about the future of India and proud of the changes 
wrought by the EIC in India.  Kaye frequently wrote about how the East India 
Company had improved its territories through increasing morality by limiting 
excessive drinking and stopping the practice of the sati, and through public works 
such as improving roads. These perceived improvements applied to Anglo-Indians 
and Indians. Many of Kaye’s articles and books demonstrated this progressive 
history; his book on the EIC was subtitled A History of Indian Progress. These two 
improvements were closely tied to missionaries being able to spread Christianity. 
Kaye's writings displayed the progression of Anglo-Indian society from being filled 
with debauchery and solely concerned with profit to one that attempted to govern the 
people of India well. Kaye viewed this as a slow, but a beneficial process, which 





society and culture. Kaye believed that change occurred from the top down in society. 
Rules and regulations in and of themselves could not make changes without the 
modeled behavior of leaders in society. British leaders led the behavior they expected 
of their British subjects in the empire. In certain cases, such as structural 
improvement, Kaye viewed these changes as having a beneficial influence on Indians. 
However, for the British to bring moral change and convert Indians to Christianity, 
the Anglo-Indians needed to live pious and morally upright lives as examples to be 
modeled by Indians.  Before Indians could be westernized, Anglo-Indians had to first 
live as a society to be imitated by Indians. Both the EIC and Parliament worked since 
the late eighteenth century to improve the moral quality of British society in India.  
Kaye believed that the government was responsible for the improvement of the 
people under it and that it should be judged by how well it improved the people.121 
Kaye viewed progress as a top-down transition. As leadership reformed and became 
an example, then the people, both British and Indians, would make these changes as 
well. Kaye viewed this process as essential in both moral changes and also in 
spreading Christianity in India.  
Kaye’s View of Moral Progress of Anglo-Indian Society 
Kaye's histories of India demonstrated his view that the British in India during 
the 1600s and 1700s had little or no morality.  He viewed them as selfish, depraved 
and uncaring about the situation of the people in India. In Kaye’s history of the East 
India Company, he wrote that in the early stages, the EIC “did not care about the 
                                                 






people of India, the happiness of the people was a means to an end.”122 The British 
were in India solely for their own gain and did not live as a Christian society. Kaye 
described the Anglo-Indians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as people 
who “traded briskly; they fought bravely; and they lived hardly. But they neither 
feared God nor loved their neighbors.”123 Kaye asserted that there were two reasons 
for the immorality he described of the British in India. The first reason was that the 
British in Britain did not live by much higher standards of morality. This was a 
common Victorian belief that the seventeenth century was filled by immorality. The 
second reason was that in India there was no standards of behavior and no social 
consequences for immorality, which left the British without any restrictions on 
adopting Indian practices and living by their passions. 
First, Kaye thought the immoral community in India reflected the British at 
home. Kaye claimed that changes in India could not begin until there were moral 
reforms in Britain since the men who went to India came from Britain. Kaye began 
his examination of moral reforms with early eighteenth-century Britain. While he 
specifically identified the problems rampant in British India, Kaye claimed that the 
British at home were no better. He argued that both the British and Anglo- Indian 
societies were equally guilty because “we have seen them drinking, gambling, 
fighting, and taking bribes [in India] . . . they merely reflected the manners of their 
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brethren at home.”124 It was not until reform began in England that India could also 
be anglicized by new men coming to India who were morally sound. Following 
Kaye’s view that history was made by great individuals, he attributed the moral 
progress in England to George the Third’s personal example, who reigned from 1760-
1801. Kaye wrote that “morality appears to have advanced steadily in England with 
the reign of George the Third.”125 George III, he argued, was influential because he 
“waved the royal privilege of gilding vice . . . denied himself the luxury of 
contaminating, by his example, the morals of a whole country; and proved to the 
world, that with every source of sensuality open to him, it was possible to be a 
virtuous man. During his reign, men ceased to make an open business of 
licentiousness.”126  Kaye claimed that change through personal example was a 
lengthy process and could take a lifetime, such as with the life of George III.127  Kaye 
always viewed the morality of high positioned men as influential on society and this 
was no different with the king. 
Second, the British came to India where there were few moral guidelines and 
structure, which made it easy to regress and go native. There were also no leaders 
who modeled appropriate behaviors. Kaye credited this lack of support with creating 
an environment for men to abandon their ways, for “a man, cut off from the society of 
his countrymen, is not only removed beyond all the obstructions of immorality, but is 
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doubly exposed to all its temptations. There is in fact everything to allure- and 
nothing to stay him.”128  These men had “left a country of checks- checks imposed 
not only by civil polity but by the moral strongest code of opinion.”129 They arrived in 
a country where these same checks were not imposed upon them and therefore did not 
follow these morals, but, acted as men who were only interested in their own profit 
and pleasure. Considering that during the early period of the Company the majority of 
the British went native and many times cohabitated with Indian women, took bribes, 
and drank too much, there were few constraints against this lifestyle. This also 
demonstrated that Kaye’s idea of a civilized and moral society required all the 
mechanisms of the society to maintain high standards. Changes in Britain along with 
increasing governing power in India forced the EIC to consider regulating the 
behavior of its employees in India. When the EIC gained governing powers in 
Bengal, it became more concerned with governing its territories because “up to that 
point in the history of our Indian Empire the Company’s servants had been almost 
exclusively merchants- now they grew into administrators.”130 At this point, the 
Company and Parliament began attempting to stop excessive drinking, gambling, and 
licentiousness.131 Parliament limited gambling in the early 1700s through making 
gambling more than 10 pounds’ illegal.132 It was a struggle for the Company to 
change the culture of Anglo-Indian society.  Kaye recorded how the directors and 
Parliament continually worked to effect change, but with little success.133  As the 
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authority of the EIC shifted, the Company tightened the rules and expectations for 
individuals in its employ. These regulations and laws had a limited effect 
transforming British society in India.  
While India was governed by men who lived immorally, moral changes could 
not take root. Just as Kaye believed that history was driven by great men, change also 
was driven by the personal examples and policies of these men. Kaye believed that 
Robert Clive and Warren Hastings, though great men, could not drive moral reform 
because of their own examples.134  This argument was driven by Kaye's idea of 
paternalism which required close bonds between the British and Indians. Change was 
driven through personal example and Clive and Hastings' lives were incapable of 
inspiring change because their behavior was immoral. They both left Britain when 
they were young and grew up in the immoral Anglo-Indian society. As products of 
this society, they were unaware of what needed to change. Kaye wrote that "Clive and 
Hastings had left England as mere boys" and therefore "brought with them to India no 
settled principles, their morals accordingly were Indian morals- formed in the worst 
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possible school.”135 Kaye was able to point to these specific examples of when they 
were leaders and failed his standard of acceptable behavior. For example, both men 
committed adultery, with Hastings living with the wife of another man.136 Kaye 
focused on their moral faults and did not discuss as much the personal economic 
gains during their power.   
Kaye equated a steady improvement in British reforms in Anglo-Indian 
society with the influx of honorable governor-generals into India. Kaye saw 
“substantial improvement” beginning with the arrival of the Marquis of Cornwallis in 
1786, who the Company specifically brought in to stop corruption.137 Kaye described 
Cornwallis as having "all the finest characteristics of a high-minded English 
nobleman; he came among his exiled countrymen with the English ideas of honor and 
morality" and initiated changes which Kaye believed would lead to moral progress 
that continued through Kaye’s own time.138 Another important figure, Governor -
General John Shore, served as an example of the morally upright EIC officer who, 
Kaye believed, through personal example changed the community around him.  Kaye 
wrote in 1861 John Shore “even in corrupt times, walked purely and honorable before 
God and man, this improvement continued. Personal example did much.”139 Kaye 
viewed change as a process which began and was modeled by leadership. He viewed 
these men as responsible for changing Anglo-Indian society. Then, under Cornwallis, 
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social occasions became more controlled because he limited access to excess alcohol, 
which decreased drunkenness at these functions. Through these social efforts 
gambling and drinking had gone out of “fashion.”140 A man of exemplary personal 
example could enforce and encourage the reforms which the EIC had attempted to 
make by regulations. Kaye tracked these moral changes through cultural productions, 
such as newspapers and journals, and noted that overtime the topics, such as novels 
and approved social events, became more morally acceptable. Kaye viewed this kind 
of progress as extremely important to India and that it had to come from the example 
of prominent British individuals.  
Kaye’s View of the Potential of Christianity in India and the Moral Upliftment of the 
People 
Kaye argued strongly that Indian society could not be reformed without the 
British in India modeling behaviors that could be emulated by Indians. This was 
especially true when it came to Christianity. Kaye envisioned missionary work 
through a government hands-off approach. Kaye believed that Christianity would be 
beneficial for Indians. But, because of his view of the Indian psyche and convictions 
that perceptions of forced conversion would cause unrest, Kaye insisted that 
missionaries should be allowed into India, but that the government should not support 
them. Kaye believed that outright support and financial assistance to missionaries 
from the EIC would cause panic among Indians.  
                                                 





 Kaye was highly aware of how controversial missionaries were in India. 
Many feared that missionaries would cause discontent among Indians, even a revolt. 
Missionaries were tolerated until the Vellore Mutiny of 1806, which some viewed as 
the fault of missionaries stirring up discontent among Indians.141 After this, however, 
the Company wanted to remove them because missionaries were blamed for this 
mutiny because the change in headdress was thought by Indians to be the last step 
before forced conversion.142  But in 1813, Parliament gave missionaries official 
permission to be in India against the wish of the East India Company, which feared 
that potential unrest would result.143 From this point there was a great influx of 
missionaries. However, tensions remained high between the missionaries and both the 
EIC and Kaye felt that government sponsorship of missionaries was dangerous 
because it could make Indians fear forced conversion by the government. Kaye 
asserted that conversion to Christianity should be encouraged by individual 
missionary groups and through personal example. 
For Indians to convert to Christianity, Kaye believed Anglo-Indians had to 
model Christian behavior by providing a morally sound society. Kaye asserted that in 
the eighteenth century, when the British were living in debauchery, profit, and going 
native, Indians had no incentive to convert because they viewed the British as more 
morally bankrupt than themselves. During this period, British behavior caused 
Indians to disrespect Christianity because “the general belief among the natives was, 
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that if the English traders had any God, they had left him in oblivion at home.”144 In 
another work, Kaye argued that the British should "first convert ourselves, and then 
think of converting the people of India. It is certain that the English, in our Eastern 
settlement, are not now open to the old reproach, 'Christian-man—Devil-man."145  
During the early period of the EIC, the British could not convert Indians to 
Christianity when their behavior made the best argument for not converting from 
Hinduism and Islam because of their immoral behavior. But Kaye argued, as Anglo-
Indian society became more moral, Indians took notice and were similarly influenced 
by the changes in the British culture. In 1844, Kaye wrote that gradual moral 
improvements of the British “cannot but have been attended with a corresponding 
influence, directly or indirectly, on the native mind.”146  The actions of the British 
affected Indians. Kaye noted that, whether or not the hearts of Indians were changed, 
their outward behavior changed with the reforms in both Anglo-Indian and Indian 
society. Kaye documented the change by showing that because of the British presence 
Indian actions were altered. He compared the past actions of Indians to the current 
state, in which “atrocities such as these [unjust beheadings] no native of India, or of 
the neighboring states, would dare to commit or even meditate in the presence of 
English gentlemen.”147 Kaye maintained that these changes in Indian society only 
occurred after the British themselves went through the process of reforming their own 
society. Kaye claimed that that British regulations were not sufficient in making great 
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changes in society. However, the change of Indian behavior must also be attributed to 
British law and power to enforce it in addition to the examples of great men.  
Kaye believed that Christianity was meant to be spread through private 
channels and personal examples, not through official EIC policy. This did not mean 
that Kaye was uncaring about Christianity in India or think that it was non-essential. 
He believed that Indian conversions were possible and beneficial for the people of 
India. In 1845, Kaye wrote that Indians were “well prepared not only for the reception 
but for the origination of great moral and religious change. To discourage and to 
check these yearnings after better things would be an act of as wicked and insane 
folly.”148 But Kaye believed the government should not be perceived to have any 
support for this missionary progress.149 Kaye did not support blind interference. He 
wrote “we are no advocates for the exercise of blind unregulated zeal in the obtrusion 
upon the people of India of legislative forms or in private interference with their 
religious prejudices or social customs.”150 For Kaye, the primary point of difference 
was whether the government or private groups supported missions. As he wrote, "the 
question was not whether Christianity was to be supported in India, and heathenism 
discouraged; but how far, consistently without- standing pledges and existing 
obligations, Christianity could be supported and heathenism discouraged."151 Kaye 
insisted evangelism as necessary and helped to justify British Empire in India and that 
it would be morally wrong to bar missionaries and to kill any growing desire for 
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Christianity among the natives. However, he also noted the concern of the British that 
more mutinies could occur out of fear because of missionary efforts. Kaye also 
recognized the importance of religion to caste and that the wrong action by the EIC 
would be dangerous. Therefore, to allow missionaries who were not sponsored by the 
government was a moderate approach for the EIC and Parliament since it did not 
restrict missionary access, but also did not force Christianity on the people of India.  
British Reforms in Indian Society- Public Works and Education 
Kaye viewed the moral improvement of Anglo-Indian society as the 
predecessor to reforming Indian society. Kaye wrote about two types of changes in 
Indian society spearheaded by the British: the first was structural changes, such as 
laws and regulations governing Indian practices and providing them with European 
education; the second was moral upliftment of Indians, potentially leading to 
Christianity. He tended to favor making humanitarian changes quickly, such as 
outlawing barbaric practices, such as infanticide. But, because of his knowledge of 
Indian culture and religion, he thought most reforms and Christianity should be 
introduced more slowly. Instead of implementing official changes, Kaye argued for a 
gradual change in Indian culture which was inspired by British personal examples, 
not through legislation and forced conversion.  
Throughout the nineteenth century the EIC debated about at what rate and to 
what degree westernization should be made in India by the EIC.  There were two 
general parties in this debate: Orientalists and Anglicists. Orientalists were more 





increasing professionalization of the EIC, these numbers were decreasing by the 
nineteenth century. Orientalists believed that India historically had great and ancient 
achievements which should be respected. Future improvement rested on the ability to 
draw on ancient traditions and laws as the foundation.152 For example, caste was not a 
system which the British wanted to abolish because it was intrinsic to Indian 
culture.153 Caste was part of the Hindu religious tradition. However, some Muslims 
adopted a similar stratified social structure in India, though it did not have the same 
religious implications if rules were broken.154 Hindu religious practices could not be 
separated from caste structure. Kaye focused more on Hindu practices because of 
how complicated it was and the probability of British interference having major 
implications on the caste system. However, other traditions such as the suttee, the 
burning of widows after their husband's death, were considered inhumane and 
garnered additional support for an immediate ban. Anglicists believed in the duty of 
the British to make Indian culture more British because of their belief in the 
superiority of British religion, culture, and governing structures. Anglicists argued 
that the British needed to take more direct efforts to implement progressive reforms.  
The Anglicist view of India saw it as behind Britain in civilization and that the British 
needed to be more proactive in enacting changes.  Kaye took more of a middle 
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ground. He was on the cautious side, but truly believed in the potential of British rule 
for India.  
Kaye did not want to push for quick changes, but for gradual change. Kaye 
saw that the people of India could be changed, but there needed to be measures and 
checks in place to ameliorate Indian backwardness.155 Changing Indian society 
rapidly would encourage mistrust amidst Indians and therefore cause instability. He 
described the nature of Indian people as able to “bear a great deal so long as they are 
used to it. They are very intolerant of change. They do not understand it. They are 
timid and suspicious. Benevolence and wisdom may go hand in our measures, but the 
people are not easily persuaded that what we are doing is for their good.”156 Kaye 
believed Indians could withstand great injustices if it was an established practice. 
Change was dangerous. The people of India might not tolerate changes in Indian 
customs, technology, and society. This was one reason why Kaye was against 
immediate reforms and was also why he did not think that missionaries should be 
supported by the government because that would give the impression of the EIC 
forcing change upon the people. Kaye’s view was a hybrid of the Anglicist and 
Orientalist. Kaye believed that westernization was generally better and that European 
practices such as Christianity, were an important part of British rule in India. 
However, his knowledge of Indian psychology led him to believe changing Indian 
practices too quickly was hazardous to maintaining British rule in India. 
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On the other hand, Kaye argued that certain improvements in Indian society 
were necessary, humane and required more immediate changes through new laws. 
These laws included banning the sati, infanticide, and eliminated the criminal 
Dakotee and the Thugee gangs. Kaye summarized his respect for these changes, for 
the “suttee, in our own provinces, was utterly abolished . . . female infanticide, if not 
altogether extirpated, has been much diminished in all parts of India. In our own 
provinces it does not exist at all. Thugee, another hideous evil- the systematic 
professional strangling of unsuspecting men – has, by a series of vigorous well-
directed efforts, been almost entirely struck down and demolished.”157 The sati was 
not common everywhere in India and traditionally local officials had to approve the 
sati. At first, the British banned compulsory burning, but, with local help, the British 
determined that this was not required for the Hindu faith and banned the practice 
completely.158 The Thugee and Dakotee bands were groups of thieves and murderers 
whom the British hunted and destroyed. Kaye wrote that "I have shown how they 
have toiled and striven, and with what great success, to win the benighted savage to 
the paths of civilization, and to purge the land of those cruel rites which their false 
gods were believed to sanction. There is nothing in all history more honorable to the 
British nation than the record of these humanizing labors. It is impossible to write of 
them without a glow of pleasure and of pride."159 By thus changing Indian culture 
under their dominion, they brought the natives closer to civilization. Yet, it is 
important to note how cautious the British were about some of these laws. For 
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example, the sati was slowly abolished and in accordance with the council of Hindus. 
This was important to Kaye, that the British not act rashly in destroying Indian 
culture.  
Kaye also viewed infrastructure improvements as essential parts of good 
government. Kaye’s references to public works primarily concentrated on those 
which affected most Indians and would uplift their economic, and therefore, moral 
wellbeing. In his history of the EIC written in 1853, Kaye devoted a chapter to 
discussing the canals and roads created in India. Kaye briefly discussed railroads but 
thought it was too early to determine if they increased the prosperity of the people.160 
Kaye believed the canals in the Northwest and Northeast regions of India, the former 
had been more successful, uplifted the state of the people. He demonstrated the 
benefits by examining the money collected by the EIC for usage taxes, as proof of 
how much these canals were used by the people.161 Kaye explained why he believed 
canals were one of the most important public works created in India:  
Of the moral results of these great reproductive works I need not 
particularly speak, for they are those which ever attend increased 
security and prosperity, the accumulation of capital, and the diffusion 
of wealth. To fertilize the land is to civilize the people. It is impossible 
to conceive anything that will have a greater effect upon the 
civilization of the inhabitants of Upper India than the great remedial 
measure which guards them collectively against the barbarizing and 
dehumanizing effects of famine, and secures to every man individually 
his daily bread.162 
Because canals affected most Indians and were a safeguard to famines, Kaye believed 
that this progress was significant. Kaye argued that by increasing the economic 
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prosperity of Indians, they would become increasingly interested in protecting their 
property and therefore easier to guide to making India more civilized. 
The second improvement Kaye emphasized was the development of the roads. 
These had been improved and better secured throughout British India. One specific 
improvement was the widening of the road between Calcutta and Delhi.163 These 
expanded roads led to more secure highways, protecting private property and human 
life. These improvements also led to increased communications throughout the 
provinces. Kaye viewed these public works as essential in British India because they 
improved the quality of life. He wrote that the EIC had done much, but that the 
money spent on these works was minimal in comparison to the cost of expansionist 
wars. He wrote that "on the whole, it would appear from these statements that there 
has been a progressive tendency, on the part of the Indian Government . . . to promote 
great works of public utility. That the amount of money expended on such works is 
miserably small in comparison with the immense sums lavished on unproductive 
wars, is a fact which cannot be too deeply deplored.”164 Kaye believed that the 
improvements of the people were more important that these wars demonstrating the 
importance he placed upon uplifting the people. 
Kaye also wrote about the educational reforms which took place in India. 
Kaye did not discuss the educational reforms in detail or the writings of Macaulay on 
Indian education. Rather, he wrote about the development of schools and the men 
who helped to create them. Macaulay was significant in proposing the teaching of 
                                                 
163 Ibid., 309. 





English literature and science in India not discuss this proposition. Rather, he focused 
on the governor-generals who implemented educational reform, such as Lord William 
Bentinck.165 Education was believed to be the answer to this problem. In 1813, the 
EIC became more interested in educational reforms, but it took about a decade for 
institutional progress to be made. In 1817, the Hindu College of Calcutta was created 
by Sir Henry Hyde in conjunction with the EIC, but attendance remained low.166 
Most of the schools propagated orientalist views and old beliefs, they were not true 
centers of westernization. In 1830, the home office of the EIC in Leadenhall, London 
determined that European education should be encouraged amidst the Indian elite. 
This new educational system was supported by Macaulay, Trevelyan, and Governor-
General Bentinck. Macaulay was appointed to oversee Indian education and "from 
that time English education has been a dominant in the chief Government schools 
throughout India, as before it was languid and depressed."167 These schools were not 
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meant to remove Indian culture, the vernacular was still taught, and English was an 
added subject. Many Anglo-Indians feared that the changes made by the British were 
only accepted in practice by the Indians, that these would not take root in the hearts of 
the people.168 However, Kaye argued that the effect of this schooling seemed to only 
affect the boy's mechanical abilities to be able to write and understand English. It did 
not create moral improvement. The success of the public schools varied, but Kaye 
pointed to the fact that throughout the century the missionary schools were successful 
because of the number of students. He pointed to the efforts of Duff in Calcutta who 
had many pupils in his schools.  
Kaye believed western education was important, but did not think that it 
should be only a means to an end. In 1844, as an encouragement for pursuing 
European education, Henry Hardinge declared that Indians with this education would 
be preferentially treated in seeking government employment.169 Kaye viewed this 
promise of employment as problematic. First, he admitted that by the British taking 
over governing functions in the majority of India, the local elite had lost their jobs 
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and had few, if any, other prospects. Providing Indians education and a path for 
advancement was important to Kaye to remedy the displacement of the nobility by 
the British.170 However, Kaye believed that there were not enough government 
positions to be able to support the number of students coming out of these colleges. 
Kaye argued that the EIC could not promise that Indian men with a western education 
would be placed into the EIC’s employment. Kaye believed that education had its 
own rewards. He wrote that “it was a great thing that the natives should be 
encouraged to cultivate their minds by the promise of the high reward of official 
employment; but it was a still greater thing that they should learn to rely on 
themselves- to look to education as the means of independent advancement in life.”171 
Kaye thought this education was an important part of Indians being able to become 
independent again. Kaye believed that trained Indians could be helpful in the 
government’s administration. His only criticism was the false hope some Indian 
statesmen gave to Indians for future EIC employment because there were too many 
educated Indians for the limited number of EIC positions.  
Kaye disliked the inequality and ill-treatment of Indians in the Civil Service. 
One author, Mr. Alison, described the potential for natives as “still ineligible to 
offices of trust both in the civil and military departments.”172 Kaye replied that “had 
Mr. Alison perused the existing charter of the Indian Government, he would have 
perceived that natives of India are not ‘ineglible” to offices of trust. Had he made any 
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inquiries relative to the practice of the Indian Government, he would have ascertained 
that natives of India are, every week, appointed to offices of trust.”173  Kaye did not 
define the offices open to Indians, but he did notice the progress within India and the 
potential for natives. Yet, Kaye noted that Indians were not able to reach equality 
with Europeans because he doubted “whether they [Indians] are yet admitted to a fair 
share in the administration of the country is a question, which may be properly 
discussed.”174  Kaye was unclear in his writing about how much upward mobility 
Indians should have, but he acknowledged the discontent that the absence of mobility 
for Indians would cause in India. Kaye thought that in the future, Indians would be 
included in all parts of the government. Kaye did note that it was difficult for sepoys 
to gain a rank higher than an NCO. Also, these men were always supervised by 
British officers. There was a great limit to Indian promotion within the army.175 Kaye 
clearly thought that there needed to be a type of amelioration for the elite Indians who 
had lost their governing positions. Once Indians had been westernized, they should 
have been trusted in important positions. Kaye was critical of the racially imposed 
limits on Indian potential.  
Kaye’s Pre-1857 Writings on the Expansion of the British Empire 
During the beginning of the nineteenth century, British India expanded 
significantly, to include the Punjab, Oude, Sindh, and Gwalior. Kaye viewed the 
British government as continuously hungry for more lands. Kaye did not think this 
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would change because “history forbids us to believe, that the British Government will 
long be contented with what it has got.”176 Kaye was not a rampant expansionist. 
Rather, he had a critical and cautious view of British expansion. His criticisms of the 
British Government’s and the EIC’s policy towards expansion were guided by his 
paternalistic view of Indians, his respect for other cultures, and his desire for the 
British to refrain from intimidating behaviors. Kaye was against general territorial 
expansion because it was costly and diverted funds that could otherwise be used for 
public improvements. Even though he was against expansion, he viewed it as 
sometimes inevitable within India because of aggressions from outside. Kaye was not 
a pacifist. He believed that under certain circumstances the EIC and the Empire 
should defend their territories and were justified to take over other regions.  
Kaye argued that in many situations the British had no option but to expand 
their empire within India. In 1849, Kaye generally defended the EIC's annexations in 
India by arguing that “the extension of our Indian Empire has been a matter of sheer 
necessity.”177 Certain wars and annexations were necessary either because of Indian 
aggression or previous British interventions which left them no moral option but to 
interfere in other Indian principalities.  In 1853, when Kaye defended renewing the 
Company’s charter in India, he insisted that the company did not want uncontrollable 
expansion. He wrote that the Company had "never dreamt of establishing 
principalities in India- of conquering native states and ruling native tribes- of sending 
out soldiers and law-givers to Hindostan.”178 Kaye believed that there was not a 
                                                 
176 Kaye, “The War in China,” Calcutta Review, Vol 1, 188.  
177 Kaye, "Civis on Indian Affairs," 407. 





general wish for senseless expansion. In this, Kaye distinguished between the British 
Empire in general, of which he was very critical about expansion, and the EIC. As 
noted earlier, Kaye claimed that the British always desired expansion, but that the 
EIC did not want additional lands. Kaye argued that the EIC was better to bring 
progress in India and make governing decisions. Kaye differentiated between wars of 
the EIC and conflicts, which might have used the EIC’s resources, but which where 
instigated by the British home government. He wrote, “it is a common thing to cry 
out against the Company’s lust of dominion; but there never was a government less 
greedy of conquest. We have seen a smile of incredulity on the lips even of intelligent 
men, when it has been asserted that such acquisitions as those of the Punjab have 
been forced upon us.”179  Kaye believed that circumstances had forced the EIC into 
war. Previously, Kaye argued that the British were continuously in want of more land. 
The annexations and wars that Kaye was the most critical of were under Lord 
Auckland and Ellenborough. This could be a conflict in thinking or an important 
differentiation. Kaye was more likely to defend the EIC’s decisions and to interpret 
actions of the British Empire as selfish and impending his view of progress.  
Kaye admired men who strove for peace, but who could engage in war when 
necessary. He praised Hardinge because he only entered into war if it were a 
necessity. Hardinge brought the EIC into war, as a last resort, and not as something 
that had been manipulated. Kaye believed that Hardinge's own experience of the 
trauma of war had led him to avoid pointless conflict. For, “men who know best what 
are the horrors of war are the least likely to plunge a country into them” for Kaye, this 
                                                 





explained why, even after having a militaristic youth, Cornwallis had no craving for 
war, “he was resolute to maintain the country in peace, if it could be done 
consistently with our honour and our safety; but did not disguise from himself the fact 
that he might be unwillingly precipitated into war.”180 Kaye admired men who did not 
have a “vigorous” government, but who appreciated peace and yet, when necessary 
were not scared to engage in warfare.  
 
Kaye’s View of Justified Reasons for War 
Even though Kaye favored peace, he believed there were justifiable reasons 
for war. The East India Company had expanded significantly from the early 
eighteenth century to the mid nineteenth century and Kaye thought there were two 
legitimate arguments for land annexation. The first was to prevent or stop the British 
from supporting a despotic power. During the long period of British involvement in 
India they had established relationships with surrounding kingdoms. This support 
could be in the form of soldiers, money, or political support.  But along with this 
involvement came the British right to interfere when the poor native leadership led to 
the oppression of the people. If these Indian rulers began to be despotic towards the 
people under their care, the British would be guilty by association. Kaye believed 
military intervention to be justified when the British previously had intervened and 
supported evil leaders. The second justified reason for war was to protect the EIC 
from foreign aggression.   
                                                 





Kaye used the British annexations of the Punjab and the Oude as justified 
examples of expansion within the empire. The Punjab was the home of the Sikh 
Empire, located in northern India and annexed to the British Raj in 1849. Kaye 
recorded that since the death of Runjeet Singh in 1839, “the annals of the Sikh nation 
have presented one continued series of tragic events, in which almost every possible 
form of murder and violence had been developed.”181 But because of the Company's 
non-interference policy, “the British Government in India was, for years, an idle 
spectator” to the evils committed.182 The position of the Punjab was strategic for the 
protection of India. Kaye debated if the British could interfere in the Punjab without a 
legitimate cause in order to maintain the British policy of non-interference. In 1844, 
Kaye did not see any reason to invade.183  The British relationships with the Sikhs 
continued to grow more tenuous. The Afghanistan War increased these strained 
relations because the British hired part of the Sikh army to assist in their campaigns. 
The British criticized the Sikhs for inadequate assistance in the conflict. After the 
war, the Punjab was mismanaged by the native rulers and its army became restless 
and desired to invade India. Kaye argued that for a while, the British did not take 
these threats seriously. For safety measures, the British stationed an army nearby the 
Sutlej, the border between British Indian and the Sikh empire.184 When the Sikh army 
crossed the Sutlej, and thereby broke their treaty with the British, war was 
declared.185  The clear aggression shown by the Sikhs justified the British going to 
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war to defend British India. Kaye also viewed this annexation as very beneficial to 
the inhabitants of the Punjab. In 1849, Kaye emphasized that “we know that the Sikhs 
have not proven themselves worthy of the forbearance which was exercised towards 
them . . . but we were never more assured than at the recent moment of the wisdom 
and the nobility of the course pursued by Lord Hardinge, and never less inclined to 
regret it.”186 The British could not fail to act and because the British had previously 
been involved, it was just for them to act. They could not stand by and see people 
suffer at the hand of rulers once supported by the British. Kaye justified this 
annexation by claiming the Sikhs had shown first signs of aggression and were unjust 
rulers to their people.  
The second example was the territory of the Oude which was annexed in 
1856.  Kaye justified this annexation by arguing that the British had already been 
interfering in the territory and the Indian prince was no longer the true ruler. He wrote 
that “we must waste no sympathy on the extinction of an ancient sovereignty” 
because “the Governor of Oude was no more an independent sovereign than is the 
Lord- Lieutenant of Ireland.”187 Kaye claimed that the native rulers were no more 
than puppet kings for the British. Kaye referred to this as dual government. The 
British were thus partially responsible for the treatment of the people under the Oude 
princes. Kaye argued that the Oude government “ground the people to the dust.”188 
The rulers of the Oude had been warned that if they did not change and start to help 
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the people, then the British would have to take over.189  British support made the 
situation worse because this “connection with the country had largely contributed to 
the sufferings of the people, inasmuch as it had afforded protection to tyranny, and 
rendered hopeless the resistance of the oppressed.”190  Because the British had set up 
native governors in Oude, when these governors turned cruel and broke treaties, the 
British had to intercede. To have just removed the British troops from the territory 
would have been worse because it could have thrown the Oude into a civil war. This 
meant there would be a lot of violence and eventually the British would have later 
interfered after more evil had been done to the people.191  It was better for the British 
“to assume the administration of Oude before than after a civil war in the course of 
which, in all human likelihood, the king himself would have been barbarously 
slain.”192 Kaye believed that in some cases the British had no choice but to intervene 
in surrounding Indian territories. If it were necessary, then Kaye approved of these 
actions.  
Kaye’s Criticisms of Unjustified War 
 Kaye was opposed to continued expansion for many reasons. One of the 
greatest objections Kaye had against continued expansion was how it would 
negatively impact the people of India already under the EIC’s care, a view highly 
influenced by paternalism. Kaye disagreed with some wars started by the EIC and the 
majority of wars directed by the British home government. Kaye believed further 
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expansion was dangerous because of the monetary cost which could be better used 
elsewhere. Kaye was very aware of the burdens of war to the EIC. In 1848, Kaye 
wrote that “it is, doubtless, a very humiliating fact, that the representatives of the 
people have been voting away large sums of public money for the purchase and the 
support of the instruments and agents of human destruction.”193 Kaye viewed war as 
counter to good government because it was wasteful of resources. In 1853, Kaye 
claimed that further expansion would “swallow up the surplus revenue.”194 By 
emptying the public treasury, public works could not be completed which would 
benefit the British and Indians. Kaye wrote that  
all beneficent schemes of the development of the resources of the 
country- the education of the people- the protection of their lives and 
property- the furtherance of their commerce- every measure, indeed, 
for the advancement of their social happiness, the improvement of 
their political condition, must be for a while suspended. Instead of 
digging canals we must cast cannon; instead of framing beneficent 
laws we must send forth martial manifestos; in place of new roads we 
must have new regiments; hospitals and colleges are wanted, and we 
erect barracks in their room.195  
 
It was not just for the betterment of the people that war should be avoided. If the 
people were less burdened the government, and therefore the EIC, would prosper. 
Kaye argued that peace would be mutually beneficial. This paternalistic perspective 
greatly influenced Kaye’s writing and was a large element of his viewpoint on 
expansion. Even though Kaye had specific opinions on different annexations and 
invasion, he viewed peace as better than the consequences of war. 
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Kaye disliked the war-mongery and bullying British behavior he identified in 
the debates over potential annexations. Kaye identified Lord Ellenborough as 
particularly favorable towards war and manipulating situations to lead to conflict. 
This was a shift for Kaye, who was initially in favor of Lord Ellenborough because of 
his anti-war stance and his denouncement of the Afghanistan War.196 When 
Ellenborough became governor-general in 1841, he declared that he detested 
aggressive policies and would instead focus on the “arts of peace; to emulate the 
magnificent benevolence of the Mahomedan conquerors; to elevate and improve the 
condition of the generous and mighty people of India.”197 Ellenborough’s 
pronouncement aligned with the priorities Kaye argued were important in a 
government. Kaye respected this position because of the focus on how British rule 
affected the people of India. But, between a small mutiny and his withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, Ellenborough’s viewpoint on war became more aggressive.198 Kaye was 
disappointed that Ellenborough was not the man of peace he had claimed to be when 
he came to India. Instead Ellenborough had been tantalized by war. Kaye argued that 
Ellenborough’s “hatred of war was confined to the wars made by other men.”199 After 
this war, Ellenborough was seduced by the "allurements of the camp which had 
dazzled his eyes and captured his ear and led astray his understanding."200 As 
Ellenborough went through the beginning of his time as the Governor-General of 
India, he became power hungry, which displeased Kaye. During his short tenure as 
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Governor-General, the EIC was at war nearly the whole period of 1842-1844. 
Ellenborough failed to quickly and adequately withdraw the troops from Afghanistan, 
he went to war with the faithful Amirs of the Sindh, and annexed Gwalior. Kaye was 
highly critical of each of the conflicts which occurred during Ellenborough's period as 
governor-general because they were not legitimate reasons for war.  
Kaye also disagreed with the British bullying behavior towards surrounding 
regions. He viewed this as unacceptable British conduct which placed Indians in an 
untenable position and manufactured circumstances used to justify annexations. The 
British many times claimed they had negotiated with a region before invasion or 
annexation. Yet, Kaye claimed that many of these “negotiations” between the EIC 
and less powerful princes was a method of forcing their will on other regions. Kaye 
found that the treaties made with surrounding powers favored the British, who then 
viewed it as their right to interfere regardless of circumstances. Kaye summarized 
these negotiations by asking his “readers to look well into this struggle between 
strength and weakness. The strong man forces upon the weaker a covenant of his own 
invention; no matter how inequitable it is, the weaker one must accord his 
consent.”201 Kaye used the Ameers of the Sindh, who bordered Afghanistan and the 
Indus river, as an example of British intimidating behavior which led to illegitimate 
annexation. The British and the Ameers had disagreements over river usage rights; 
the British broke the previous treaty to use the Indus to move military forces, an 
action which was barred in their treaty. Kaye argued that the Ameers, aware of the 
                                                 






British style of forceful negotiations, met the British with an army in an attempt to 
make the talks more equal.202 Ellenborough used this amassing of the Sindh army as 
an act of aggression which justified war, even though the British broke the treaty 
beforehand and also had a nearby army. Kaye argued that Ellenborough used a double 
standard. Many times, the British came to negotiations with an army waiting to 
invade. Yet, when Indians mimicked the British example, Ellenborough used it as a 
justification for war because he viewed it as aggressive behavior against British 
interests. 
Another trend in British-Asian relations was the British tendency to invade 
and annex other territories without any justification except for the British strength to 
do so. Kaye used the annexation of Gwalior to demonstrate his argument. Kaye did 
not believe the British had any “just pretext for the absorption of Gwalior . . . to do 
evil that good may come of it is no more admissible in politics than in morals.”203 
Kaye did not defend British actions in which the end could justify the means. There 
needed to be a legitimate reason to interfere in another culture before invading. Kaye 
claimed that this annexation was only justifiable by:    
might makes right- and might has made right from the beginning of the 
world, and probably will, to the end of it. To defend, in accordance 
with any abstract principles of justice, the doctrine that a weak state, 
continuous to a stronger one, only exists by sufferance. . . the character 
of a just and uprising statesman is never more clearly evinced than in 
the measure of respect for the rights of the weak, which his policy 
exhibits.204  
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Gwalior was now a British Province with “a stroke of a pen”205 Kaye described this 
bullying behavior as unacceptable. He believed that the British needed legitimate 
reasons for annexation and negotiations needed to occur with respect and justice 
towards the natives. Even though Kaye did not write explicitly about the personal 
Indian-British relationships, throughout his writings, he clearly thought that the 
British needed to emulate the behavior expected by their subjects. In these instances, 
such as the annexation of Gwalior, Kaye identified British conduct which was not 
honorable and worse than the natives around them. This was against Kaye's 
expectations of the British role in India and was the opposite of the kind of 
paternalistic behavior he expected.  
Kaye also did not believe that war was justified by economic gain. Kaye 
recognized that the British war in China (1839-1842) was only for commercial 
interests; there was no aggression from the Chinese and no broken treaty. Kaye 
summarized the war as a three-year “murderous conflict” in which all the “worst 
miseries of war were let loose, in this unequal contest, upon myriads of innocent 
human beings."206 Kaye viewed war as causing death and misery. He did not play 
down Chinese deaths versus British deaths.  In Kaye's writing on this conflict, it was 
clear that he disagreed with the inhuman way the Chinese were treated by other 
British writers. The people of China were described as mere objects that were broken 
like clay pots, not human beings who were killed. Kaye argued that the British press 
presented the war without “a thought to murderous grape and canister riddling dense 
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masses of humanity jammed into narrow streets. No; in the imaginations of these 
merry witlings, there was nothing worse than an immortal smash of China; -round-
shot booming into porcelain-warehouses and damaging, not men, but tea-cups.”207 
This dehumanizing view of the Chinese contradicted Kaye’s racial ideas; being from 
the East did not make the Chinese less worthy of human consideration. Rather, Kaye 
had a positive view of the Chinese who were a “people quick to learn; docile and 
initiative.”208 Kaye in no way approved of this conflict, but he did look for ways the 
people of China could benefit. He hoped that since the country had been invaded in 
such a way, that the Chinese people would at least have further access to educational 
possibilities. In this vein, he saw the blessings of “the glorious effulgence of 
Christianity and civilization serenely beaming over all.”209 Even though Kaye was 
appalled by the violence toward the Chinese and their representation by British 
writers, he hoped that in return for these atrocities, the Chinese would be able to gain 
greater education and Christianity.  
 One of Kaye’s major critiques of British expansion was the invasion of 
Afghanistan. His criticisms of this conflict included the majority of his arguments 
against war.  In 1844, Kaye wrote about the British expedition to secure the Indus 
River and to protect India by placing a “puppet king” who would be beholden to the 
British in Afghanistan. The British were concerned about European foreign invasions 
into India through surrounding countries. In 1809, the British forged a treaty with 
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Persia in which the latter would not allow foreign armies to pass through to British 
territories.210 A dispute between Afghanistan and Persia in the 1840s compelled the 
British to invade Afghanistan to place their own puppet king on the throne and 
remove Dost Mohamed from his throne. Kaye wrote that the British had made 
“negotiations” in which Dost Mohamed had many demands placed on him by the 
British with little promised in return. Dost Mohamed requested that the British protect 
Kabul and Kandahar from Persia, that Runjeet Singh surrender Peshawar, and for the 
British to protect the individuals in Peshawar when it returned to Sultan Mohamed 
Khan.211 Kaye argued that the British should have made reasonable negotiations with 
Dost Mohamed from the beginning. Kaye’s post-war writings displayed great respect 
for Dost Mohamed because he had done “much that may be regarded with admiration 
and respect even by Christian men. Success did not disturb the balance of his mind, 
nor power harden his heart."212 The British did not agree to any of Dost Mohamed’s 
requests and instead invaded Afghanistan, but were ultimately unsuccessful. Kaye 
listed specific reasons for why the war failed as making war with a peace 
establishment, making war without a safe base of operations, bringing Indians into a 
foreign country where they were ‘infidels’, invading a country which was poor and 
therefore unable to supply what they needed for the army, and the mismanagement of 
the military after the outbreak of Kabul.213 Kaye viewed the results of the first War in 
Afghanistan as laughable and immoral. He articulated the pointlessness of the war by 
showing how all three powers had failed to meet their objectives because “the 
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Persians had failed to take Herat. The Russians had failed to make good their way to 
Khiva. And the English had failed to consolidate the Afghan empire under its old 
Suddozye sovereigns. In these vain attempts the three states had squandered life and 
money.”214 Kaye thought that the British results were worse because they 
accomplished the opposite of their goals. He wrote that if “the great object of our 
advance beyond the Indus having been to secure a friendly power in Afghanistan, it is 
-obvious that we have failed” because they made an enemy.215 Further, Kaye argued 
that pre-emptive wars were morally reprehensible. He wrote that “we are not to do 
evil that good may come of it; we are not to make war in order to maintain peace.”216 
His words of wisdom were that "to anticipate danger is often to create it."217 By 
starting a pre-emptive war, Kaye believed the British looked foolish and suffered a 
national embarrassment. 
The war in Afghanistan exemplified Kaye's idea of a failed war and 
unjustified because this conflict was unnecessary and was manufactured by the 
British. This war epitomized British bullying behavior by making unreasonable 
demands on another power and then invading when the demands were not met. As 
indefensible and embarrassing as this war was to Kaye, more importantly, he viewed 
it as very unfair to the Indian people. The war was not the machinations of the EIC, 
but the British home government. Yet, it was the EIC’s purse which was emptied to 
pay for the war. Kaye wrote that Lord Auckland, who initially had committed Britain 
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to this conflict, had confessed that this war lost “eight millions of money” from the 
Indian treasury and that the costs “fell upon the revenues of India; and the country is 
still groaning under the weight.”109 This money could not be spent on roads or 
schools. What made this worse was that the money was not spent to protect India 
itself. Indians received no benefit. This was not how the EIC should have spent its 
funds; money spent on the people was better than money spent on death. Another 
reason this war was problematic for Kaye was that it forced sepoys to leave their 
home country and cross the Indus River. Sepoys were willing to fight for the British, 
but were used to staying within India and close to their families. To leave India for 
war was one of the problems which caused fear amongst Indians. This was another 
example of how the British ignored sepoy concerns and forced them into an 
uncomfortable and unfair position- they had not signed up to fight for the British 
Empire at large.  
Conclusion 
Kaye’s arguments on India were guided by paternalism, which shaped how 
Kaye viewed progressive policies in India. Kaye believed that the British had to live 
in a manner which would inspire change in the lives of Indians. Paternalism even 
influenced Kaye’s criticisms of the EIC’s policies on expansion. Continuous 
expansion cost money. This money could not be spent on education and public works. 
Because of his experience in India, Kaye believed that reforms needed to be enacted 
slowly in order to not scare the people of India. Kaye also demonstrated a respect for 





surrounding princes. His viewpoint of how the EIC operated within India is important 








Chapter 4: Kaye’s Paternalistic Interpretation of the 1857 Indian 
Rebellion 
 
Kaye interpreted the 1857 rebellion through his well-established paternalistic 
view of British India.  His writings became more reflective on how British 
interference had caused discontent among the people of India. Even though he was 
critical of the policies of the EIC before the rebellion, afterwards he directly tied 
changes the British made in India to the causes of the outbreak in 1857. His first book 
published after the rebellion was a defense of Christianity in India. It argued that 
missionaries did not cause the uprising. He later published three volumes on the 
Sepoy War, each of which was over five hundred pages. These works, in addition to 
Kaye’s articles, articulated his position that the rebellion was the result of the slow 
degradation of the Indian-British relationship through westernization and that the 
greased cartridges were only the ignition point of a much deeper problem. 
Expansionist policies and the doctrine of lapse, claiming land with no blood heir, had 





spark igniting the fear and discontent already caused by British changes in India and 
the failure of paternalism. In addition to his four books which were published to 
address the rebellion, Kaye wrote numerous articles about the future of the EIC. 
Kaye, unlike the majority of the British, defended the EIC and argued for its 
continuance and against crown rule of India. Kaye depicted the EIC as a necessary 
vehicle for bringing progress to India. Even though Kaye was more aware of the 
negative impact of British “reforms” in India, he did not believe that the British had 
done anything wrong except in striving for good. Westernization reforms, in 
combination with the breakdown of the paternalistic bond, led to the increase of fear 
and mistrust by Indians which led to the outbreak of the rebellion. Many of the 
changes the British made caused Indians to mistrust the British. This chapter will 
examine Kaye’s paternalistic analysis of the causes of the rebellion by looking at how 
he described Christianity, westernization, British land acquisitions, and his defense of 
the EIC. First, this chapter will consider the unique nature of his published writings 
after 1857 and how his publications created a narrative. Next, this chapter will 
examine how Kaye viewed the slow decline of the British-Indian paternalistic 
relations as heavily responsible for the rebellion, even though he did not directly 
blame the British. Kaye depicted how the British had unintentionally helped to create 
the circumstances for the rebellion. Lastly, this chapter will depict how Kaye argued 
for the continuation of the EIC. Kaye depicted the British as being responsible for 
improving India and maintaining a strong relationship with their subjects. Kaye 
represented the EIC as well equipped to brining the British idea of progress to India. 





1857. Overall, Kaye demonstrated an exceptional reaction to 1857 which refused to 
place the blame on one segment of the people or on the racial inferiority of Indians.  
Kaye’s Post-1857 Publications 
 Kaye wrote many books and articles after the outbreak of the rebellion. The 
first book published was Christianity in India in 1859. This work covered the 
influence of missionaries in India, beginning with the spreading of Nestorian 
Christianity and ending with the start of the rebellion. This book drew on his past 
writings about Christianity and was published relatively quickly after the outbreak of 
the Sepoy War. Kaye wrote this book in direct opposition to the two popular 
arguments about how Christianity caused the 1857 rebellion. The first argument was 
that the sepoys had responded in fear to overly invasive missionary activities. The 
second was that the British, in fact, had not done enough to convert Indians to 
Christianity and therefore God brought the rebellion as a punishment. Kaye's work 
was meant to disprove both predominant ideas because in his view the British had 
taken an intermediate course in its policies towards missionaries and had not favored 
either extreme. Kaye believed that it was important to disprove both of these theories 
quickly because of how these debates had disrupted Victorian society and distracted 
from other legitimate reasons for the rebellion. Kaye wrote that during the rebellion 
he often "found in society that men would turn away from the consideration of the 
most important political events, or the most touching personal incidents, to discuss 
the great subject of the future place of India among the Christian nations of the world. 
The missionary seemed, even then, to overlay the military element in men’s minds; 





have ceased to regard it in any other light.”218 Indeed, Kaye believed that the debates 
in Britain about the causes of the rebellion during 1857 and 1858 were filled with 
errors.219 Kaye insisted that it was a mistake to put so much emphasis on Christianity 
and that doing so overlooked other reasons for the rebellion.  This book was an 
attempt to correct these inaccurate debates in Indian society, but it also looked 
forward and proposed future policies on missionary work in India. 
In addition to this book, Kaye wrote three others to explain the events of 
1857-1858.220 These writings are what he is remembered for and have remained basic 
texts for studying the rebellion. These books vary from the norm for a variety of 
reasons. The first is that these are the most thorough writings on the Sepoy War, 
ending with the capture of Delhi by the British in September of 1857. The conflict 
began in May of 1857, which meant his second and third histories covered five 
months in total. This thoroughness is exceptional because most other writers of the 
Mutiny completed their histories in a maximum of two volumes. Also, Kaye 
dedicated a whole volume to the long history of how the rebellion began. Colonel 
Malleson finished Kaye's history in an additional three volumes. Secondly, Kaye used 
the personal papers of high-ranking men involved in the events, such as the papers of 
Lord Canning. Many of the sources Kaye used have not survived, making Kaye's 
histories the closest accounts to the original records. Many other authors did not have 
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access to these direct sources and only used official government publications and 
other previously published histories. Thirdly, Kaye’s organizational structure of his 
histories, and the narrative he wrote of the events before the sepoy rebellion, 
demonstrated that the greased cartridges were not the sole reason for rebellion. 
Through his first volume, Kaye insisted that the Sepoy War was caused by the 
breakdown of paternalism because of westernization which created discontent among 
Indians, particularly with the aristocracy. In this volume, Kaye placed partial blame 
for the rebellion on the British, though he refused to place the majority of the blame 
on the British. 
Kaye opened his first volume by summarizing his argument that the Indian 
uprising was the result of British interventions in India, even though he did not 
believe the British were wrong for instituting changes in India. His writing 
demonstrated a slow progression of events which eventually culminated in the 
rebellion. In this gradual development, Kaye could not erase the role British 
interference in Indian life played in causing the discontent which led to the rebellion 
however good intentioned.  Kaye wrote that: 
Indeed, the errors of which I have freely spoken were, for the most 
part, strivings after good. It was in the over-eager pursuit of Humanity 
and Civilization that Indian statesmen of the new school were betrayed 
into the excesses which have been so grievously visiting upon the 
nation. The story of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 is, perhaps, the most 
signal illustration of our great national character ever yet recorded in 
the annals of our country. It was the vehement self-assertion of the 
Englishman that produced this conflagration; it was the same 
vehement self-assertion that enabled him, by God’s blessings to 
trample it out. It was a noble egotism, mighty alike in doing and in 
suffering, and it showed itself grandly capable of steadfastly 
confronting the dangers which it had brought down upon itself. If I 





the great crisis arose; but it was only because we were English that, 
when it arose, it did not utterly overwhelm us.221  
 
Kaye did not sidestep the fact that the British desire for change was a part of the 
reason for the uprising. Rather, it was the self-assertion of the English which was 
problematic. The British strove too much for good. British character in India- the 
pride, superiority, and desire to cause change- what Kaye referred to as “too English” 
is what caused the conflict. One of the problems Kaye wrote about during the various 
annexations and changes made within India was the continuing divide between 
Indians and the British, partially due to the increased haughtiness of the British. He 
covered the conquests of the Punjab and Pegu, the doctrine of lapse, the annexation of 
Oude, the erosion of the Indian aristocracy, westernization, the attributes of the Indian 
army and how it deteriorated through centralization, various mutinies, the 
Afghanistan War, and the immediate events leading up to the uprising. By starting his 
history of the Sepoy War with this long history of incremental British self-assertion, 
Kaye indicated that these events were connected to the rebellion in some way. Kaye 
argued that these policies over time had eroded the trust between the British and 
Indians to a point that the sepoys could be easily manipulated to fear the British. By 
1856, the “inflammability of the native mind was continually increasing; and . . . 
there were many influential persons, both Hindoo and Mahomedan, running over with 
bitter resentments against the English, who were eagerly awaiting a favorable 
opportunity to set all these combustible materials in a blaze.”222 This degradation of 
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the paternalistic relationship through perceived wrongs by the British created the 
perfect circumstances for Indians to react in fear and to distrust their British officers.  
Kaye’s Defense of Christianity in India  
 Kaye disagreed with the popular views of how Christianity had caused the 
Sepoy War through either the overreach of missionaries or the lack of conversions 
bringing God’s wrath. Kaye maintained that the long history of missionary activities 
in India without large negative reactions from Indians supported his point that the 
rebellion was not caused by conversion activities. For Kaye, the fact that the English 
Church very slowly instituted itself in India was one reason why Indians did not panic 
over missionary activities. If Protestant missionaries had arrived in large numbers 
when the British initially arrived through the EIC’s support, then Indians might have 
feared loss of their own culture. He wrote that it took eighty years to build a church in 
Bengal after the British first arrived on the sub-continent.223 Kaye emphasized how 
“slow, indeed, was the growth of religion and morality among the English in India. 
Hospitality, kindness, generosity, nay, even a sort of conventionality, which might 
have been mistaken for something better, sprang up among our people; but it was 
long before Christian piety and its fair fruits began to bless our adopted land.”224  He 
asserted that “it is a profound conviction in my mind- that the cause of Christianity in 
India is indebted, humanly speaking, to nothing so much as the often-condemned 
‘backwardness’ of our forefathers.”225 By the EIC trying not to encourage 
Christianity, Indians did not fear conversion, their guard came down, and they 
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tolerated the building of churches. The British only asserted themselves because 
Indians felt secure.  Kaye argued that individual missionaries did not cause fear in 
India. He wrote that the "natives of India have no fear of the persuasive efforts of 
Christian ministers, that the arguments and exhortations of individual men or of 
private societies create no apprehensions in their minds."226  Kaye emphasized that 
individuals proselytizing natives did not cause fear and persuasive missionaries were 
acceptable if they were not agents of the EIC. Rather, the British government 
instituting a change which had religious implications created a fear of forced 
conversion. Hindus and Muslims could live peacefully with those of another faith. 
The problem was how Indians perceived EIC policy. Kaye argued that because of the 
slow progress of Christianity in India, Indians viewed it as non-threatening to their 
religious practices and therefore did not revolt because of missionaries proselytizing.  
Kaye insisted that the EIC had taken an intermediate policy in regards to 
supporting missionaries, which he believed was wise, and supported his argument 
against missionaries causing the 1857 rebellion. Kaye argued this by discussing his 
theory of how the EIC should interact with the Indian people regarding Christianity. 
He wrote that “the duty of the Government was the practice of general toleration 
towards all the religions professed by the people under their rule, permitting every 
man, without restraint and without interference, to worship his God, true or false, in 
his own way.”227 Kaye did not believe the British had the right to outlaw the practice 
of religious activity, whether it was a Christian or pagan belief. Kaye fully believed 
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that Christianity would benefit Indians. However, he believed that this conversion 
should come through personal examples and the work of individuals and not through 
forced behavior modification—once again illustrating the place of paternalism within 
his system of rule.  
Other parties in Britain did not think that the EIC was doing enough to spread 
Christianity. Rather, they thought that the EIC should have taken direct actions to 
convert more Indians to the Christian faith. Kaye observe that the government’s lack 
of support was viewed by some as a support of Indian idolatry.228 Religion and caste 
were protected by the Indian legislatures and by the British Parliament, once again 
making it look like the government supported Hinduism and Islam.229 In the early 
nineteenth century, the British debated if they were inadvertently supporting 
paganism through collecting the pilgrim tax. When Indians travelled to certain 
religious sites and festivals they traditionally paid a tax to the native government. 
When the EIC became a governing power, it continued to collect this tax. Many 
viewed this as a support of paganism and idolatry, especially as the EIC profited from 
it.230  Kaye argued that it was a difficult decision because to abolish the tax might also 
have encouraged more pilgrimage visits.231 The EIC kept the tax to maintain the 
temples, which was regarded as its duty as rulers to prevent them from falling into 
disrepair.  Kaye wrote that "the British Government here undertakes to maintain the 
religious institutions of the Hindu faith. Thus was Government connection with 
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Idolatry openly declared and authoritatively established.”232 Kaye believed that the 
EIC had chosen a careful and thoughtful course of action. By 1840, the EIC removed 
the pilgrim tax, but not before it had been declared as encouraging pagan belief. For 
Kaye, the policy of the EIC demonstrated that it knew that interacting with the Indian 
populace on matters of religion was complicated. Kaye used this debate to highlight 
how the Company tried to take a middle stance and neither encourage what they 
viewed as paganism nor upset the people by forcing Christian practices on a country 
which primarily consisted of Muslims and Hindus. For Kaye, the EIC’s backing of 
Indian tradition while also supporting Christianity demonstrated that the EIC was not 
at fault for failing to support Christianity. The 1857 rebellion was not the result of 
punishment from God on the British.   
Kaye also argued that the true danger to maintaining control in India was 
Indian officials who mixed religion and duty because there was a danger of making it 
seem as if the EIC was pushing for forced conversion of Indians. Kaye wrote that 
Indians "are keenly sensitive of anything that even faintly resembles coercion by the 
State, and the least appearance of authoritative Government interference, therefore, 
excites, first in the teachers, and then in the followers both of Hindooism and 
Mohammedanism, the most unreasonable emotions of alarm."233 The true danger to 
the empire was the Anglo-Indians who mixed their civic duties with their personal 
beliefs, causing Indians to fear the intentions of the government. Kaye wrote that 
“tidings reached England that a proselytizing spirit was abroad among the officers of 
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the State- that soldiers and civilians were usurping the functions of the missionary- 
and so interfering with the religions of the people of the country as to awaken 
suspicion of the good faith of the Government itself.”234 In 1847, the EIC officially 
forbade company employees, both civil and military, to participate in mission work 
because they did not want it to appear as if the British government officially 
supported the spread of Christianity.235 Kaye emphasized how important it was for 
Indians to believe their religious institutions were safe from British interference.  
After 1813, when the EIC was mandated to allow priests in India and permit the 
building of a church infrastructure “the natives regarded with disinterest, because 
their own institutions were safe."236 For “in the neutrality of the Government lies the 
hope of missionaries. It is the basis of all evangelical success.”237 There was a clear 
line between the state and religion, which in a country with three dominant religions 
was a necessity to keep the peace. The British had to live like Christians in India 
before there could be conversion of the populace. When it came to the EIC’s policy, 
he thought the Company should have an intermediate approach to maintain peace in 
India and refrain from directly encouraging proselytizing of their subjects.  
Kaye concluded that neither the lack of missionary work nor the anger of 
Indians towards missionaries caused the rebellion. Kaye concluded that missionary 
work had not caused the Sepoy War because he did not think that “anything which 
tended to the downfall of our temporal kingdom in India could have contributed to the 
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extension of Christ’s kingdom on earth.”238 For God to allow a rebellion in response 
to spreading Christianity was antithetical to Kaye's beliefs. However, Kaye admitted 
that religion could not be ruled out as a contributing factor to the revolt. He wrote that 
Christianity "contributed something to the vague feeling of insecurity and alarm 
which predisposed men’s minds to regard with suspicion the designs of the Christian 
Government, and to distort into the most grotesque shapes of the manifestations of its 
power."239 Even though Kaye acknowledged that religion in this way could have 
contributed to the rebellion, he refused to overemphasize the role of Christianity. 
Kaye argued that the EIC needed to be cautious moving forward in how their policies 
affected religious practice and needed to demonstrate that one religion was not 
favored. For example, if Christianity were taught in the public schools from the 
public purse, then Hinduism and Islam had to also be instructed.240 Even so, Kaye 
still saw the potential for the conversion of more Indians and he did not want the EIC 
to adopt any policy which might damage this. He wrote that "for the small handful of 
Christian men whose mission I firmly believe it is, in God’s good time, to evangelize 
the great Indian races . . . doing nothing rashly, nothing precipitately, lest our own 
folly should mar the good work, and retard the ripening of the harvest.”241 In Kaye’s 
writings he viewed spreading Christianity as important, and he was optimistic of the 
future of converting Indians to Christianity even after the rebellion. 
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Kaye’s Argument for Westernization and the Decline of Paternalism’s 
Contribution to the outbreak of 1857 
A large part of Kaye's post-1857 writings re-examined the EIC’s policy in 
Indian government and society. The British brought westernization to the Indian 
army, government, and infrastructure. Before the rebellion, Kaye viewed most of 
these changes as beneficial and a form of progress. Though Kaye urged for caution in 
these "progressive reforms," he did not view them as a negative British influence. 
After 1857, although Kaye continued to approve of the changes the British made in 
India, his discussion of the events leading up to the rebellion revealed a newly 
cautious attitude towards those policies. He emphasized how the changes created a 
disconnect between the Anglo-Indian community and the people. Kaye argued that 
these changes for modernization and improved morality in India ruined the 
paternalistic relationship, leading to the British being unaware of the discontent 
growing within certain areas of India. 
In his post-rebellion writings, Kaye attributed the declining paternalism to 
the growing cultural divide between the British and Indians. He wrote that 
increased intercourse between India and “Europe gave a more European 
complexion to society. English news, English books, above all, English 
gentlewomen, made their way freely and rapidly to India.”242 Because the time it 
took to travel between the colony and Britain had been shortened, there was an 
increase in British culture being brought into India. This westernization created a 
division between Indians and the British because the British were less likely to 
                                                 





adopt Indian customs. Gone were the days when the British went “native.” This 
division created an atmosphere where “there was no reciprocity of kindly feeling, 
no bond of sympathy between the white-faced captain and the dusky sentinel. The 
bond had been broken, people said, by the encroachment of Western civilization; 
and there was a growing feeling of indifference or distaste on the one side, and of 
bitter resentment on the other.”243 The British belief in their superiority, which led 
to pride in their interactions with Indians, contributed to their “indifference” 
towards Indians. The result was Indians feeling increasingly bitter towards their 
British officers.  This increasing separation of Anglo-Indian and Indian cultures 
because of westernization decreased the familiarity between the two races. The 
British, because of their perceived superiority, did not interact with Indians in a 
more familiar setting. This created growing resentment amongst the Indian 
population because of the way the British treated them. Since Kaye had viewed 
change as operating osmotically through great men, this breakdown was 
detrimental to the types of change which Kaye viewed as essential to British rule. 
Kaye identified the problematic relationship between the British and Indians due to 
the egoistic British attitude towards Indians, which increased with the shift from 
orientalism to Anglicization. He recognized that because of racial differences, 
Indians were treated as inferior within British India and in such a way that Kaye 
argued that it was unfair. Kaye wrote that: 
We have not, in our daily lives, treated them [Indians] with the 
gentleness, the respect, the consideration which they would have won 
from us, had they been of the same colour and the same creed. I am 
afraid that we have rarely, in our intercourse with them, forgotten the 
                                                 





difference between the conqueror and the conquered, and that when 
we have not treated them with cruelty, we have treated them with 
contempt. The tone of the dominant race continually asserts itself in a 
manner which, if ever applied to ourselves, we should feel to be 
galling in the extreme. There are some who vehemently assert that this 
tone should now become louder and more imperious. . .. But God will 
never suffer us so to hold these Eastern races in subjection. If there be 
one thing which more than another He has taught us, speaking terribly 
to us throughout these late calamities, it is that the natives of India- 
abject, down-trodden as we have long supposed them to be- are 
capable of rising against their conquerors, and that we cannot 
permanently hold them in subjection to their fears.244  
Kaye recognized this as a problematic attitude on the part of the British. He argued 
against allowing this negative British attitude towards Indians to continue.  Kaye 
claimed that “increased kindness and consideration towards the natives of the country 
should now be the rule and the practice of every Englishman whose lot is cast among 
them. The amnesty which has been proclaimed by the Queen of England should be 
echoed by every Christian heart.”245 Kaye agreed in his writings with policies 
declared by Queen Victoria and Lord Canning (the Governor General). He argued for 
a future of forgiveness in India. The British should adjust their attitudes toward 
Indians. Instead of vengeance, they should try to reconcile.  
Kaye examined specific changes wrought by the British which contributed to 
the degradation of the officer-soldier relationship. Westernization and changes in the 
military structure were one of the forces that had created a growing divide between 
the British and the Indian Army.  Kaye suggested that many army reforms altered 
paternalism and led to many smaller mutinies before the 1857 rebellion. Kaye 
deemed these to be at least partially the fault of the officers who had failed to explain 
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to their troops the benefit of British reforms. In 1857, Kaye summarized the 
phenomenon of British culpability in these rebellions as “it is not so much that the 
Sepoy is not to be trusted, as that we have proved ourselves not worthy to be trusted 
with the use of so perilous an instrument.”246  He wrote in August of 1857, that “if 
proper relations had been maintained between the Sepoy and his English officer, there 
would never have existed this dangerous delusion, ‘that they should believe a lie.’ 
The Sepoy is very credulous. There is, indeed, a childlike simplicity in the readiness 
with which he believes and ponders over the most absurd story.”247 This failure of 
paternalism allowed sepoys to believe rumors and lies about British intentions. Kaye 
insisted that the Anglicization of the Indian army was problematic because it caused 
Indians to fear the loss of their own identity. The westernization of the army was a 
process which included changes in drilling, dress, and the persons allowed into the 
Indian Army. Kaye wrote that Indian soldiers were being “drilled after a new English 
fashion. He was to be shaved after a new English fashion . . .They were stripping him, 
indeed, of his distinctive Oriental character; and it was not long before he began to 
see in these efforts to Anglicize him something more than the vexatious innovation 
and crude experiments of European military reform.”248 As has already been 
mentioned, the British desired to increase uniformity in the ranks and changed the 
traditional headdresses. 
In Kaye’s A History of the Sepoy War in India, he expanded upon the various 
mutinies which had occurred in India since British rule began and demonstrated a 
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correlation between westernization and mutinies. His narrative structure emphasized 
that as the treatment of Indians in the army declined and British officers became 
increasingly separated socially from their troops, the mutinies became more frequent. 
Kaye stressed his belief in the degradation of the Indian army through making it a 
section in his first volume of one the Sepoy War. He titled this section of his volume 
the “Decline of the Indian Army,” which covered the initial formation of the Indian 
army and the 1764 Bengal Mutiny. European officers were disgruntled because they 
did not receive their pay and the Bengal Indian Army therefore followed suit and 
mutinied.249 Indians convicted of mutiny were executed by being tied to and shot 
from cannons. Kaye wrote about this as if it were an unfortunate event, not something 
that he rejoiced or believed was well deserved. During this horrific punishment, the 
native Indian officers noted that their troops were about to revolt to save their 
comrades about to be executed. However, the native officers felt comfortable enough 
to come forward to General Munro to discuss the potential mutiny. By coming 
forward, Munro could fulfill his obligation of executing guilty mutineers while also 
adopting a strong-handed policy which guaranteed the troops would not rebel. Munro 
had the canons with grapeshot pointed at the Indian troops to thwart any attempted 
resistance.250 This is an interesting mutiny for Kaye to discuss because even though 
he emphasized the freedom Indian officers felt in coming forward to British 
commanders, it also demonstrated the iron fist the British used in many situations to 
ensure compliance with laws and regulations. This paternalistic example showed how 
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British reactions affected Indians under their command. In this case, it was a negative 
consequence because of the unfortunate behavior of the British officers.251 Kaye did 
not avoid discussing how the British threatened violence to keep Indian troops in line. 
However, his writing indicated that he thought it was better to threaten violence 
instead of having an additional mutiny which would result in more deaths.252 What 
was more unique in this description, compared to other mutinies Kaye described, was 
that Indian officers still felt like they could report problems amongst Indian troops to 
their British officers and were believed and welcomed to give feedback. This was, for 
Kaye, an important component of the British-Indian relationship which was later lost.  
Kaye claimed that the degradation of the Indian officer was an important 
component in the decline of paternalism in India. This occurred because of an influx 
of young British officers and the erosion of respect for Indian officers. Kaye argued 
that changes in the retirement policy of the Indian army significantly decreased the 
number of experienced British officers and resulted in an influx of young British 
officers in India. In 1796, the policy on retirement was reformed which meant that 
officers could retire earlier. This led to a greater number of officers leaving the army 
at the same time instead of a gradual retirement system. The incoming British officers 
were not only inexperienced, but had not spent enough time in India to understand 
their troops, another contributing factor to the decline of the paternalistic relationship. 
Also, the Indian army no longer used the system of selecting officers on competency, 
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but solely based on their rank. This led to many troops being led by officers who did 
not appreciate Indian culture and sometimes did not know any Indian language. Kaye 
used the example of Indian troops who could not ask for a water break in their own 
language because of the inadequate knowledge of their officers. This distance, and in 
some cases the inability to communicate well, resulted in a breakdown of paternalism 
because there was no longer trust and understanding between the two groups.  
These new officers were not only unknowledgeable about Indian customs, but 
were haughty in the interactions with sepoys. Kaye viewed the complaints of the 
sepoy as valid because they were racially discriminated against and then ridiculed for 
the blunders of their English officers.253 As Kaye wrote in his history of Christianity 
in India, that the haughtiness of the British had become problematic. Between the 
reorganization of the army, the increasing westernization of Anglo-Indian society and 
the British officers, and the increasing numbers of new officers, the sepoys had 
legitimate complaints and the paternalistic bond which relied on personal and 
intimate relationships was frayed. He wrote that: 
The complaints of the Sepoy were many. If he were to pass his whole 
life in the Company's service and do what he might, he could not rise 
higher than the rank of Soubahdar; there had been times when 
distinguished native soldiers had been appointed to high and lucrative 
commands, and had faithfully done their duty; but those times had 
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passed, and, instead of being exalted, native officers were habitually 
degraded. A Sepoy on duty always presented or carried arms to an 
English officer, but an English soldier suffered a native officer to pass 
by without a salute. Even an English Sergeant commanded native 
officers of the highest rank. On parade, the English officers made 
mistakes, used the wrong words of command, then threw the blame 
upon the Sepoys and reviled them. Even native officers, who had 
grown grey in the service, were publicly abused by European 
striplings.254  
 
The first warning of the growing distance and discontent of the sepoy was the Vellore 
Mutiny of 1806.255  Kaye saw the lack of coming forward by the native officers as 
emblematic of their degraded position and their belief that the British would not 
believe them. The distrust and lack of faith in their British officers led the sepoys to 
believe false rumors which led to the Vellore Mutiny. If the sepoy-officer relationship 
had been closer, British officers would have heard of these rumors and could have 
been able to dispel them.  
Kaye documented that by 1796, after the British had made significant reforms 
to the Indian army, there was very little upward mobility for natives in the army. The 
new regulations, in addition to the new officer’s haughtiness, limited the possibility of 
Indian advancement and created a British-Indian relationship which many times 
embarrassed the sepoys. Indians were always inferior in rank to the lowest British 
officer. Kaye emphasized that a British officer could have no military experience, but 
because of his perceived racial superiority, still outrank Indian officers with years of 
experience. Kaye acknowledged that this upset the Indian soldiers. Military service 
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previously had been an avenue of greater advancement for upper caste Indians. Kaye 
wrote that “the little authority, the little dignity, which still clung to the position of the 
native officers was then altogether effaced by this new incursion of English 
gentlemen; and the discontent, which had been growing up in the minds of the 
soldiery, began then to bear bitter fruit.”256 This degradation of the Indian officer was 
caused by a system that was determined by racial difference. Kaye noted that for 
Indian officers this was a frustrating situation and many times brought humiliation. 
British officers would mistake commands and then place the blame on the Indian 
soldiers and officers instead of admitting their own faults. Kaye did not agree with 
this hard-racial line in military command and how Indian officers were treated. 
Before the rebellion, Kaye had discussed British education for Indians and saw the 
potential of greater Indian involvement in the government. He did not speak directly 
about how much Indians should be allowed to advance in the government. However, 
Kaye's attitude to the barring of Indians from government, his encouragement of 
education, and his post-rebellion accounts of the treatment of Indians officers 
suggests that he saw greater potential for Indians than many of his contemporaries.  
 Kaye wrote that this broken relationship was partially mended through 
warfare, which occurred regularly during the early nineteenth century. During war, 
there was little extra time for rumors on the part of the sepoys and for British officers 
to abuse their position. Kaye wrote that during end of the eighteenth century and the 
beginning of the nineteenth century “were years of active Indian warfare . . . the 
Sepoy had constant work, under great generals whom he honoured and trusted; he had 
                                                 





strong faith in the destiny of the Company; and his pride was flattered by a succession 
of brilliant victories.”257 However, during times of peace, the differences between the 
Indian and the British officer became more pronounced. Warfare had the ability to 
reduce the difference between the British and Indians in the army because they were 
united against a greater enemy. War made both races depend on each other for 
survival and victory. During this period of constant warfare, the “English officer felt a 
personal attachment for the Sepoy, the relations between them were in no degree 
marred by any considerations of difference of race. There was a strong sense of 
comradeship between them, which atoned for the absence of other ties . . . the heart of 
the Sepoy officer again turned towards his men, and the men looked up and clung to 
him with child-like confidence and affection.”258 War and expansion were able to 
help mend the broken officer- sepoy relationship. Neither side had time to stir up 
division between the races. Kaye argued that these times of war made mutiny less 
likely.   
 Kaye argued centralization removed the ability of British officers, who 
understood their troops, to make decisions in the best interests of their units. Kaye 
argued that centralization of command through expedited transportation and telegraph 
reduced the power of British officers over their troops. Prior to these advances, 
officers had to make swift decisions on their own and based off their knowledge of 
their men. Centralization meant that decisions were made from afar and could 
potentially be made in a manner that hurt the paternalistic relationship.259 Leaders 
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who rarely interacted with the troops and who did not understand the sepoy psyche 
could quickly make damaging decisions. Kaye continued to argue that westernization 
benefited both the British and Indian societies, but was a poor influence on the 
British- Indian relationship. He wrote that “these influences were sensibly weakening 
the attachment which had existed between the native soldier and his English 
officer.”260 The EIC had a great need for men to serve in the Civil Service. Many 
British officers took this opportunity to make a change in their careers and switched 
to serving as civilians.261 This further damaged the Indian army because of the loss of 
officers again. Centralization not only removed decision making power from British 
officers but also continued to increase the rotation of new British officers in the 
Indian army.   
 It was these kinds of grievances that Kaye believed fueled the 1824 
Barrackpore Munity. The Indian army was being sent to fight in Burma.262 Sepoys 
were accustomed to being near home and were cautious about crossing the sea due to 
Hindu restrictions.263 In this campaign the army was unable to provide cattle for the 
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troops, which was unusual for travel on land; instead, the sepoys were supposed to 
provide for themselves. However, rumors began to spread that the lack of cattle was 
not because of a shortage, but because of a secret plan to transport the army via sea. 
Kaye wrote that “it was said that as the Bengal regiments could not, for want of cattle, 
be marched to Chittagong, they would be put on board ship and carried to Rangoon, 
across the Bay of Bengal. Murmurs of discontent then developed into oaths of 
resistance. The regiments warned for service in Burmah [Burma] met in nightly 
conclave, and vowed not to cross the sea.”264 This misunderstanding also led to an 
outbreak of a mutiny. However, if the British had officers who were approachable 
and understood their troops, this could have been avoided. The British officers should 
have heard the rumors, recognized the fear, and explained the plans to their troops so 
that it was clear that the British did not intend to force Indians to violate their 
religion. Kaye wrote of other mutinies that followed the same pattern of 
miscommunication and mistrust.  
Kaye argued many officers did not understand the importance of caste to how 
Indian society operated. Therefore, when the EIC changed military uniforms and 
practices, the officers were not always aware of the fear these changes caused amidst 
their troops. Kaye held to the belief that the British never appreciated the caste system 
and many times it appeared to Indians as if the British would try to eliminate it. Caste 
tied together the whole Hindu society, including religion and social structure. An 
Indian who lost his caste was subject to great personal consequences. Committing an 
action which endangered caste could result in being a social outcast. The sepoy would 
                                                 





be ostracized from his peers. Kaye insisted that the Indian fear of losing caste was a 
partial reason for the rebellion. In 1860, Kaye wrote that the British “nearly lost India 
by a mutiny provoked by inexcusable neglect of caste prejudice.”265 Not only did the 
British fail to understand the caste rules, they also failed to comprehend the lasting 
consequences of breaking caste. Kaye used the example of how the British expanded 
which classes of Indians would be accepted into military ranks. Traditionally, the 
warrior caste was of a higher rank. This simplified living near each other since it was 
practically difficult to live with and share food with a man of a lower caste. For an 
Indian of higher caste to drink from the Lota (water carrier/cup) of a lower member of 
the caste system would be cause for the first man to lose his caste. The general 
enlistment order, which increased the number of castes the British could recruit, had 
the potential to result in caste contamination. This brought fear because of the rumors 
that Canning had secret orders from the Queen to forcefully convert Indians to 
Christianity.266 Kaye wrote that “there was an end, indeed, of the exclusive privileges 
which the Bengal Sepoy had so long enjoyed . . . all the old pride, therefore, with 
which the veteran had thought of his boys succeeding him was now suddenly 
extinguished. Besides, the effect, he said, would be, that high-caste men would shrink 
from entering the service, and that, therefore, the vacant places of his brethren would 
be filled by men with whom he could have no feeling of comradeship. And this was 
no imaginary fear.”267 Kaye’s comment pointed to both the fear of caste 
contamination and also the damaged pride of upper castes Indians if lower caste 
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Indians could serve besides them. In this, Kaye did not argue that the British had 
made been mistaken in trying to modernize the Indian Army. Rather this critique 
pointed to the growing disconnect between the British government and the people of 
India. For Kaye, this showed that the British did not know how much trouble they 
were causing by making what seemed to them to be innocent changes. Between 
British haughtiness towards the caste system and the lack of understanding of Indian 
culture, the British were unable to see the problems they were creating and the 
Indians were not able to voice their complaints.  
 
Kaye’s Arguments About the Discontent Caused by Increasing British Land 
Control 
Kaye asserted that the continued land annexations by the British added to 
the discontent growing in India. His writings correlated British land annexation 
and growing Indian dissatisfaction. In his first volume on the Sepoy War, Kaye 
particularly emphasized how the Punjab and the Oude annexations upset Indians. 
These territories, which rebelled in 1857, were both annexed less than ten years 
before the mutiny.  Kaye re-examined the EIC’s land expansion policies and 
reflected on how these actions contributed to the rebellion. Kaye continued to 
uphold land annexations that were necessitated by prior British interference and 
the need to protect the people against tyrannical rulers. However, Kaye questioned 
several annexations that did not have this moral and legal imperative. Kaye also 
examined the doctrine of lapse, which he had did not discussed in his previous 





leaving a bloodline heir instead of following the Indian tradition of adoption. This 
blatant disregard for Indian customs was greatly upsetting to the aristocracy.  
These steps of expansion by the EIC created greater distrust between sepoys and 
the officers because of the rejection of Indian ways by the British and the lack of 
respect shown to the indigenous aristocracy.  
Kaye had written of the Punjab and Oude annexations before the 
rebellion.268 Kaye admitted that the British made mistakes in annexing the Punjab 
territory and in their methods of rule after annexation. Kaye wrote that it was 
“probable that some mistakes were committed [by the British]- the inevitable 
growth of benevolent ignorance and energetic inexperience- at the outset of our 
career as Punjabee administration.”269 In many cases, Kaye viewed government as 
an experiment. Kaye never doubted that the British could make mistakes in their 
government. The British might have made mistakes, but it was in pursuit of an 
honorable and beneficial government. Kaye believed that this annexation had 
damaged the Indian aristocracy.  Kaye wrote that the aristocracy did not recover 
from this annexation because “the chief sufferers by the revolution have been 
found among the aristocracy of the land. The great masses of the people have been 
considerately, indeed generously treated, but the upper classes have been 
commonly prostrated by the annexing hand, and have never recovered from the 
blow.”270 Kaye wrote that the British had taken a harsher approach to the Indian 
aristocracy because of their assumption that the Indian aristocracy had exploited 
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the people. By using this annexation in his history, Kaye highlighted it as 
important in causing discontent. Kaye did not argue that it was wrong, but rather 
that the perceived benefits of British rule were not always clear to Indians and this 
event helped to cause discontent by the loss of a royal family.   
The second region Kaye addressed was the Oude territory. Kaye continued 
to view the annexation of Oude as justifiable because of the lawlessness in the 
territory which the British had inadvertently reinforced by giving support to the 
native rulers. After 1857, Kaye re-examined British involvement in Oude and 
viewed it as an important reason for the rebellion. Kaye explained how “indirectly 
the condition of Oude, the ferocity of its chiefs, the warlike habits of the people, 
the fanaticism of its castes, and the hatred which prevails in that province against 
the restraints of law and government did promote the insurrection, and served to 
render Oude the rallying point of the disaffected, and the area of a protracted 
resistance.”271 Kaye did not think that the British should be surprised that the 
territory most recently annexed would be the rallying point for rebellion. The 
people of Oude had not yet been conditioned to accept British rule and not 
forsaken their fierce spirit. Although he became more reflective about how the 
annexation of the Oude might have upset the people, he did not challenge the 
British right to rule or the benefits which the British could bring to Oude.  
However, Kaye examined how the British failed to recognize two primary 
problems in maintaining their control of Oude. The Oude army and the aristocracy 
                                                 





were made irrelevant by British annexation. The British disbanded large numbers of 
men and many of them could not locate equitable employment. Kaye wrote that it 
was easy to be “wise after the event [1857], we see clearly now what were the 
dangers which threatened the Government of India in the first years of its rule in 
Oude. In the first place, there was a large body of disbanded soldiery [thousands let 
loose with no employment].”272 This part of the population was restless and ready 
for an opportunity to apply their skills to war. In addition, Kaye looked at the 
disgruntled landowners, which also caused discontent in Oude. These annexations 
disproportionately harmed the aristocracy and higher castes of the Oude. Since 
warriors came from the higher castes in Indian society, this displacement and loss of 
status was important to sepoys, many of whom came from the Oude territory. Once 
again, the aristocracy lost power and prestige with British rule. With the British 
annexation “there were no longer any privileged classes . . . equal justice was 
administered to all. What the Sepoys lost, the people gained; and, doubtless, the 
aggregate result of the change was extremely advantageous to Oude.”273 But in 
Oude, "the rebellion of 1857 . . . saw the whole landed aristocracy of Oude arrayed 
against us” which Kaye interpreted as evidence that the British treatment of the 
Oude aristocracy caused great discontent.274  Kaye clearly demonstrated in his post-
rebellion writings that the annexation upset Indian elites and soldiers, both of whom 
lost tangible benefits due to British rule. His inclusion of this annexation in the 
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beginning of his History of the Sepoy War is a clear indicator of how it contributed 
to the ill feelings towards the British, culminating in rebellion. 
The second area Kaye addressed on the question of land annexation was the 
doctrine of lapse. This was an EIC policy which Kaye did not agree with and which 
he viewed as increasing Indian discontent and damaging the British-Indian 
relationship. The British annexed many lands because the prince or landowner in 
control did not have a bloodline heir. Traditionally, Indians could adopt a son as an 
heir and this was an important part of Indian society. Kaye wrote that “the right of 
adoption is, therefore, one of the most cherished doctrines of Hindooism.”275 This 
adoptive heir had all the same rights and privileges as a biological son. These 
adopted sons had many responsibilities, such as burial of his adoptive father which 
would determine his father’s life after death. Yet, the British did not view adoption 
as a legitimate course to choosing a new leader. In these cases, the British claimed 
the land under the right of lapse when territory did not have a legitimate heir. Kaye 
wrote that most of the British could not culturally understand why adoption was 
important to Indian culture. In 1849, lapse became an officially approved doctrine in 
governing India.276 Kaye wrote that “lapse is a dreadful and an appalling word; for it 
pursues the victim beyond the grave. Its significance in his eyes is nothing short of 
eternal condemnation.”277 For Indians, this was against their customs and against 
how they understood legitimate claims to land. Many territories were annexed due to 
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lapse, including Sattarah, Nagpore, Kerwolee, and Sumbhulpore.278 These 
annexations ignored adopted sons and also did not allow widows (as would be 
allowable in Indian culture) to appoint an heir if her husband had failed to do so 
before death. With lapse, the British many times provided for the descendants of the 
deceased land owner or prince since they would no longer be able to support 
themselves on their revenues.279 For Kaye, this standard of lapse had no moral or 
legal standing and only served to expand British territories. This was not even an 
inheritance standard which the British followed themselves. Kaye viewed the 
doctrine of lapse as damaging to the Indian aristocracy.  This greatly affected princes 
who, with only an adopted heir, were not able to pass their power and wealth to 
another selected Indian. Instead, the British gained greater control. For Kaye, this fit 
into his previous criticisms of the EIC creating policies that benefited themselves by 
expanding their territories to the detriment of the people of India.  
These examples demonstrated overarching themes in Kaye’s viewpoint on the 
EIC’s expansionist policy. Kaye compared how the EIC used lapse and annexation 
through war to expand their lands. Kaye generally agreed with the Oude and Punjabee 
annexations because he thought the EIC could free the people from evil rulers and 
uplift the condition of the people. Both of these annexations were also military 
campaigns which made the land won through right of conquest, which was more 
acceptable in Indian customs. However, for the British to claim land through lapse 
did not make sense to the people of India. The doctrine of lapse seemed to be only a 
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self-serving policy of the EIC. Kaye wrote that the annexation of Nagpore and 
Sattarah caused unrest because of the perceived injustice against Indians. He wrote 
that these annexations through lapse  
had a bad moral effect; that it had shaken the confidence of the people 
in the justice and good faith of the British Government; that people 
had asked what crime Sattarah had committed that sentence of political 
death should thus have been pronounced against it; that throughout 
India acquisition by conquest was well understood, and in many cases 
admitted to be right; that the annexation of the Punjab, for example, 
had not been regarded as a wrong, because the chiefs and people had 
brought it on themselves, but that the extinction of a loyal native State, 
in default of heirs, was not appreciable in any part of India.280 
Here Kaye pinpointed why this form of expansion was more damaging to the 
British-Indian relationship. Even though these annexations caused discontent among 
Indians at some level, the reason for British control aligned with Indian traditions. 
War was not an uncommon idea to Indians and it was only natural that the victors 
should become the new rulers of a territory. However, to ignore Indian custom and 
to take control of a territory because of a default of heirs was not perceived by 
Indians as a legitimate claim. It created distrust of the British which was another 
deteriorating influence on the paternalistic relationship.  
Kaye’s Thoughts on the Expansion of British India and the Resulting Downfall 
of the Indian Aristocracy 
 Kaye's post-1857 narratives displayed how the changes implemented by the 
British might have helped the poorer Indians, but slighted the aristocracy, and this fed 
into the discontent that led to the rebellion. Many of the aristocracy lost power and 
                                                 





prestige due to British interventions in ruling India through expanding their empire, 
reforming the Indian army, and spreading their religion. Kaye believed this 
displacement of the aristocracy was an important reason for the outbreak of the 
rebellion. First, this underlined how the British had failed to care for a portion of the 
population under their paternalistic care. Except for providing education, a whole 
segment of the population was displaced with no hope of regaining their former 
status. Second, Kaye’s focus on the aristocracy displaced blame from the traditional 
soldier onto the elite. Even though Indians revolted against the British in Northern 
India, many Victorians believed the instigators were the Indian aristocracy.    
 Kaye pointed to the negative view Anglo-Indians had of the Indian 
aristocracy. The British approached rule in India under the assumption that the people 
had been downtrodden under the native aristocracy who profited off their people. He 
wrote that, “the utter worthlessness of the upper classes was assumed to be a fact; and 
it was honestly believed that the obliteration of the aristocracy of the land was the 
greatest benefit that could be conferred on the people. And thus, it happened that 
whilst the native sovereigns of India were one by one being extinguished, the native 
aristocracy had come well-nigh extinct.”281 The British viewed the Indian aristocracy 
as a problematic obstacle in the way of British progress. Kaye argued that this attitude 
affected British policies in India, which helped to turn the upper castes against the 
British.   
                                                 





Kaye’s histories demonstrated how the aristocracy and higher castes had 
slowly lost positions of power because of expanded British roles in governance and 
increased territory.  Upper caste Indians could no longer use the army as a respectable 
form of advancement. In the early days of the Company, an Englishman could have 
served under an Indian officer from the upper classes.282 As the British made the 
army more rigid and uniform, Indian officers became limited in their upward mobility 
because they could no longer command European officers. Indian officers could only 
lead other Indian troops because they were racially excluded from the highest 
positions of power. This created a hard racial division between the British and 
Indians. By 1796, when the EIC instituted new regulations and earlier retirement for 
British officers, a sepoy officer received limited benefits for their experiences and 
were superseded by young Englishmen who were less qualified. Kaye wrote that as 
this “degradation” took place it changed the army because “it ceased to be a 
profession in which men of high position, accustomed to command, might satisfy the 
aspirations and expend the energies of their lives. All distinctions were effaced. The 
native service of the Company came down to a dead level of common soldiering, and 
rising from the ranks by a painfully slow process to merely nominal command. There 
was employment for the many; there was no longer a career for the few.”283 Indians 
could only serve in relatively lower positions in the Indian army. For Kaye, this 
clearly fueled Indian resentment towards the British officers who outranked them and 
towards the changes implemented by the EIC.  
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The upper classes were also further restricted in their role in land 
management. Since the permanent settlement of 1793, the British directly controlled 
the collection of rents. When the British acquired new lands, they had to assess the 
properties to determine the value for taxes. The British were inclined to favor the 
peasants and not the Talookhars, the aristocracy.284 The British assumed that the 
lower castes had been abused by the aristocracy and that they now had to protect the 
people’s rights. This view that the British Empire brought freedom, equality, and 
democratization to the colonized people represented a traditional imperialist approach 
to empire. Kaye’s viewpoint also reflected the British assumption that native rulers 
did not use their power for the benefit of the people. The Talookhars had the rights of 
a manorial lord and were an established institution. During this period, Kaye wrote 
the British removed land from the aristocracy and restored much of it to the lower 
castes or took over the land themselves. In many cases the British gave the 
management of the land to a newly emergent class of Zamindar. Kaye believed that 
the upper classes were repressed by these land settlements and resumption policies 
and that many of them were left with only huts to live in.285 Kaye observed this policy 
as “it was at the same time a cruel wrong and a grievous error to sweep it away as 
though it were an encumbrance and an usurpation. The theory of the settlement 
officers was that the village Zamindars had an inalienable right in the soil, and that 
the Talookhdar was little better than an upstart and an imposter. All the defects in his 
tenure were rigidly scanned.”286 This treatment of the aristocracy affected the general 
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populace and their views of the British.  According to Kaye, British actions in the 
North before the rebellion was a mistake because “this great work of the Settlement 
of Northern India, that it involved a grave political error” because it alienated the 
people against the British.287 Kaye thought that the British “should have respected the 
rights, natural and acquired, of all classes of the community, instead of working out 
any abstract theory of our own.”288 Regardless of how the British enacted their land 
policies, it is evident that Kaye thought the EIC needed to respect the customs and 
rights of the people. Kaye thought that they could have respected the rights of the 
aristocracy while still making changes in India that would benefit all.289 Kaye’s 
writings did not address British management of Indian lands until his post-rebellion 
writings. This was one way in which Kaye’s writings became more reflective and 
critical of British actions in India. 
Kaye claimed that British land policy alienated the upper castes by 
diminishing Indian control over the land. Although Kaye never claimed that the 
British should relinquish government to Indians he did suggest that the British should 
have done more to ameliorate their social and economic positions. Kaye disagreed 
with how the land was managed in conquered territories. The British brought their 
own assumptions about proper management and their bias against the Talookars. 
Instead of learning more about the Indian system, the British restricted the land 
revenue system and created more discontent in the alienated aristocracy. This 
treatment of the aristocracy left a significant and powerful section of the population 
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feeling alienated by the British and created mistrust of the British, which had serious 
consequences when the sepoy uprising broke out.  
Kaye’s Argument for Future Reconciliation with India 
 Kaye’s post-rebellion writings looked to the future of British rule in India and 
the prospect of reconciliation with the people of India. He believed that the events of 
1857 could eventually be overcome particularly because he believed that the uprising 
in the North was not a national cause. If it had been a national uprising, he claimed, it 
would not have been possible to sustain British rule. He believed that the bond 
between the soldier and officer had not been completely broken, and where it had 
been fragmented, it could be repaired. Kaye’s way forward required repairing the 
broken and frayed paternalistic bonds between the two races. 
Kaye’s writings demonstrated that reconciliation was possible because not all 
of India had revolted against the British.  During 1857, only Northern India rebelled.  
Kaye noted that in Lucknow “there was no rising of the populace” against 
Lawrence.290 Kaye illustrated this loyalty by telling many personal stories of sepoys 
who warned their officers to flee because the situation was becoming uncontrollable. 
Indeed, the British were only able to reclaim northern India because of help from 
other Indian units. Kaye wrote that the “services rendered to the British Government 
by the native princes and chiefs were of the most substantial character, and tended 
largely to the re-establishment of our authority.”291 This assistance was essential for 
the British, especially considering the greater percentage of native troops to British 
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troops. Furthermore, for Kaye, the localized nature of the rebellion meant two things. 
The first was that only a segment of the population was moved enough to rise against 
the British, and this suggested that there were other reasons for the uprising besides 
nationalism. This meant that the people could be reconciled back to pre-mutiny status 
if the reasons for the rebellion were alleviated, avoided in the future, and the 
paternalistic bond restored. Second, it also indicated that recent British events in 
Northern India were at least partially responsible for the rebellion since that was the 
epicenter of the Sepoy War. Kaye wrote that “we can conceive nothing more 
preposterous than to write or to speak of these men as patriots, fighting for the 
independence of their country and resenting the indignity of a foreign yoke."292 Even 
though Kaye was generally optimistic about Indian potential, he did not believe that 
Indians were organized enough to purposefully rebel. Yet, by discussing the 
possibility of nationalism, it meant that Kaye was forced to consider nationalism a 
legitimate reason for the revolt. Kaye insisted that it was the changes in the society 
which caused the revolt, not Indians’ desire for a free India. By arguing the rebellion 
was the result of fear and discontent, Kaye minimized the larger implications of the 
potential of a unified India against the British.  In 1860, Kaye wrote that: 
The idea of patriotism and nationality has never presented itself to us 
as an element in the discussion. If there was anything of an elementary 
and intelligible character about the whole affair, we must regard it as a 
struggle between order and disorder- between constituted authority and 
licentious military power- in which the princes of India, for their own 
sakes, might well have made common cause with the paramount state 
in defense of their own sovereign rights. But, in truth, the entire 
movement appears to have been altogether eccentric and 
exceptional.293  
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 The common people were not united to oust the British from India and to start their 
own state. If anything, it was the princes of India who used the discontent to start the 
rebellion against the British. Instead of placing great nationalistic meaning in the 
uprising, Kaye viewed it as an "exceptional" moment and a "sudden madness." This 
was in no way a united front to remove the British from power. Kaye’s writings did 
not indicate that he believed the British would rule India forever and he desired the 
betterment of the people and continued education.  
Rather than nationalism, Kaye argued that the rebellion was a result of the 
sepoys’ fear and mistrust of the British, which had developed over time, that caused 
the revolt. This fit into Kaye's framework of paternalism in which the Sepoy needed 
guidance because they were “very ignorant and very credulous, and they are very 
easily alarmed.”294 The sepoys were driven by panic and fear at what they perceived 
as forceful abandonment of caste and religion exemplified by the British enforcing 
the use of greased cartridges. The rebellion was not meant to create an Indian state or 
to support one national cause and “it is an undoubted fact, that more were driven into 
mutiny by their fears than by their hopes.”295  Furthermore, he did not subscribe to the 
opinion that sepoys were “fiends, or wild beasts, or men devoid of noble feelings and 
generous emotions” for these events “have prominently elicited the good qualities of 
the Indian races, and the good deeds of which they are capable. They who have risen 
against us are but the few. They who have disgraced their manhood by foul deeds are 
few.”296 Panic and fear caused the rebellion among a few, but the majority showed 
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bravery in battle while assisting the British. With the proper guidance from the 
British, Indians would be able to continue to serve the British. 
Finally, Kaye pointed to the fact that it was common after conflict for 
societies to eventually reconcile their differences. In this, Kaye placed Indians on a 
more equal basis with the British than many of his contemporaries who viewed 
Indians as inferior. He wrote that “nations slaughter each other one day, and embrace 
each other on the next. . . But it is hard to forget treachery and outrage- murder 
committed upon unresisting victims, and foul indignities wreaked upon the helpless, 
unoffending little ones. And it is hardest of all to forget, when our humiliation comes 
from those whom we had before trodden down and despised.”297 Kaye acknowledged 
that it would be more difficult for the British to reconcile with the people of India 
because of the presumed inferiority of Indians. For the British to have been dealt such 
a blow by an inferior society, or for some, a different race was an embarrassment and 
a shock to the British psyche. The fact that Indians could have killed so many Anglo-
Indians and maintained the rebellion for such a long period of time was shocking. The 
rebellion was an embarrassment and, for many of the British, reconciling with Indians 
who caused such shame seemed impossible.  Kaye knew that with time reconciliation 
would be more probable, but he also thought that some within Britain wanted to use 
this event to stir up more trouble. He wrote that there were those: 
who appear to desire that hatred between the white man and the black 
should be the normal condition of our tenure in India. They dwell upon 
the ethnological differences of Race; upon the natural superiority of 
the children of the West over the children of the East; upon the 
distinctions engrafted upon it by the advancing civilization of Europe; 
and contend that, as conquerors, we have every right to impose 
                                                 





disabilities and restrictions upon the conquered. . . the more we know 
of the people of India, of their early history and literature . . . To rank 
them with the black races of Africa is philosophically absurd; but it is 
more to our purpose to say, that the theory which upholds the 
expediency of a general recognition by the State of these distinctions 
of race, is politically false and dangerous.298  
 
This was one reason why Kaye praised Lord Canning, who refused to legislate based 
on racial difference in India.299 Canning refused to make racial law codes in India, 
though racism in the enforcement of the law was still a possibility. Canning’s refusal 
to legislate harsher treatment of Indans post-rebellion was hopeful for Kaye and a 
beginning step towards reconciliation. Once again, the British would be able to take a 
leading role in helping to “progress” Indian society. Kaye’s desire for reconciliation 
fit into his paternalistic view. For the British to make good changes in India, there had 
to be personal relationships. If reprisals and hatred remained, then the restoration of 
the paternalistic relationship would be impossible. 
Kaye’s Defense of the East India Company Post-1857 
 Kaye was one of the few Victorians who defended the EIC after 1857. The 
tide had turned against private companies as ruling powers, which made the EIC 
less popular in Britain. Most Victorians believed that the EIC had mismanaged 
Indian Affairs. Between the perceived failure of the EIC for the rebellion and the 
dislike for companies as governing powers, many Victorians concluded that the 
EIC's rule in India should end. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
autonomy and power of the EIC in India had given way to a greater British 
parliamentary role. The EIC’s power in India rested on a royal charter which gave 
                                                 






it a monopoly on trade, but the charter had to be regularly renewed. In 1813, the 
EIC lost its monopoly on trade. After the rebellion, Kaye acknowledged that the 
EIC would have eventually ceased to rule because “the East India Company was 
being destroyed piecemeal . . . it would have died out in the course of a few years. 
It was simply a question of time.”300 The rebellion sealed the fate of the EIC and, 
in 1859, India became a crown colony. Few disagreed with this transition or 
argued in favor of the EIC publicly. Immediately after the start of the uprising, 
Kaye wrote articles about the success and importance of the EIC for India and 
made four main arguments. First, Kaye claimed that the EIC had not caused the 
rebellion nor could have predicted it. Second, that India required committed men 
to colonial rule in the subcontinent- and not just the empire in general. Third, that 
the Crown could not rule any better than the EIC had. Fourth, that the Indian army 
and British army should not be amalgamated because it would have negative 
consequences for India. Kaye's arguments continued to display his paternalistic 
view of India in which Indians and the British needed close ties and the British to 
bring slow change modeled by personal example.  
First, Kaye argued that the Company could neither have predicted the 
rebellion nor avoided it. He suggested that mutiny was not an irregular act for 
eastern armies and they were not usually shocking. There had been many smaller 
mutinies in India, and the Company had always stopped the movements relatively 
quickly. It was the size and impact of the 1857 rebellion which was unprecedented 
and left the Company unprepared. Kaye wrote that in “my own impression mutiny 
                                                 





always has been the normal state of an Eastern army; and that the marvel is, not 
that after so many years the Sepoys revolted, but that they did not revolt before.”301 
Kaye insisted that the EIC had no ability to foresee such a large rebellion and he 
disagreed with how the EIC became the scapegoat for the uprising. Kaye wrote 
that if the EIC had prepared for the Sepoy War then they would have been viewed 
as a “timid old fool” for placing that much respect in Indians.302 British pride in 
their own power, and the strength of the British belief in the inferiority of Indians, 
made any claim of an upcoming dangerous uprising seem laughable. Kaye’s 
writing demonstrated his opinion of the superior attitude of the British and how it 
blinded them to problems in India. Because of this, Kaye believed that no one 
could have predicted the rebellion of 1857 and that this perceived failure should 
not have counted against the EIC. 
Second, Kaye argued that there was a need for a firm commitment to 
progress in India for paternalism to be effective as opposed to the ignorant rule of 
British officers blinded by prejudice. This was an important component of Anglo-
Indian culture; Kaye viewed newly arrived Englishmen in India as “almost always 
haughty, insolent, and even cruel, the natives, and the officers of line regiments 
have, hitherto, rarely become more considerate towards them throughout the 
period of their residence in India.”303 Kaye viewed this superior attitude of the 
British in India as problematic because they did not have the best interests of the 
people at heart and could not build close ties with Indians. Kaye’s description of 
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new officers demonstrated a superior English attitude which could take years of 
learning about India in person to change. Because most British individuals viewed 
themselves as inherently better than Indians, they no longer welcomed Indians into 
their homes or tried to understand the beliefs and customs of India, both of which 
were indispensable in Kaye’s view of paternalism. Kaye did not think that a 
continual flux of newcomers running the Indian government and army would be 
beneficial for India. With the EIC, many British men became a part of the Anglo-
Indian community and made a commitment to India. Kaye argued that the 
knowledge needed to rule India could not be learned through textbooks, but 
required personal experience in the sub-continent.304 Kaye argued that for the EIC 
to be beneficial for Indians it required a long-term commitment that was vital for 
paternalism.   
Third, Kaye claimed that Crown rule of India would not be any better than the 
EIC. Immediately after the rebellion, there were discussions of making British India a 
crown colony and revoking the EIC’s charter.  During these debates, the Queen 
issued a declaration with her intentions for Indian rule under the Crown.  According 
to the royal proclamation, Queen Victoria declared that “we desire no extension of 
our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggressions upon our 
dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no 
encroachment on those of others.”305 Kaye argued that even though the proclamation 
insinuated that this was a new policy towards India, the EIC had followed a similar 
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policy.306 Kaye claimed that the “East India Company, always resisting territorial 
aggrandizement, seldom fell into the folly- especially ruinous in the presences of 
Asiatic neighbors.”307  Even though Kaye clearly had differences with the policies of 
certain Governor- Generals whom he viewed as greedy for expansion, in particular 
Lord Ellenborough, he did not think that the Queen’s proclamation was substantially 
different than the EIC’s policy. Therefore, the transition of government from the EIC 
to the Crown was unneeded and dangerous. For Kaye, this demonstrated how 
ignorant the British were about India because they were unaware of the policy the 
EIC was committed to in India. The EIC was filled with subject experts who 
understood the complicated nature of British rule in the East. Kaye suggested that the 
new forms of government would condense power and create a dictatorship.308 The 
new proposed form of government drastically reduced the number of directors of the 
colony, which condensed power into the hands of a few who would not have the 
necessary expertise to rule India. The fact that the Queen thought she had proposed a 
new policy proved that those in Britain were not well enough informed to rule India. 
This was an extension of his paternalistic view where a few committed men should 
live their lives in India instead of rule from abroad.  
Fourth, after the final decision was made to abolish the EIC and make India 
a crown colony, it was proposed to combine the Indian Army with the British 
Army, which Kaye viewed as a mistake. Kaye had two primary reasons for arguing 
for two separate armies. First, he argued that amalgamation would be unfair 
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punishment, considering the majority of Indians had remained faithful during the 
rebellion. Kaye wrote that even though the rebellion brought shame to the Indian 
army: 
At worse, it was only the rebellion of a part of that army. It is 
common to write and to speak of the outbreak as if the whole 
army had violently thrown off its allegiance, and given itself up to 
the wild delights of rapine and murder. But considering the 
infectious character of this disease of mutiny- how the evil 
influence runs, as it were, like a fine electric fluid, from link to 
link of the great chain- it is subject of admiration that so large a 
portion of the Indian army remained, throughout all that troubled 
period, true to its alien masters. Or should it be forgotten that 
even some of those rebellious regiments, which died at last in 
such fiery convulsions, had years and years, perhaps nearly a 
century, of good and faithful service . . . Let us not forget this. 
Dear old Jack Sepoy has become in men’s minds only an accursed 
Pandy.309  
Kaye recognized that the British were not the natural masters of the sepoys, yet 
Indians remained faithful instead of joining their brethren in rebellion. To end the 
Indian army would be an overreaction since the majority were loyal to the British. It 
would be an unfair to punish the sepoys who remained faithful to the British. He 
asked whether is “the Sepoy, then, never to have absolution?”310 Kaye instead 
maintained that there were Indians who could be trusted. He encouraged the British to 
consider that “every English officer who has served with the native Sepoy knows 
right well that he had many good and noble traits of character, that he was faithful to 
his employers, that he did, when well treated, love his English captain; and there are 
few who do not believe that, if trusted again, they would be true again.”311 If the 
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British could trust Indians again, then the Indians would respond by being trustworthy 
of this British faith. Kaye instead argued for a better-balanced army. The Indian army 
was primarily comprised of Indians, which led to instability during times of revolt. 
Officers could not be certain if their troops would remain faithful. It also meant that 
most of the army did not share the same culture or priorities as the British. If there 
was a mutiny, officers were completely outnumbered and had little chance of 
maintaining order. Kaye called for more Europeans in the Indian army to ward off the 
threat of future rebellion instead of the complete amalgamation of the British and 
Indian armies.312 An influx of British officers would create a greater barrier to 
rebellion and aid in keeping order. 
Kaye further claimed that, following amalgamation of the two armies, it 
would be unfair for men who joined the Indian Army to be forcefully transferred to 
the British Army. He pointed to the fact that there were many Scotsmen and Irish who 
served in the Indian Army. These men, particularly the Irish, might not readily join an 
army which supported the empire and enforced law and put down uprisings in their 
native country. These men “had enlisted, they said, for the service of the East India 
Company; the East India Company had ceased to exist, and therefore their service 
was at an end.”313  It would be unfair to alter the terms of their enlistment, especially 
when it could force them to support a mission they disagreed with. As Kaye wrote, 
“the majority, we believe, simply resented the abstract notion of an enforced transfer 
from one authority to another.”314 Kaye argued that forcing the Scottish and Irish men 
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into the British Army would be outrageous considering that they could then be sent to 
Ireland and Scotland as an occupying force.  
   Because the British Army moved units around the globe, amalgamation 
would result in the loss of an army committed directly to India. If the British 
constantly moved officers and troops around the empire, the British would be less 
equipped to understand the people they ruled. Paternalism was dependent on the 
close bond of the officers with their troops and a frequently moving army was not 
well disposed to Kaye’s vision for future paternalism. This would heighten the 
differences between the British and Indians and continue to grow the cultural 
divide. British officers would no longer be able to learn Indian culture over time 
and less haughty in their interactions with Indians.  
 
Conclusion 
Kaye’s post-rebellion writings showcased his perception of a slow decay of 
paternalism and a consequent increase in the number of Indian complaints against the 
British. He argued that the rebellion was not caused by one conflict, such as the 
greased cartridges. Rather, it was the increasing westernization in India which led to a 
breakdown of the British-Indian relationship. The intimacy which Kaye viewed as 
essential in paternalism was broken. These changes included new officers whose 
attitudes were Anglicist rather than Orientalist   In addition, the extensions of British 
domain over places like the Punjab and Oude upset the aristocracy and, in cases of 





relationship of trust which had once existed could be restored. Reconciliation was a 
possibility because Indians were not united against the British. For this to happen the 
British needed to show leniency, restore the officer-Sepoy bond, and ensure that India 
was ruled by men who were committed to India and had spent their lives learning 
about the people and culture. By examining the 1857 rebellion through this unique 
paternalistic viewpoint, Kaye could more oppose the against harsh reprisals against 
Indians because he regarded the sepoys as acting out of fear.  The EIC had created the 
conditions of discontent in their pursuit of beneficial government, that led to the 
revolt. For Kaye, with proper guidance from the British, Indians and the British could 








Chapter 5:  The Conclusion 
 
The uprising of the Indian army and populace in Northern India during 1857-
1858 was a shock to Victorian society. This event garnered much attention from the 
public and was the subject of many novels and histories. For India, the rebellion 
brought an end to the EIC and placed the colony under crown rule, also known as the 
British Raj. The British Raj did not encompass all of India and there remained many 
independent Indian states. The British allowed these Indian princes to keep their lands 
if they pledged loyalty to the crown. The official British policy was that they could 
only intervene in these surrounding provinces to protect British lands or to end gross 
misrule by native princes. As Kaye argued, India continued to have a separate army 
apart from the regular British army. To safeguard against further insurrections the 
British doubled the number of British soldiers in India and that number never fell 
below 60,000.315 This remained the status quo until India gained independence in 
1947. 
 Kaye’s life was centered around India and this did not change after the 
rebellion. He had lived in the sub-continent and when he returned to Britain he 
focused his time on writing about it. He began to work for the EIC in London in 
1856. With the transition of the Indian government to the Crown in 1858 and the 
retirement of John Stuart Mill, Kaye took over as the political and secret department 
secretary for the Indian Office. He wrote many articles for Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Review defending the EIC and writing on rebellion related subjects. His writings 
                                                 






about modern Indian events tapered off in 1862. Many of his articles were about 
subjects such as travel and gardening. Yet, Kaye continued to write books focused on 
the historical past. He wrote about the great men of India and published biographies 
of them. He continued to write volumes on the Indian rebellion, but his writings on 
India did not move past 1858. He only completed three volumes on the Sepoy War 
before his death in 1876.  
Modern scholars have focused on how this event impacted British society and 
culture. Others have focused on whether the rebellion was the first Indian nationalist 
movement. However, few scholars have focused solely on the works of Kaye in order 
to evaluate his interpretation of the Mutiny. Though his histories on the Sepoy War 
have been frequently used, historians have focused on Kaye’s presentation of the 
facts of 1857-1858 instead of on his paternalistic arguments about the British-Indian 
relationship. Kaye refused to accept the general interpretation of the rebellion and 
examined a longer period of Indian history than others to determine the reasons for 
the revolt. Considering Kaye's expertise and experience in India, his response is 
significant. Kaye’s attribution of the rebellion to the decline of paternalism through 
arrogant British behavior and cultural complaints which began in the eighteenth 
century is significant because it left the British partially culpable for the Mutiny. 
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Kaye continued to view Indians as eligible for 
positions of trust and still capable of advancing as a society. His contrary opinion on 
the reasons for the rebellion rested in his personal knowledge of India and his 





Kaye's view of India and the EIC’s policies did not fit within any predominant 
theory. Kaye was not strictly an orientalist, utilitarian, or Anglicist in his writings 
about India. He varied from the orientalist viewpoint because he saw the value in 
importing western practices. Kaye's writings demonstrated that he approved of what 
he saw as western progress in India. These changes included restricting certain British 
behaviors, including licentious living and drinking, while also discouraging British 
men from adopting Indian practices and going "native."  Kaye’s writings displayed 
his pride in the changes within India since the late eighteenth century which helped to 
restrict British men from being orientalists. He wanted to see a more British society in 
India where British ideas of morality and western progress were upheld. Kaye’s 
opinions were in many ways similar to the utilitarian’s arguments in India. He was 
opposed to implementing reforms too quickly because he did not want to stir up 
discontent which would threaten British rule in India. Kaye believed that introducing 
British culture too much, especially anything that threatened Hindu and Muslim 
religious practices, was dangerous for the EIC to maintain peaceful rule. However, 
unlike other utilitarians, Kaye viewed the British enabling Indian progress not only as 
possible, but as necessary. His concern did not only lie with maintaining British 
power, but also assisting the people they ruled. Even though Kaye approved of many 
Anglicist measures, he thought that westernizing India too quickly would lead to 
unrest. Kaye believed that Christianity was beneficial for the people of India. He had 
a personal desire for proselytization to occur and a belief that there could be many 
conversions in India. Kaye also agreed with regulations and laws which restricted 





concerned that a more official presence of missionaries would cause problems. 
Kaye’s writings do not fit within one predominant theory because he used the British 
paternalistic relationship with Indians as his basis for critiquing the EIC’s policies in 
India. 
In many cases, Kaye’s viewpoints seemed contradictory. Kaye’s writings 
represent a Victorian who tried to reconcile the overbearing nature of British 
imperialism with his liberating and progressive view of British tutelage. He desired to 
bring westernization to India, but also viewed it as detrimental to the paternalistic 
relationship. Kaye was proud of the moral advancement of Anglo-Indian society and 
the higher caliber of students who came from Haileybury and Addiscombe. Yet, he 
recognized these changes as damaging to the British-Indian relationship because it 
reduced the commonality between the two groups and created a haughty class of 
British officers. He was generally against war, but still found occasions where the 
British were justified to engage in warfare. Kaye wrote about the discontent that 
British changes brought to Indians and yet refused to blame the British for anything 
except for desiring to assist Indians. In many of proposed policies, he argued for a 
medium course of action to balance his desire for change while respecting Indian 
culture. Kaye’s arguments about India are demonstrative of a Victorian who had to 
reconcile two opposing viewpoints.  
Instead, Kaye balanced his desire for change with what he understood about 
Indian culture and mentality. He approved of certain types of land annexations and 
westernization reforms, while he was critical of others. The details of how and why 





personal relationship between Indians and the British. He thought the security of 
British rule in India rested on each group understanding each other and being aware 
of each other's reactions. Close personal relationships meant that there would be more 
understanding between the two groups and less haughtiness from the British officers. 
These relationships helped the British keep a pulse on Indian discontent and plans, as 
was seen in the Bengal Mutiny.316   
More importantly, these personal relationships were a way of implementing 
change in India. Kaye expected the British to emulate the behaviors desired in their 
subjects. In this vein, Kaye believed that change could happen when leaders modeled 
moral and upright behaviors. Kaye insisted that change happened from a top-down 
approach. He attributed the personal lifestyle of George III as an important factor in 
what Kaye perceived as the moral upliftment of the people in Britain.317 Just as 
history was made through the action and lives of greater men, the British in India had 
to live in such a manner that Indians could emulate.  In Kaye's writings, this pattern 
of moral influence worked by the king modeling behaviors for the Governor-Generals 
who modeled behaviors for the British in India and finally having these behaviors 
emulated by Indians. These relationships were important because Kaye argued that a 
                                                 
316 After the 1764 Bengal Mutiny, while the Indian troops were being punished, another 
mutiny almost occurred. The Indian officers warned General Munro about the rising discontent which 
allowed the British to stop any uprising through positioning the cannons and using heavy force to 
demand obedience.  
317 Kaye tracked the beneficial transformation of Anglo-Indian society as beginning during the 
reign of George III. Even though Queen Victoria is generally viewed as an icon of British morality and 
culture in nineteenth century Britain, Kaye did not write about this because he already viewed Anglo-
Indian society as advanced. Instead, he focused on expansion and westernization practices during the 
reign of Victoria. It was also during her reign that the EIC lost its charter and control of India went to 





government was judged by the condition of its people and that it was the duty of the 
EIC to improve the condition of the people under it.  
Kaye identified the weakening of this paternalistic bond before the rebellion 
through a growing cultural distance between the British and Indians and through 
westernization reforms causing discontent and fear. He viewed this as a downside to 
the progress that he otherwise praised.  Kaye’s approval of training British officers 
for India did not negate that these changes created a greater cultural divide between 
these two groups. Cultural differences created a growing haughtiness of the British 
and resentment of the sepoys. After the Sepoy War, Kaye more thoroughly examined 
the consequences of British actions in India and argued that this paternalistic bond 
had indeed been broken. This, in addition to the increasing westernization which also 
brought discontent in India, led Indians to fear and distrust the intentions of the 
British towards their caste and religions. Kaye argued that this fear of Indians led to 
the perfect circumstances for a revolt to occur. Even though he wrote about the 
greased cartridges, he documented that there were many other reasons for discontent 
within India, which once added together led to the greased cartridges being the 
starting point for the rebellion.  
The rebellion did not alter Kaye’s view of Indians and how the British should 
interact with their subjects. Kaye, unlike his contemporaries, continued to fight for 
the continuance of the EIC. This commitment to the EIC was based on Kaye’s belief 
that the EIC had been a good agent of change and had not been directly responsible 
for the rebellion. The EIC had provided men who were dedicated to India, educated 





sub-continent. Gone were the days of the sati, infanticide, and the thugees. The EIC 
had diligently worked to remove these elements from the regions from the regions 
they controlled. It wisely balanced how to negotiate its involvement in evangelistic 
activities. Throughout his writings, Kaye documented his pride in how much Anglo-
Indian and Indian society had advanced since 1800.  For the future, Kaye argued that 
India continued to require a strong commitment from British individuals who worked 
in India. The EIC and a separate Indian army provided this commitment. Crown rule 
and army amalgamation threatened further decay of the British-Indian bond because 
of the constant interchange of personnel. Kaye did not allow the rebellion to alter his 
racial view of Indians. He continued to believe that Indians were capable of greater 
potential with the assistance of the British. Even though Kaye admitted his sorrow at 
the deaths of the Europeans during the rebellion, he still argued for reconciliation in 
India. Kaye believed the paternalistic bond between the British and Indians could be 















Primary Works   
Books:  
Ball, Charles. The history of the Indian mutiny: giving a detailed account of the Sepoy 
insurrection in India; and a concise history of the great military events which 
have tended to consolidate British Empire in Hindostan. London: London 
Print and Pub. Co., C. 1858.    
The Calcutta Monthly Journal and General Register of Occurrences Throughout the 
British Dominions in the East, Forming an Epitome of the Indian Press For 
the Year 1838. Calcutta: Samuel Smith and Company, 1839. 
Carlyle, Thomas. On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History. New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1841. 
Cooper, Frederic. The Crisis in the Punjab, From the 10th of May Until the Fall of 
Delhi. London: Smith, Elder and Co, 1858.    
Dodd, George. The History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expeditions to Persia, 
China, and Japan, 1856-79. London: Edinburgh, W. and R. Chambers, 1859.   
Duff, Alexander. The Indian rebellion; its causes and results. New York: Carter, 
1858.    
Nolan, E. H. The illustrated history of the British Empire in India and the East, from 
the earliest times to the suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny in 1859.London: 
Virtue.    
Seeley, J.R. The Expansion of England. C. 1890. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1971.  
Other:   
“History of the Indian Mutiny.” The Morning Post. London. 12 October 1878, 6. Gale 
Cengage Learning: British Library Newspapers, Part II: 1800-1900.  
“Lord Ellenborough and the Generals in Afghanistan.” The Standard. London. 10 






“Sir John William Kaye.” The York Herald. London. 20 October 1874, 7. Gale 
Cengage Learning: British Library Newspapers, Part II: 1800-1900.  
“Summary of the Morning News.” The Pall Mall Gazette. London. 19 October 
1874. Gale Cengage Learning: British Library Newspapers, Part I: 1800-
1900.  
“The Literary Examiner.” The Examiner. London. 8 November 1851. Gale Cengage 
Learning: British Library Newspapers, Part I: 1800-1900.  
“Wills and Bequests.” The Morning Post. London. 23 March 1877, 7. Gale Cengage 
Learning: British Library Newspapers, Part II: 1800-1900.   
Kaye’s Works  
Books  
Kaye, John William. The Administration of the East India Company, A History Indian 
of Progress. London: Richard Bentley, 1853.   
_____. A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-1858, Volume I, Seventh 
Edition. London: W.H. Allen & Co, 1876.    
_____. A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-1858, Volume II, New 
Edition. London: W.H. Allen & Co, 1874.   
_____. A History of the Sepoy War in India, Volume III, 1857-1858. London: , W.H. 
Allen & Co, 1876.  
_____. Christianity in India: A Historical Narrative. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 
1859.  
_____. History of the war in Afghanistan : from the unpublished letters and journals 
of political and military officers employed in Afghanistan throughout the 
entire period of British connexion with that country, Volume 1. 1851  
_____. History of the war in Afghanistan : from the unpublished letters and journals 
of political and military officers employed in Afghanistan throughout the 
entire period of British connexion with that country, Volume 1. 1852  
Articles  
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine:  
“A Familiar Epistle from Mr. John Company to Mr. John Bull.” Blackwood’s 





“A Few More Words from Mr. John Company to Mr. John Bull.” Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine 83 (March 1853): 370-384.  
“John Company’s Farewell to John Bull.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 84 
(September 1858): 338-351.  
“The Administration of India.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 88 (November 
1860,) 542- 563.  
“The Competition System and the Public Service.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine 85 (May 1859): 598-612.  
“The Demise of the Indian Army.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine  90 (July, 
1861): 100-114.  
“The Future of India and Her Army.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 86 
(November 1859): 633-646.  
“The Indian Civil Service: Its Rise and Fall.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 89 
(January 1861): 115-130.  
 “The Royal Proclamation to India.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 85 (January, 
1859): 113-126.  
“The Transition-state of our Indian Empire.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 88 
(August 1860): 241-252.  
 “What We have done for the princes of India.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 87 
(April 1860): 497-510.   
Saint Pauls, A Monthly Magazine:   
“Employment of Military Men in Civil Life, at the Expiration of One Year's 
Service.” Saint Pauls: A Monthly Magazine 6 (June1870): 237-242.   
The Cornhill Magazine:  
“One People Who Will Talk.” The Cornhill Magazine (January 1875): 24-39.  
“Success.” The Cornhill Magazine 2 (December 1860): 729-741.  
“The Career of an Indian Officer.” The Cornhill Magazine 3 (January 1861): 72-89.  





“The House that Scott Built.” The Cornhill Magazine 16 (September, 1867): 356-
369.  
“The Peace-Conflicts of India.” The Cornhill Magazine 14 (October 1866): 422-431.  
Calcutta Review:  
“Advertisement.” Calcutta Review 1 (May 1844): i-ii.   
“Alisons’ Chapters of Indian History.” Calcutta Review 4 (July 1845): 128-159.  
“Civis on Indian Affairs.” Calcutta Review 13 (April 1850): 406-441.  
“Cunningham’s History of the Sikhs.” Calcutta Review 11 (April 1849): 523-558.  
“French Pictures of the English in India.” Calcutta Review 5 (April 1846): 317-347.  
“Illustrations of Anglo- Indian Society.” Calcutta Review 8 (October 1847): 548-568.  
“Life in the Sick Room.” Calcutta Review 5 (1846): 71-101.  
“Lord Teignmouth.” Calcutta Review 1 (May 1844): 42-94.  
“Martin on the Re-Occupation of Negrais.” Calcutta Review 11 (April 1849): 257-
281.  
“Military Society in India.” Calcutta Review 22 No. 44: 429-456.  
“Mr. Thornton’s Last Volume.” Calcutta Review 4 (July 1845): 145-180.  
“Recent Military Memoirs.” Calcutta Review 14 No. 28: 265-302.  
“Scenes in a Soldier’s Life.” Calcutta Review 10 (October 1848): 496-520.  
“The Administration of Lord Ellenborough” Calcutta Review 1 (May 1844): 508-
562.  
“The Ameers of the Sindh” Calcutta Review 1 (May 1844): 217-245.   
“The English in India.” Calcutta Review 1 (May 1844): 290-336.  
“The Life and Services of General Lord Harris.” Calcutta Review 6 (October 1846): 
354-397.  





The Edinburgh Review, 1802-1900:  
“India, Persia, and Afghanistan,” The Edinburgh Review 105 (January 1857): 266-
304.  
“The Conquest of Oude,” The Edinburgh Review 107 (April 1858): 513-540.  
“The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier.” The Edinburgh 
Review 106 (October 1857): 322-355.  
The North British Review, 1844-1871:  
“Army reform — limited enlistment,” The North British Review  9 (August 1848): 
509-540.   
“Christianity in India,” The North British Review 13 (August 1850): 583-620.  
“India convalescent,” The North British Review  34 (FEBRUARY, 1861)  
“Lord Canning,” The North British Review  37 (August 1862): 222-245.  
“Our Indian Empire; Its Beginning and End.” The North British Review 34 (February 
1861): 1-32.  
“Recent Military Literature.” The North British Review 12 (February 1850): 499-
531.  
“The Annexation of Oude,” The North British Review 25 (August 1856): 515-553.  
“The Army and its Officers.” The North British Review 12 (1850): 499-531.  
“The Crisis in India,”  The North British Review  27  (August 1857): 254-276.  
“The Fall of the Sikh Empire,” The North British Review  11 (August 1849): 618-
661.  
“The Government of India — the new India Bill.” The North British Review 19 
(August 1853): 552-582.  
“The Government of the East India Company.” The North British Review 18 
(February 1853): 526-560.  






“The War on the Sutlej [in the Punjab],” The North British Review 5 (May 1846): 
246-280.  
Bentley's Miscellany :  
“Amateur Soldiering.” Bentley’s Miscellany 31 (January 1852): 220-224.  
“Jack Sepoy.” Bentley’s Miscellany  32 (July 1852): 77-88.  
“Lord Hardinge.” Bentley’s Miscellany 32 (July 1852): 452-460.  
“Modern India.” Bentley’s Miscellany 31 (April 1852): 465-473.  
“Sir Charles Napier and the Unhappy Valley.” Bentley’s Miscellany 31 (January 
1852): 82-88.  
“Sir Walter Gilbert and the Indian Army.” Bentley’s Miscellany 33 (January 1853): 
627-632.  
“Society in India.” Bentley’s Miscellany 31 (March 1852): 242-249.  
“Sworn at Highgate.” Bentley’s Miscellany 31 (January 1852): 674-681.  
“The Priesthood and the Press.” Bentley’s Miscellany 33 (January 1853): 241-248.  
Secondary Works Cited   
Bayly, C. A. and Katherine Prior. “Cornwallis, Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis 
(1738–1805).” C. A. Bayly In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
edited by H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online 
ed., edited by David Cannadine, September 2011. 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/6338 
(accessed September 8, 2016).  
Barua, Pradeep P. Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Officer Corps, 1817-1949. 
London: Praeger Publishers, 2003. 
Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi ed. Rethinking 1857. Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007.  
Bearce, George. British Attitudes Towards India, 1784-1858. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1961).   
Bolt, Christine. Victorian Attitudes to Race. London: Routledge and KeganPaul, 





Boase, G. C. “Trevelyan, Sir Charles Edward, first baronet (1807–1886).” Rev. David 
Washbrook. In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, edited by H. C. G. 
Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed., edited by David 
Cannadine, January 2016. http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/27716 (accessed November 15, 2016). 
Chakravarty, Gautam. The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.   
Chaudhuri, Sashi Bhusan. English Historical Writings on The Indian Mutiny, 1857-
1859.Calcutta: The World Press Private LTD, 1979.   
Embree, Ainslie T. “Napier, Sir Charles James (1782–1853)” Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: 
OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. David Cannadine, January 2008, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/19748 (accessed November 13, 2016). 
_______“Shore, John, first Baron Teignmouth (1751–1834).” Ainslie T. Embree In 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, edited by H. C. G. Matthew and 
Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed., edited by David Cannadine, 
May 2009. http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/25452 (accessed September 7, 2016).  
Finkelstein, David and Douglass M. Peers, eds. Negotiating India in the Nineteenth-
Century Media. New York: St. Martin’s Press LLC, 2000.  
“Genesis of the Calcutta Review.” Calcutta Review 117 (1903): 111-115.  
Herbert, Christopher. War of No Pity: The Indian Mutiny and Victorian 
Trauma. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.    
Howlett, David J. “Hardinge, Henry, first Viscount Hardinge of Lahore (1785–
1856).” David J. Howlett In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, edited 
by H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed., 
edited by David Cannadine, January 2013. http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/12271 (accessed September 8, 2016)  
British Library. “Indian Officers and Other Ranks.” 
http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/india/indiaofficerecordsfamilyhi
story/occupations/indianofficersandotherranks/indianofficers.html (Accessed 
November 17, 2016). 
Koditschek, Theodore. Liberalism, Imperialism, and the Historical Imagination: 
Nineteenth-Century Visions of a Greater Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge 





Levine, Philippa. The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset. London: Pearsons Longman, 
2007. 
Lindhol, Charles. “Paradigms of Society: A Critique of Theories of Caste among 
Indian Muslims." European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes De 
Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie 26, no. 1 (1985): 131-41. 
http://www.jstor.org.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/stable/23999296. 
Lloyd, E. M. “Reed, Sir Thomas (1796–1883).” Rev. James Lunt. In Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, edited by H. C. G. Matthew and Brian 
Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed., edited by David Cannadine, 2004. 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/23277 (accessed November 14, 2016). 
Lorimer, Douglass. Colour, Class and the Victorians: English Attitudes to the Negro 
in the Mid-Nineteenth Century. New York: Holmsand Meier Publishers, 
1978.   
Marshall, P. J.. “Hastings, Warren (1732–1818).” P. J. Marshall In Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, edited by H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. 
Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed., edited by David Cannadine, October 
2008. http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/12587 (accessed September 7, 2016).  
Metcalf, Thomas R.. “Canning, Charles John, Earl Canning (1812–1862).” Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, edited by H. C. G. Matthew and Brian 
Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed., edited by David Cannadine, 
January 2008. http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/4554 (accessed September 6, 2016).  
Moreman, T. R.. “Lawrence, Sir Henry Montgomery(1806–1857).” Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, online ed., edited by David Cannadine. 
Oxford: OUP, 2004. http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/16179 (accessed November 13, 2016). 
Peers, Douglas M.. “Bentinck, Lord William Henry Cavendish- (1774–1839).” 
Douglas M. Peers In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, edited by H. 
C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed., edited by 
David Cannadine, October 2009. http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/2161 (accessed December 13, 2016). 
_________. “There is Nothing More Poetical than War”: Romanticism, Orientalism, 
and Militarism in J.W. Kaye’s Narratives of the Conquest of India  in Imperial 
Co-Histories: National Identities and the British Colonial Press, Julie F. 





Prior, Katherine. “Astell , William (1774–1847),” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Bio1978graphy, online ed., ed. David Cannadine, Oxford: OUP, 2004, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/815 
(accessed November 13, 2016). 
 
Ramachandra, GP. “The Outbreak of the First Anglo-Burmese War.” Journal of the 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 51, no.2 (1978): 69-99. 
Rapson, E. J. “Kaye, SireJohn William (1814-1876), Military Historian” Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2016.   
Sharma, Gautam. Indian Army Through the Ages. London: Allied Publishers Private 
Limited, 1966. 
Singh, Navtej, ed. Rethinking 1857 And The Punjab. Patalia, India: Punjabi 
University, 2008.   
Sing, Nihar Nandan. British Historiography on British Rule in India: The Life and 
Writings of Sir John William Kaye, 1814-1876.New Delhi: Janaki 
Prakashan,1986.   
Steele, David. “Law, Edward, first earl of Ellenborough (1790–1871).” David Steele 
In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, edited by H. C. G. Matthew and 
Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed., edited by David Cannadine, 
January 2011. http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/16143 (accessed September 8, 2016).  
Stocking, George. Victorian Anthropology. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 
1987.   
Sweetman, John. “Barnard, Sir Henry William (1798–1857).” Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, edited by H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: 
OUP, 2004. Online ed., edited by David Cannadine, January 2009. 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/view/article/1452 
(accessed November 14, 2016). 
Sundaram, Chandar S. “Swords Trembling in their Scabbards: The Changing Status 
of Indian Officers in the Indian Army, 1757-1947.” Journal of Military 
History 80, no 3 (July 2016): 881-883. Historical Abstracts with Full Text. 
Wagner, Kim. The Great Fear of 1857:Rumours,Conspiricesand the Making of the 
Indian Uprising. Whitney: Peter Lang, 2010.   
West, Shearer. The Victorians and Race. Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing 





Yadav, K.C. “Interpreting 1857: A Cast Study,” in Rethinking 1857, Sabyasachi 
Bhattacharya, ed. Delhi: Chaman Enterprises, 2007.  
